Pacific Coast Law Journal. VOL. 2. SEPTEMBER 7, 1878. No. 2. Current Topics. THE Clerk of the Supreme Court is sending out the following notice to attorneys: "You will please take notice that the Calendar of this Court for the October Term, at Los Angeles, will be made up on the 21st day of September, and will consist of all cases from the counties of Santa Barbara, Ventura, Kern, Inyo, San Bernardino, San Diego, and Los Angeles. The Calendar for the November Term, at Sacramento, will be made up on the 19th day of October, and will consist of cases from the counties of Sacramento, Yolo, El Dorado, Alpine, Amador, Placer, Nevada, Yuba, Sierra, Sutter, Tehama, Colusa, Butte, Plumas, Shasta, Siskiyou, Modoc, Lassen, and Trinity. Cases from other counties may be placed on either Calendar by stipulation, said stipulation to be filed with the Clerk, at his office in San Francisco, on or before the time above mentioned for the making up of the respective Calendars. By order of the Chief Justice." HUDSON VS. IRWIN, an unwritten opinion of our Supreme Court, made August 13, 1878, was an action to quiet title. The case was before the court before, and it will be found reported in 50 Cal. 450. The facts are all set out fully in that opinion. The court then reversed the judgment of the court below for an error in not allowing proof to be made by the defendant of a certain (Peabody) survey. This last trial of the case was before a jury, and they returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff asked for a new trial, and, being denied, appealed. He alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Defendants claim that the evidence was sufficient, and also invoke the rule laid down in Kile vs. Tubbs (32 Cal. 339), that a new trial will not be granted, even where the verdict is against the weight of evidence, if there be some evidence to support the verdict. Affirmed. Thomas & Pressley, for plaintiff. Haight & Taylor, for defendants. YOUNG VS. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (an unwritten opinion), was an action brought by the plaintiff to recover $14,913 90 paid the defendant for lease of certain lots sold under Ordinance No. 533 at public auction. The plaintiff claims that the defendant had no authority to sell the same, and relying on the representations of the defendant as to the validity of the ordinance, and that the defendant had a right to sell said leases, paid to the defendant the amount above set forth. He alleges fraud on the part of the city, and seeks to recover the money paid, which the city refuses to return. The defendant denies the complaint, and pleads the Statute of Limitations, and also claims that the contract was a sale. The plaintiff says the Statute of Limitations will not apply in this case on account of the fraudulent acts of the defendant, he having brought his action within six months after the discovery of the fraud. Also that the statute will not apply, because of the mistake on the part of the plaintiff. The court below gave judgment for the defendant, and denied a motion for a new trial. Judgment and order affirmed. W. C. Burnett, for defendant. Supreme Court of California. JULY TERM. [No. 6,025.] [Filed August 26, 1878.] YBARRA, RESPONDENT, VS. LORENZANA, APPELLANT. DEEDS MADE IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS-EFFECT OF AS TO GRANTOR.-Where the purpose of a deed is not only to secure the grantee in the payment of a debt due to him, but also to invest him with the legal title, in order that the creditors of the grantor might be hindered in the collection of their debts, such a conveyance is valid as against the grantor, and he is estopped from showing that it was intended as a mortgage. Appeal from the Seventeenth District Court, Los Angeles County. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that on July 6, 1875, he borrowed from the defendant a sum of money, and executed a mortgage on certain property to secure the loan; that on August 2, 1876, he made a deed in fee simple to the defendant in lieu of the mortgage, at the defendant's solicitation, which deed was to operate as a mortgage and be subject to redemption; that the plaintiff has offered to repay the money loaned him and demanded a reconveyance of the premises, and that the defendant refused to accept the money, and refused to reconvey, and prays that the deed be held and decreed to be a mortgage. The defendants deny that the deed was intended to operate as a mortgage. The case was referred to the Court Commissioner to take testimony and report findings and conclusions of law and a judgment thereon, and he filed the following findings: That on July 19, 1876, the plaintiff executed to the defendant a deed of conveyance of the premises and the mortgage was canceled. That on August 2, 1876, the plaintiff executed another deed to the defendant for the purpose only of correcting the description of the premises. That the deed of July 16th was in fact a mortgage given for the purpose of continuing the security first given, and that the deed of August 2d was of the same character. As conclusions of law finds that the plaintiff is entitled to a reconveyance upon the payment of the amount due on said equitable mortgage with interest, etc. Defendants appeal. Thom & Ross, for appellants. Plaintiff, according to his own sworn and repeated statements, having made the deeds for the purpose of avoiding the payment of a claim against him, will not be heard by a court of equity to say the deeds were intended as mortgages. Equity will not relieve him from the consequences of his own fraudulent conduct. (1 Story Eq. Juris., Sec. 61, p 69; 3 Paige, ch. 154; 12 Nevada, 38; 11 Paige, ch. 349; 2 Johns. Cas. 417.) V. E. Howard, for respondent. No creditor complains, as plaintiff owed no debt, except a judgment which was recorded and was a prior lien on the property in controversy. If the deed is fraudulent and void the proper judgment is that the deed be canceled. (41 Cal. 84.) PER CURIAM. The findings are attacked on the ground that it appears by the evidence that the plaintiff executed the deeds of July 19th and August 2d, respectively, for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. The plaintiff testifying in his own behalf (fol. 81) stated as follows: "The paper (the conveyance of July 19th) was made because parties wanted me to pay more than was justly due them, and, therefore, I went and made this conveyance of this piece of land to Mr. Lorenzana, to save it from being taken from me to satisfy an unjust debt." Again (fol. 83) he testified as follows: "I executed this deed (the deed of Aug. 2d) because I was afraid they would attach the property. I executed it for the purpose of saving him for the payment of the money I owed him (Lorenzana), and the land." The deed of August 2d was executed for the purpose of correcting a mistake in the description in the boundaries of the land conveyed by the deed of July 19th, and the complaint was filed for the purpose of obtaining a decree, declaring the conveyance of August 2d to have been a mortgage merely, and not an absolute deed, as it purports, on its face, to be. The answer denied that the deed in question was intended as a mortgage. The judgment given below was that this deed was a mortgage merely, and that the plaintiff be allowed to redeem it, etc. As seen already, the evidence given by the plaintiff himself, when testifying as a witness in the cause, was to the effect that the purpose of the conveyance was not only to secure the defendant Lorenzana in the payment of the debt due to him, but also to invest him with the legal title in order that the creditors of the grantor, plaintiff here, might be hindered in the collection of their debts against the plaintiff. Such a conveyance, while subject, of course, to the attack of the creditors, is valid as against the grantor. It is a settled principle of law that the grantor, in a deed made for the purpose of defrauding, hindering, or delaying his creditors, can not be relieved against its operation. As to him it is valid. The rule in this respect is one common to courts of law and equity, and is expressed in the maxim, "In pari delicto melior est conditio defendentis." (1 Story Eq. Jur., 61.) Judgment and order denying a new trial reversed, and cause remanded. [No. 10,337.] [Filed August 26, 1878.] PEOPLE vs. VAN DELEER. CRIMINAL LAW-SECTION 216 PENAL CODE CONSTRUED-POISONOUS AND NOXIOUS SUBSTANCES-What are.-A poison is any substance which, when applied to the body externally, or in any way introduced into the system, without |