that he has made the office of clerk a subject of private negotiation between men to whom he is under personal obligation, and is endeavoring to cancel those debts by a barter of office (Robbins v. Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. [Ky.] 540); writing of a person that he is about to commence an action for a libel, but that he will not like to bring it to trial in a particular county because he is known there (Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 347); stating, in the criticism of a book, that the motives of the author are dishonorable or disreputable (Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434); imputing to a person the want of official integrity, and charging that in his official capacity he was induced by a pecuniary or valuable consideration to act in a particular manner upon matters which came before him (Wilson v. Noonan, 23 Wis. 105); publishing of a candidate that he bartered a public improvement in which his constituency were interested for the charter of a bank to himself and his associates, that if elected he will be an unfaithful representative, and that he will, by criminal indifference or treachery, delay or defeat such improvement, in order to accomplish selfish, sinister and dishonest purposes (Powers v. Dubois, 17 Wend. 63); writing of a man, "I look upon him as a rascal, and have watched him for many years" (Williams v. Karnes, 4 Humph. [Tenn.] 9); or of a person that he is thought no more of than a horse thief and counterfeiter (Nelson v. Musgrave, 10 Mo. 648); publishing of a juror that he agreed with another juror to rest the determination of the amount of damages in a case under their consideration on a game of draughts (Com. v. Wright, 1 Cush. 46); or of a person, that he refused to correct the statement of a witness who was testifying before a magistrate, when he knew that it was not true (Coombs v. Rose, 8 Blackf. [Ind.] 155); charging another with knowingly assisting in a swindling enterprise (Williams v. Godkin, 5 Daly [N. Y.], 499); or a politician, that, influenced by a bribe, he offered a resolution at a nominating convention that no nomination of a candidate for a particular office should be made (Hand v. Winton, 38 N. J. Law, 122); falsely and maliciously publishing of a person that he is living in poverty and extreme destitution. Moffatt v. Cauldwell, 5 T. & C. (N. Y. Sup.) 256; S. C., 3 Hun, 26.

Where a letter was addressed to the wife of another man, insinuating that she had acted libidinously toward him, had invited him to an adulterous intercourse with her, and had sought opportunities to effect it; and it appeared that the letter was written and sent with intent to abuse and insult her, to seduce her affections from her husband, entice her to commit adultery, and to bring her into hatred and contempt; it was held that it constituted a libel. State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266. A statement in a newspaper that a ship, of which the plaintiff was owner

and master, and which he had advertised for a voyage, was not a seaworthy ship, and that Jews had bought her to take out convicts, was held to be a libel for which an action might be maintained, without proving malice or alleging special damage. Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. (N. S.) 212; S. C., 5 id. 66. A publication which characterizes a verdict as infamous, and states that the writer cannot express the contempt which should be felt for those twelve men who have thus not only offended public opinion, but have done injustice to their oaths, is a libel on the jurors individually. Byers v. Martin, 2 Col. 605.

The general rule is, that it is libelous per se, to impute to a person in his official capacity, profession, trade, or business, any kind of fraud, dishonesty, misconduct, incapacity, or unfitness, notwithstanding the person libeled is not then in the actual enjoyment of his office, trade, or business, and although the trade or calling is not one of which the court can take judicial notice, if it be shown that the defamation or matter was published of the plaintiff, with reference to that trade or calling. Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. (N. S.) 212; Boydell v. Jones, 4 M. & W. 450; Foulger v. Newcomb, L. R., 2 Exch. 327; Gage v. Robinson, 12 Ohio, 250; Cramer v. Riggs, 17 Wend. 209; Croswell v. Weed, 25 id. 621. A publication which holds a person up to the public as wanting in the qualities and characteristics of a merchant of integrity and honor is actionable, although it relates to the conduct of such person, in a transaction which was unlawful, if he acted therein in conformity to what he supposed to be the law and usage in similar cases. Chenery v. Goodrich, 98 Mass. 224.

Scandal expressed in allegory or irony may amount to a libel (Peake v. Oldham, Cowp. 275; Woolnoth v. Meadows, 5 East, 463; Hillhouse v. Dunning, 6 Conn. 391); such as imputing to a person the qualities of the frozen snake in the fable (Hoare v. Silverlock, 12 Q. B. 632); or a writing which, after enumerating several acts of public charity done by a person, proceeds: "You will not play the Jew nor the hypocrite;" and then insinuates, that what the person did is owing to his vainglory. A declaration was held good where the libel complained of consisted of a paragraph in a newspaper, entitled, " An honest lawyer," followed by an imputation upon the plaintiff, of sharp practice. Boydell v. Jones, 4 M. & W. 446. Doggerel verses describing another as stinking of brimstone, and having the itch, are libelous. Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403. The defendant printed and published of the plaintiff, a witness in a cause then lately tried in the supreme court, the following: "Affidavits. Our army swore terribly in Flanders, said Uncle Toby, and if Uncle Toby were here now, he might say the same of some modern swearers. The man at the sign of the Bible,

the plaintiff, is no slouch at swearing to an old story." "These words," said the court, "import that the plaintiff swore with levity, rashly, and inconsiderately, without due regard to the solemnity of an oath, or to the truth or accuracy of what he said. If the words do not impute perjury in the legal sense, they hold the plaintiff up to contempt and ridicule, as thoughtless, or so immoral, as to be regardless of the obligations becoming a witness, and therefore utterly unworthy of credit. In this view the words are actionable." Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214. An obituary notice of a person living, if written and published falsely and maliciously, is a libel. McBride v. Ellis, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 313. To publish in writing an expression of belief that one has committed a felony is actionable per se; and the fact that the reasons for the belief are also given will not affect the question, unless those reasons explain away the charge. Johnson v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 2 Mo. App. R. 565.

The following, entered on the books of a corporation, is actionable, if intended by the defendant to impute dishonesty to the plaintiff, and if it was so understood by those who read it: "This company, for good and sufficient reasons, has resolved to dismiss D. D. Maynard from its service." Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 47 Cal. 207. A defamatory writing, which expresses only one or two letters of a name, in such a manner that what goes before and follows after it must be understood to signify a certain person, and would be nonsense if strained to any other meaning, is as much a libel as if it expressed the whole. name. Bourke v. Warren, 2 Car. & P. 307; Roach v. Read, 2 Atk. 469.

A caricature, drawn or painted, is often more scandalous than any written representation; and the same may be said of burning a person in effigy, and other similar acts. An action was sustained for setting up a lamp adjoining the dwelling-house of the plaintiff, and keeping it burning in the day-time, with intent to convey the impression that the plaintiff was the keeper of a brothel. Jefferies v. Duncombe, 11 East, 226. A libel may be contained in hieroglyphics, or in a rebus, or anagram; or in language which is obscure, from being grossly illiterate; or in slang terms, whether referring to specific charges or not; or by an insinuation in the form of an interrogatory; or by comparing another with odious characters in a work of fiction. Digby v. Thompson, 4 B. & Ad. 821; 1 Nev. & Man. 485; Reg. v. Gathercole, 2 Lew. C. C. 225; Woodgate v. Rideout, 4 F. & F. 202; Sawyer v. Eifert, 2 N. & McCord, 511.

Responsibility may result for libelous matter contained in a paper filed in court. Thus, where the defendant, without probable cause,

maliciously made an affidavit containing libelous matter and filed it in a suit to which he was not a party, whereby the plaintiff was damaged in his business and in his reputation as a good citizen and an honorable man, the defendant was held liable for the damage. Kelly v. Lafitte, 28 La. Ann. 435. But a party cannot be held liable in damages for allegations set up by him in his pleadings in a suit, which assail the character of the other party, when it appears that the circumstances were such that he might reasonably have believed that the allegations were true. Wallace v. New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 29 La. Ann. 66.

§ 3. What publications are not libelous. It is not libelous, merely to write of a person that he has done something in bad taste, or that he has kept company unworthy of his position in society, or of his position in his profession. Clay v. Roberts, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 580. The following notice was posted up in a public room: "The Rev. J. Robinson, the plaintiff, and Mr. J. K., inhabitants of this town, not being persons to whom the proprietors, or annual subscribers, think it proper to associate with, are excluded from this room." Held not actionable, for the reason that it did not represent the plaintiff as an improper person for general society, but merely stated the opinion of the defendants, that the parties excluded were not suitable persons to be associated with the defendants, and did not necessarily impute any thing derogatory to the moral character of the parties Harman v. Delany, 2 Str. 898. It is not libelous to publish in a newspaper that a certain physi cian meets homoeopathists in consultation, though the declaration alleges that the profession regard the meeting of homoeopathists in consultation as a breach of professional etiquette, and injurious to the professional character, reputation, and practice of a physician. Clay v. Roberts, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 580; 11 W. R. 649; 8 L. T. (N. S.) 397, Exch..

Publishing of a tradesman, that his goods are bad, is not actionable, if made bona fide, and is true; nor a statement in a newspaper, that a certain invention is different from what the inventor represents it to be, unless falsely and maliciously made. Put imputing to a tradesman, that he is in the habit of selling goods which he knows to be bad, would be libelous. Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624. Mere puffs between rival tradesmen, the one depreciating the other's goods, and exalting his own above them, are not libelous. Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624. An action cannot, therefore, be maintained for an imputation that the goods of a certain dealer are inferior to those of another, although the imputation be false, and special damage be alleged. Young v. Macrae, 3 B. & S. 264; contra, Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., L. R., 9 Exch. 222; 10 Eng. Rep. 395. The same is true of a publication consisting of the

certificate of a professor of chemistry, embodying the result of a comparison between oils sold by the plaintiff and defendant, showing that the plaintiff's oil was inferior to the defendant's (Young v. Macrae, 3 B. & S. 264); and also, of a publication cautioning the public to deal with the agent of the defendants, if they wished to procure genuine Franklin coal, and stating that they had neither sold nor shipped Franklin coal to any party except their agent. Boynton v. Remington, 3 Allen, 397.

A publication relative to a person's conduct in prosecuting an illegal business which involves moral turpitude, or may fairly be held to affect his general character, is not actionable. Manning v. Clement, 7 Bing. 362; Chenery v. Goodrich, 98 Mass. 224. But it is otherwise of a publication which charges fraud beyond an illegal transaction; as to publish of another that he cheated in gambling and playing at dice. Greville v. Chapman, 5 Q. B. 744.

Publishing of another, who had been found guilty of selling spirituous liquors in violation of law, that he was a convicted felon, was held not libelous, if understood by the public to mean only an offense against the excise law. Perry v. Man, 1 R. I. 263. Charging that the plaintiff has figured quite prominently in some of the squatter riots is not libelous per se, as imputing to the plaintiff the offense of having been wrongfully and wantonly engaged in committing breaches of the peace. Clarke v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 472. Publishing of a person that he forged sentiments and words for Silas Wright, which he never uttered, without stating what the sentiments and words were, is not libelous. Cramer v. Noonan, 4 Wis. 231. And the same is true of a report of the condition of schools, made by the school committee to the town, and published by the defendants in their official capacity, pursuant to law, stating that the prudential committee employed a teacher, and placed her in charge of a school, contrary to law, took possession of the school-house, and forcibly excluded the school committee, and the teachers employed by them, without imputing corrupt motives. Shattuck v. Allen, 4 Gray, 540.

As injury to the plaintiff's character in public estimation is the basis of the action, an action cannot be maintained for the libelous contents of a letter delivered to the party himself, and not exhibited or its contents made known to any other person. McIntosh v. Matherly, 9 B. Monr. 119. (For privileged communications, see post, 304, 309, art. 3, §§ 2 and 3.)

4. Of the malicious intent. Malice in an action for a libel consists in intentionally publishing, without justifiable cause, that which is injurious to the character of another. Hagan v. Hendry, 18 Md.