cific difpofitions. Such profeffions have been repeatedly held out by all thofe who have fucceffively directed the refources of France to the deftruction of Europe! and whom the prefent rulers have declared to have been all from the beginning, and uniformly, incapable of maintaining the relations of amity and peace. Greatly, indeed, will his majefty rejoice whenever it fhall appear that the danger to which his own dominions, and thofe of his allies, have been fo long expofed has really ceafed; whenever he fhall be fatisfied that the neceffity of refiftance is at an end that after the experience of fo many years of crimes and miferies, better principles have ultimately prevailed in France; and that all the gigantic projects of ambition, and all the restless schemes of deftruction which have endangered the very existence of civil fociety, have, at length, been finally relinquifhed: -but the conviction of fuch a change, however agreeable to his majefty's wishes, can refult only from experience, and from the evidence of facts. The best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence, would be the restoration of that line of princes which for fo many centuries maintained the French nation in profperity at home, and in confideration and refpect abroad :-such an event would at once have removed, and will at any time remove, all obftacles in the way of negociation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient territory, and it would give to all the other nations of Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that fecurity which they are now compelled to feek by other means. But, defirable as fuch an event must be both to France and to the world, it is not to this mode exclufively that his majefty limits the poffibility of fecure and folid pacifica tion. His majesty makes no claim to prescribe to France what shall be the form of her government, or in whofe hands fhe fhall veft the authority neceffary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. His majefty looks only to the fecurity of his own dominions and thofe of his allies, and to the general fafety of Europe. Whenever he fhall judge that fuch fecurity can in any manner be attained, as refulting either from the internal fituation of that country, from whofe internal fituation the danger has arifen, or from fuch other circumstances of whatever nature as may produce the fame end, his majefty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his allies the means of immediate and general pacification. Unhappily no fuch fecurity hitherto exifts; no fufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reafonable ground by which to judge of its ftability. In this fituation it can for the prefent only remain for his majefty to purfue, in conjunction with other powers, thofe exertions of juft and defenfive war, which his regard to the happiness of his fubjects will never permit him either to continue beyond the neceffity in which they originated, or to terminate on any other grounds than fuch as may best contribute to the fecure enjoyment of their tranquillity, their conftitution, and their independence. Grenville, Downing-ftreet, Jan. 4, 1800. Affairs, &c. at Paris. Letter from the Minifter for Foreign MY LORD, Affairs at Paris to Lord Grenville. Paris 24 Nivofe, 8th Year, (Jan. 14, 1800.) I lost no time in laying before the firft conful of the republic the official note, under date of the 14th Ni vofe, which you tranfmitted to me; and I am charged to forward the anfwer, equally official, which you will find annexed. Receive, my lord, the affurance of my high confideration. (Signed) Ch. Mau. Talleyrand, Minifter for Foreign Affairs at London. NOTE. The official note, under date the 14th Nivofe, the 8th year, addreffed by the minister of his Britannic majefty, having been laid before the first conful of the French republic, he obferved with furprife, that it refted upon an opinion which is not exact refpecting the origin and confequences of the prefent war. Very far from its being France which provoked it, fhe had, it must be remembered, from the commencement of her revolution, folemnly proclaimed her love of peace and her difinclina. tion to conquefts, her refpect for the independence of all governments: and it is not to be doubted that, occupied at that time entirely with her own internal affairs, the would have avoided taking part in thofe of Eu rope, and would have remained faithful to her declarations. But from an oppofite difpofition, as foon as the French revolution had broken out, almost all Europe entered into a league fór its deftruction. The aggreffion was real, long time before it was public; internal refiltance was excited; its opponents were favourably received; their extravagant declamations were fupported; the French nation was infulted in the perfon of its agents; and England fet particularly this example by the difmiffal of the minilter accredited to her. Finally, France was, in fact, attacked in her independence, in her honour, and in her fafety, long time before the war was de clared. Thus it is to the projects of fub- jection, diffolution, and difmemberment, which were prepared against her, and the execution of which was feveral times attempted and purfued, that France has a right to impute the evils which fhe has fuffered, and thofe which have afflicted Europe. Such projects, for a long time without example, with refpect to fo powerful a nation, could not fail to bring on the moft fatal confequences.' Affailed on all fides, the republic could not but extend univerfally the efforts of her defence, and it is only for the maintenance of her own independence that he has made ufe of thofe means which the poffeffed, in her own ftrength and the courage of her citizens. As long as the faw that her enemies obftinately refused to recognife her rights, the counted only upon the energy of her refist. ance; but as foon as they were oblig. ed to abandon the hope of invafion, fhe fought for means of conciliation, and manifefted pacific intentions; and if thefe have not been efficacious; if, in the midst of the critical circumftances of her internal fituation, which the revolution and the war have fucceffively brought on, the former depolitaries of the executive authority in France have not always fhewn as much moderation as the nation itself has thewn courage, it mu above all be imputed to the fatal and perfevering animofity with which the refources of England have been lavished to accomplish the ruin of France. But if the withes of his Britannic majesty (in conformity with his affurances) are, in unifon with those of the French republic, for the reeftablishment of peace, why, instead of attempting the apology of the war, fhould not attention rather be paid to the means of terminating it? And what obftacle can prevent a mutual understanding, of which the utility is reciprocal, and is felt, efpecially when the first conful of the republic has perfonally given so many e proofs 344 this majefty's conduct) not on iy in themfelves utterly groundlefs, Ca contradicted both by the interevidence of the tranfactions to they relate, and alfo by the als telimony (given at the time) government of France itfelf. With refpect to the object of the e, his majefty can only refer to wer which he has already given. has explained, without referve, bitacles which, in his judgment, de at the prefent moment all f advantage from negociation. inducements to treat, which lied upon in the French official the perfonal difpofitions which id to prevail for the conclufion ace, and for the future obferof treaties; the power of inthe effect of thofe difpofitions, fing them to exift; and the dity of the fyftem newly establishafter fo rapid a fucceffion of retions; all thefe are points which n be known only from that teft to ich his majefty has already referred m-the refult of experience, and he evidence of facts. With that fincerity and plainnefs which his anxiety for the re-eftablishment of peace indifpenfably rel quired, his majefty has pointed out to France the fureft and speedieft means for the attainment of that great object. But he has declared in terms equally explicit, and with the fame fincerity, that he entertains no defire to prefcribe to a foreign nation the form of its government; that he looks only to the fecurity of his own dominions and of Europe; and that whenever that effential object can, in his judgment, be, in any manner whatever, fufficiently provided for, he will eagerly concert with his allies the means of immediate and joint negociation for the re-establishment of general tranquillity. To thefe declarations his majefty fteadily adheres, and it is only on the grounds thus ftated, that his regard to the fafety of his fubjects will fuffer him to renounce that fyftem of vigorous defence, to which, under the favour of Providence, his kingdoms owe the fecurity of thofe bleffings which they now enjoy. (Signed) Grenville. MEMOIRS OF RICHARD BRINSLEY SHERIDAN, ESQ. T has been juftly remarked by Dr Johnson that, "many things, ich are falfe, are tranfmitted from ook to book, and gain credit in the orld." This obfervation may be plied to the different memoirs of vir Sheridan, which have been pub hed. f the and frequently mislead even friends of the perfon, whofe memoir is the fubject of perufal. But it is the duty of a biographer to be accurate in the moft trivial circumstances, which he has occafion to relate, or to omit them altogether. Richard Brinfley Sheridan, is the third fon of Mr Thomas Sheridan, celebrated as an actor, eminent for his fkill in elocution, and entitled to the gratitude of the public for his judi- : cious and indefatigable exertions to improve the fyftem of education in this country. His works, with the exception of fome plays, which he altered, and the Life of Dean Swift, which he prepared for publication, in Q2 The groffeft errors acquire a fort currency among the majority of readers, who have not had an opportunity, or perhaps an inclination, to investigate the accuracy of circumftances, that feem of trifling moment. They are confidered as unquestionable facts by fucceeding biographers, and given to the public with embellifhments which ftrengthen deception, general, proofs of his eagerness to put an end to the calamities of war, and of his difpofition to maintain the rigid obfervance of all treaties concluded? The firft conful of the republic could not doubt that his Britannic majefty recognised the right of na. tions to chufe the form of their government, fince it is from the exercife of this right that he holds his crown; but he has been unable to comprehend how to this fundamental principle, upon which refts the exiftence of political focieties, the minifter of his majefty could annex infinuations which tend to an interference in the internal affairs of the republic, and which are no lefs inju. rious to the French nation and to its government, than it would be to England and to his majefty, if a fort of invitation were held out in favour of that republican government, of which England adopted the forms in the middle of the last century, or an exhortation to recal to the throne that family whom their birth had placed there, and whom a revolution compelled to defcend from it. If at periods, not far diftant, when the conftitutional fyftem of the republic prefented neither the ftrength nor the folidity which it it contains at prefent, his Britannic majefty thought himself enabled to invite a negociation and pacific conferences; how is it poffible that he should not be eager to renew negociations to which the prefent and reciproca! fituation of affairs promifes a rapid progrefs? On every fide, the voice of nations and of humanity implores the conclufion of a war, marked already by fuch great calamities, and the prolongation of which threatens Europe with an univerfal convulfion and irremediable evils. It is, therefore, to put a flop to the course of these calamities, or in or der that their terrible confequences may be reproached to thofe only who fhall have provoked them, that the first conful of the French republic propofes to put an immediate end to hoftilities, by agreeing to a fufpenfion of arms, and naming plenipotentiaries on each fide, who should repair to Dunkirk, or any other town as advantageously fituated for the quickness of the refpective communications, and who fhall apply themselves without delay to effect the re-establishment of peace and good understanding between the French republic and England. The first conful offers to give the paffports which may be neceffary for this purpose. (Signed) Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. Paris, 24th Nivofe, (14th Jan. 1800,) 8th year of the French Republic. Letter from Lord Grenville to the Minifter for Foreign Affairs at Paris. SIR, Downing Street, Jan. 20, 1800. I have the honour to inclose to you the answer which his majesty has directed me to return to the official note which you tranfmitted to me. I have the honour to be, with high confideration, Sir, Your moft obedient humble fervant, (Signed) Grenville. To the Minifter for Foreign Af fairs, &c. at Paris. Note. The official note tranfmitted by the minifter for foreign affairs in France, and received by the underfigned on the 18th int. has been laid before the king. His majelly cannot forbear expreffing the concern with which he obferves in that note, that the unprovoked aggreffions of France, the fole cause and origin of the war, are fyftematically defended by her prefent ruler under the fame injurious pretences by which they were origin. ally attempted to be difguifed. His majefty will not enter into the refutation of allegations now universally exploded, and (in fo far as they re Spect ₹ |