those who wish for a familiar aid in investigating the Antiquities of our Country. Yours, &c. J. N. BREWER.

OBSERVATIONS AND INQUIRIES CONCERNING ARCHITECTURE. (Continued from p. 224.)

On the Origin and Construction of Spires, and of Storied Steeples.

NE of the most beautiful orna

tall and elegant Spire. The precise origin of this great addition to an ecclesiastical building is still somewhat obscure, notwithstanding the multiplied researches of Antiquaries. Long before the construction of such lofty Spires made of stone, as those of Salisbury, Norwich, and Chichester, the Saxons are said, by many writers, to have made Spires of wood. I can find no distinct and authentic description of these antient Spires, and their existence contradicts the probable origin of Spires given by many ingenious writers on architecture, namely, that after the construction of pinnacles at the corners of the square towers, the idea suggested itself of erecting one large pinnacle in the middle, and that this in time was perfected, and became the tail and tapering Spire*, "ascending towards Heaven," to use the expressions of a skilful writer on architecture, "elevating the mind of the devout spectator to the contemplation of the Divine Religion he professed t."

That great prototype of Spires, which ascends from the tower of Salisbury Cathedral, is clearly ascertained to have been achieved in the latter end of the 13th century. The whole height from the ground to the vane on the summit is 410 feet. Whether or no this was really the first elevated Spire ever placed on a Christian church, it was at all events the first of any beauty and magnitude of which we have a correct account. And it seems to have inspired the architects of other buildings with a very general desire of emulating its form and beauties. People became so pleased with this new ornament, that during the 14th century lofty * See Milner's Eccles. Architecture,

p. 105.

See Dallaway on English Architecture, p. 125.

Spires were erected on most of the principal churches in England.

That there were Spires on buildings of Norman form, before that of Salisbury was built, cannot be doubted; some of them bear the date of nearly. 200 years before it; but these were very inferior in size and elegance of construction to the high Spires superadded at a later period to edifices built in the Pointed Style of Architecture, vulgarly and erroneously

The rage for Spires, moreover, caused Architects to place them on the towers of old edifices of Saxon and Norman construction; and in some cases new towers were added to old churches in order to place Spires on them.

As fashions, when begun in the capital, are soon imitated in the country, so the Spires placed on the great Abbeys and Cathedrals were shortly afterwards extended to smaller buildings: And country village churches in many counties of England became topped with Spires. The same thing took place in Holland, Germany, and part of France. But the Spires on the Continent are not nearly so elegant in form as those of England; they have frequently large bulging balls swelling out in the middle, or near to the top of the Spire, and are in other respects irregularly built. This circumstance of dissimilarity of form induces me to think that Spires are not so eutirely of British origin as some writers imagine, and inclines me to the opinion of others, who suppose that the contemporary Spires of the continental churches of the 14th century were partly imitations of very old ones made of wood in the earliest ages of Christianity. Large steeples were erected in Germany very early, but their forms were compa ratively inelegant, and bore but an imperfect resemblance to our Spires. Many of these may have been the prototypes of small village Spires in that country and in Holland, just as our cathedrals set the fashions for England. Among these early steeples of Germany may be reckoned the old tower of Strasbourg, said to be begun by Clovis about the year 510. But these were not Spires, according to our present acceptation of that word. That the towers for bells were common in the churches of

France

France and England, and also in other parts of Europe, as early as the 7th or 8th centuries, is well known *; and in many instances these towers had a finish at the top like an aukward low Spire. In other cases they consisted of successively smaller and smaller stories, like that at Antwerp, and like many of the Towers of Dutch and Flemish Churches. At how early a period these sort of Steeples were first raised is hardly known, but they were made in the greatest perfection about and after the thirteenth century. Octangular Louvres and Lanterns built of wood, form one feature of this style of building; they are frequently found on the Towers of the Low Countries; and, what is very remarkable, similar Buildings are seen in the low and fenny Countries of England, even where the Flemings have never resided. This circumstance of buildings, as well as the similarity of customs in general, which exists between Flanders, Holland, the Lincolnshire fens, and the Lowlands of Scotland, will be spoken of hereafter.

Instances of the style of building I allude to, constructed about or after the 18th centuries, may be deduced from the Ouder Kirk at Amsterdam, the Churches of Harlaem, the Tower of St. Martin's at Utrecht, the Lantern Tower at Ely, the Maison de Ville at Calais, and many others. Buildings on a larger and more beautiful scale, but of similar peculiarity of construction, we may view in the Steeple of the Cathedral of Antwerp, that of Boston Church in Lincolnshire, the Tower of the Stadthouse at Brussels, &c. These, though made of more solid materials, have, nevertheless, a certain resemblance to those alluded to above. These will be more fully treated of in the Section on Flemish Buildings. I have instanced them in this digression merely to shew that there is another kind of Steeple frequently confounded with the true Spire, but which had a different origin, gave birth to a different sort of minor edifices, and which one might almost say, constituted an essentially distinct order of Steeples, of which there were innumerable species. These different kinds of Architecture have been too much confounded and mixed together in the same building by mo

See Chapter on Bells.

dern innovators, who misunderstood the styles they pretended to imitate in the reparation of ancient edifices.

Village Spires in England proceeded from the larger sort on the Cathe drals, while only a few of precisely similar construction appear on the Continent and in Scotland. Many of these may have been imitations of the English, since the majority of Continental Steeples have essentially different external forms. Steeples of both kinds, that is, the real Spires, and those which consist of successively smaller stories, have, besides the peculiarities of each individual building, certain generic forms in particular districts, according to the inhabitants and architects thereof; hence we can distinguish between those of the different counties of England, the different provinces of the Netherlands, and the different states of Germany.

But I have dwelt particularly on the twofold distinction into the enlarged middle Pinnacle or SPIRE, and the STORIED STEEPLE, as having a different origin. I shall endeavour to trace out the features of each of them in the course of the following observations on particular buildings and their dates:-the task will be easier while we examine such pure and elegant edifices as Salisbury and Chichester Cathedrals, as examples of Spires, and the Cathedral of Antwerp as a specimen of the Storied Steeple, than it will be when we grope through the fanciful edifices and mixed architecture of the Pays Bas, in order to illustrate their origin and founders.

(To be continued.)

On the Extent of the Historic Relation in discovering and marshalling the Subjects of Human Knowledge. (Continued from vol. LXXXVIII. ii, 593.)

H

OW much of our ordinary conversation is historical-of our trains of thought! Not to mention that the external world is a standing phenomenon, whose parts, nature, and circumstances we are constantly exof man in the meanwhile, the proploring-not to mention the agency of society-the reception of any gress new idea or discovery-we are incescessantly watching and communicating the changes and developement of our individual faculties and constitutions, mental and physical-from infancy to manhood, to the tombmutually noting the accidents we all

meet

meet with, or are liable to; our hopes and fears as to new occurrences, whether foreign or national, political or civil, of family or personal concerndown even to the calendar of the weather, and seasons of the year. All these shew how intimate a relation is the historical one.

The meeting and parting salutation in all parts of the world, (in spite of the Judicrous turn given to it in the Spectator by the ambassador from Bantam : and though without any jesting, there may be commonly great indifference reciprocally on both sides-whether the other" does well," and afterwards of his "faring well:") still this custom of counterfeited kindness, what principle is it founded on, other than the one we are here noticing? All conversation relates to the making up in our minds some incident, or event, with its actor, catastrophe, its class, and circumstances-its chronology, and geography; and those who may not feel for the misery or happiness of others, may be curious to know of both.

In the above matter of civil conversation, we as often presume the curiosity of the hearer-and we spontaneously prevent him, or relate without putting him to the trouble of formally exhibiting these questions. Nay, the very resisting or disappointing the curiosity of others, by a politic dissembling, turns upon the same principle. It is in the due management of this curiosity, that not only a good politician, but all popular writers (of novels, for instance, or fictitious history) gratify it so as to leave ever a something for it to hang upon, and to expect.

How much in our daily life are we governed by custom and babit! So in the forms of doing business-in carrying on any system or plan, we do it in a chain-where we broke off determines the continuation. So in a train of ideas, any thing may suggest a train of thought-but when it 18 once suggested, it naturally falls into an historical series.

So in ordering any question, in the choice of any argument, or topicin the deliberation what course of conduct to pursue commonly, the answer to the question "Who is he that propounds this? What are his views and intentions-cuibono?”—the answer to this clears up every thing, and determines the mind, in its reso

lution. The mere historical statement of almost any question-after Dr. Johnson's manner, supersedes all further debate, or doubt; and it stands resolved.

And here I will attempt, notwithstanding the novelty of it, to define WIT, which has never yet been satisfactorily explained. It is singular enough that we must have recourse to Mathematicians to aid us towards a definition of wit: but see whether they do not. Wit is the producing intuitively any medium to shew that some inference or presumption leads to absurdity. It is exactly analogous to those propositions in Euclid which disprove a thing by admitting it ad absurdum. In the same way, irony, humour, mimicry, the drollery of young children, farcical characters, buffoonery, hoaxes, practical jokes ; a refined and exquisite sarcasm; a genuine Irish bull, not the common one where the expression is inconsistent without the speaker being aware of it in time, but that which wraps up various meanings, so as to give a good-natured slap on the face, as if by mistake, and under the guise of self-contradiction: and, last of all, the common punning, mere verbal wit(which to lawyers and scholars is often an argumentum ad hominem)— all these modes of wit, do by an unexpected apposition of two or more ideas, apparently (but not historically) related and suddenly contrasted together, shew that the particular relation insisted on, or purpose aimed at, is absurd, incompatible with itself, or out of the character it assumes, not accordant with the key set upor, in short, not strictly and correctly true. To define again what is absurdity itself, and why it makes us smile or laugh, is as impossible as to define the simplest ideas we have. It is essential to wit, (which is ever employed to prove a negative) to be sudden like a flash-ever lying on the surface; ready, prompt, and intuitive. It is, undoubtedly, a mode of proof: but subject to a higher test. It is not itself the ultimate test, as Lord Shaftesbury would have it. However, we are not, here, speaking of the abuse and petulant presumption of wit, but only of the rational use of it. It is a mode of illustration, shewing a gap or interval in the historical chain of our ideas, made apparent in something we have looked,

said, intended, or done. The sense of ridicule, (as it has been very unphilosophically called) must ever be in strict subordination to the reasoning faculty, and in awe of Religion. For nothing can be more heteroge neous and irreconcileable than real absurdity and the highest of all truth. Why is wit so like madness? It is impossible to define madness; for we know not the nature of mind subjected to it, nor of the union between body and mind; and madness is partly a physical disorganization. All we know is, that in madness there is a chasin in the historical relation of our ideas (something like the dream of a somnambulant): many or all of the ideas, on both sides of the chasm, are connected in their natural order, as in other minds. But there is a frightful interval between, of which the patient is unconscious: for the unity of the mind is gone, or paralysed for a time. Ordinary dreaming is somewhat analogous to this: so the delirium of a fever, and the paroxysms of all the violent passions. The nature of Wit is to shew incoherence and incongruity: and it is said that the habit of searching after, and dwelling upon such relations, may ultimately disorganise the reasoning power itself by which we perceive truth-that is, things in their historical order.

But to return: so, the disposition, manners, character, and physiognomy, are nothing but the historical stamp or fixed mark of estimation given to us by our country, our extraction, our birth, education, our condition and habits-stamped in characters legible, almost intuitively, to any observer.

Why is power so universal a pas sion with nations and individuals? It is not for vanity only, but for safety and existence; to have the means to act some part, and not to be trampled under foot, and crushed to atoms in the hurry, noise, confusion, and dust of this busy scene. The very object, or purpose of every man's life, what is it? First, following out the tendencies given him by his parents, his public instructors, and above all, by the divine Teacher, to act-to continue his race, by a family; to communicate the knowledge of truth, human and divine, to that family; to build up some monument of his race, pedigree, or of his own

achievements; he records, with the assistance of heraldry, his origin; he emblazons his arms and motto, (or the proverb of his life) hoping that his children may survive him-thus anxious to have a renewal of his corporeal being, life, and actions; and if that is denied him-at least-to leave some monument in marble behind, clinging to existence in the memory of men as long as possible! All our plans and speculations tend to practice and action-to furnish our contingent in the great account of all things.

By what means do we know that we are accountable beings? Revelation, and thence conscience, incessantly warn us that a register is kept, as a counterpart or voucher to the great reckoning we must all give of every thought and speculationdisposition, passion, affection, of every habit, whether domestic, religious, or political, of our tastes and very amusements; but doubly and triply are we accountable for our words and actions: for besides other reasons, (and that their effects have external evidence, as an historical document of themselves) these are within the ken and jurisdiction of HUMAN tribunals.

What is fortune, commonly said to be the mistress of this world?-fortune, which fixes our condition, and which distributes in various orders and proportions, the gifts of nature and society, whether mental or corporeal; which makes us be born in such a family, province, communitywith more or less of inheritance, of friends, patronage, inherited or acquired, alliances by marriage, or other adventitious advantage. We call this last a lottery, and all the rest, lot or chance: which should rather be called Providence, as we are taught by the analogies of history.

But we must define history, so as not to seem playing upon words. "History is the building up of truth." And as truth is made up of facts and principles, more or less abstract and elementary, it is the putting these together in a system, so as to make, from consistent parts, one consistent whole.

For what is termed the philosophy of mind and body, is nothing more than the preparing our implements, terms, expressions, our figures and calculations; the index, precis, result,

and