sioners v. Williams, 51 Ill. 57; Matter of Central Park Extension, 16 Abb. Pr. [N. Y.] 56. See State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458); or a public square (Owners of Ground, etc. v. Mayor, etc., of Albany, 15 Wend. 374), or for the construction of drains and sewers. Hildreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345. So, the authority is frequently conferred upon towns and cities to take private property for the purpose of supplying the inhabitants with pure water, this being clearly a public use. Burden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104; Wayland v. County Commissioners, 4 Gray, 500; Stafford v. Providence, 10 R. I. 567; S. C., 14 Am. Rep. 710; Mayor, etc., of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433, 446. And the condemnation of private property for streets, alleys and public ways is unquestionably for a public use. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223; Patrick v. Commissioners, 4 McCord (S. C.), 541; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507, 545.

It is, however, held that a municipal corporation created by a State, and deriving all its privileges therefrom, has not the power or authority to take the property of the State, purchased by the latter for a specific object, for the purpose of appropriating the same for a public street. Mayor, etc., of Atlanta v. Central R. Rs Co., 53 Ga. 120. So, under a general power to lay out and open streets, a city cannot lay out and open a street through the depot grounds of a railway, so as to destroy the value of the company's easement, acquired by condemnation under express legislative authority. Milwaukee, etc., Railway' Co. v. City of Faribault, 23 Minn. 167.

Nor is it within the corporate powers of a city to open streets on lands within the corporate limits, belonging to the United States, and which have never been sold to private persons. United States v. Chicago, 7 How. (U. S.) 185. So, it is the better opinion that property cannot be acquired against the owner's consent when wanted for purposes merely ornamental (see West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. [U. S.] 545; Blodgett v. Boston, 8 Allen, 237), but it is said that ornament, and the improvement of grounds about a public building, may be taken into consideration and regarded in connection with the convenience and necessity of a proposed highway, although they do not alone constitute a sufficient basis for establishing it. Woodstock v. Gallup, 28 Vt. 587; 29 id. 347. And see Higginson v. Inhabitants of Nahant, 11 Allen, 530.

All modes of opening, widening, and closing streets, by right of eminent domain, are, of course, subject to the constitutional inhibition, that the legislature shall enact no law authorizing private property to be taken for public use without just compensation. State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Mayor, etc., of Jersey City v. Fitzpatrick, 36 N. J.

Law, 120.

And when a street is finally established, the party whose land has been taken is entitled to payment, although the street has not been opened. Steuart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500; Philadelphia v. Dickson, 38 Penn. St. 247; Griggs v. Foote, 4 Allen, 195. The South Carolina cases (see Patrick v. Commissioners, 4 McCord, 540; State v. Dawson, 3 Hill [S. C.], 100), which hold that private property may be taken for streets, roads, etc., against the owner's consent and without compensation, are not elsewhere regarded as law. And see Dunn v. Charleston, Harper (S. C. L.), 189.

Notice of the proceedings to take property for public use, when required to be given, is the foundation of the right to proceed, and if such notice be not given, or if not given in the way prescribed, the proceedings are void. Baltimore v. Bouldin, 23 Md. 328; Darlington v. Commonwealth, 41 Penn. St. 68; Harbeck v. Toledo, 11 Ohio St. 219; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189. But the legislature may, in the absence of a special constitutional restriction, provide for constructive notice only to those interested. Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593; Dill. on Mun. Corp., § 471. And where a charter provides for constructive notice of improvements by publication personal notice is not required. State v. City of Plainfield, 38 N. J. Law, 95.

In the exercise of the power of "eminent domain," it is not neces sary for the city council to preface their laying out of a highway or street, by declaring that they find such highway or street to be expedient or necessary. This necessity is sufficiently implied in their action on the subject, inasmuch as they can act only in such a case. They need not record their motives where they have jurisdiction to act. But it might be otherwise, did their jurisdiction depend upon their first finding a preliminary fact to be true. Townsend v. Hoyle, 20 Conn. 1, 9. § 15. Granting licenses, etc. Power conferred by its charter upon a municipal corporation "to license and regulate," or to "license, regulate, and tax;" certain employments and callings, and to "tax and restrain" or "prohibit" exhibitions, shows, places of amusement, and the like, may be constitutionally exercised, unless there is some specific limitation on the authority of the legislature in this respect. City of Burlington v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 681; Savannah v. Charlton, 36 Ga. 460; Mayor, etc., of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137; Fretwell v. City of Troy, 18 Kans. 271; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Gratt. 767; Paige v. Fazackerly, 36 Barb. 392; City of Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 415. And the power to license and regulate is held to carry with it the right to require the payment of a reasonable sum in consideration of the license. State v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123. So, under a

grant of power to "license, regulate, and restrain amusements," a municipal corporation may exercise the taxing power as a means of effecting this object. Hodges v. The Mayor, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 61.

The power of the legislature to delegate to municipal corporations the right to establish markets, and regulate the sale and purchase of marketable articles and to forbid the sale or purchase of such at other than the market places during market-hours, is unquestionable. City of Bowling Green v. Carson, 10 Bush (Ky.), 64. And see St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Atlanta v. White, 33 Ga. 229; St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 41; Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Penn. St. 202. The right to make such regulations grows out of the general police power of the government, and unless they are unreasonable or oppressive, it is the duty of the courts to enforce them. Municipality No. One v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann. 336. So, the power to establish and regulate markets and market places is a continuing one, and its exercise at one period by establishing a market place and erecting a market house in a particular locality will not prevent the council intrusted by the charter with the exercise of the power from removing such building, or abandoning such locality for market purposes. Gall v. City of Cincinnati, 18 Ohio St. 563. Power "to establish" a market authorizes, as a necessary incident, the purchase of real estate for the purposes of a market. People v. Lowber, 7 Abb. Pr. 158; S. C., 28 Barb. 65; Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. (4 Kern.) 356; Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; S. C., 9 Am. Rep. 80. So, the general power to build markets includes the authority to employ an architect to prepare plans, specifications, etc., for their construction. Peterson v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 17 N. Y. (3 Smith) 449. But the right "to establish" a market gives no right to build one on a public street. Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Penn. St. 202. See State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. Law, 201.

The grant by a city of a license and lease of a market stall does not amount to a contract on the part of the corporation to prevent unlicensed sales by other persons, the breach of which will excuse payment of rent, although it is the duty of the officers of the corporation, under its ordinances, to prevent such sales. Peck v. Austin, 22 Tex. 261.

The right of a municipal corporation to license occupations, etc., must be plainly conferred, or it will not be held to exist. Thus, a power to make "by-laws relative to hucksters, grocers, and victualing shops," gives no authority to the corporation to exact a license from persons carrying on such business. Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Dunham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462. And see Leon

ard v. Canton, 35 Miss. 189. So, the power to license and regulate a lawful and necessary business confers no authority upon the corporation to make a contract creating or tending to create a monopoly. Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; S. C., 9 Am. Rep. 80. And see Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe R. R. Co., 11 Leigh (Va.), 42. It is no part of the design of the legislature, in organizing municipal corporations, that the corporate authorities shall enter into competition with the inhabitants in business or trade, or to sell, or even grant, special immunities to any portion of the inhabitants for their individual benefit or gain. The corporate authorities must exercise their franchises solely for the benefit of the community embraced within the corporate limits. City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90. That the corporate power to tax vocations may properly be extended equally to all persons plying the vocation within the corporate limits, whether they reside within them or not, see Commissioners of Edenton v. Capeheart, 71 N. C. 156.

When, by the charter of a city, the power to license a particular occupation within its limits is given to the common council of the city, such power involves the necessity of determining with reasonable certainty both the extent or duration of the license, and the sum to be paid therefor; and such power must be exercised exclusively by the common council, and cannot be delegated by it, in whole or in part, to any other person or authority. Darling v. City of St. Paul, 19 Minn. 389. See, also, Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433.

A city ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, without a license, is not in derogation of the common rights of the citizens, but a restraint of the trade of a few for the benefit of the many, and is constitutional. City Council v. Ahrens, 4 Strobh. (S. C.) 241. Thus, in the absence of general laws of the State controlling the sale of intoxicating liquors, power to a city to pass "in general, every other by-law or regulation that shall appear to the city council requisite and necessary for the security, welfare, and convenience of the city, or for preserving the peace, order, and good government within the same," was held to authorize an ordinance to prevent shopkeepers, unless licensed by the city, from keeping spirituous liquors, wines, etc., in their shops, or in any adjacent room. Heisembrittle v. City Council, 2 McMull. (S. C.) 233. See, also, State v. Clark, 28 N. II. 176; State v. Freeman, 38 id. 426; Megowan v. Commonwealth, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 3. But a "general welfare" clause confers no authority upon a municipal corporation to make an ordinance prohibiting the retail of intoxicating liquors, when this is repugnant to the State laws on the subject. Exparte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Commonwealth v. Turner, 1 Cush. 493. Where the legislature confers the power to suppress groceries where VOL. IV.-97

liquor is sold, or to regulate, license, and restrain the same, it is a matter purely discretionary whether or not the city will wholly prohibit its sale, or license and regulate the traffic. Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 444. So, under a power given by charter to "restrain and prohibit tippling houses," a corporation was held to be authorized to impose a license fee. St. Louis v. Smith, 2 Mo. 113. And power to "tax" and "restrain" the sale of liquors is held to include the power to grant licenses. Mt. Carmel v. Wabash County, 50 Ill. 69. See Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss. 189. But the power "to prohibit tippling houses" does not give authority to enact an ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer by brewers. Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 Ill. 301.

Where the charter of a municipal corporation gives the common council power to license inns and taverns, and also power to license wholesale liquor dealers, liquor cannot be sold by the quart without license, in violation of a eity ordinance. Roberson v. City of Lambertville, 38 N. J. Law, 69.

A city ordinance taxing "every owner of a wagon or other vehicle, kept or used for free delivery of goods to customers or others in the city," was held to impose the tax on drays, belonging to iron works situated outside the city limits, but used for delivery of their wares within the city. City of Memphis v. Battaile, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 524.

§ 16. Levying taxes, etc. Municipal corporations have no inherent power of taxation. Their right to tax is by delegation from the State. Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 78, 98; Waterhouse v. Board, etc., 8 Heisk. 857; Wheatly v. City of Covington, 11 Bush (Ky.), 18; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.), 383, 393; Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624; City of Richmond v. Richmond, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 604. But the legislature may confer the taxing power upon municipalities in such measure as it deems expedient, subject, however, to the limitation that it cannot confer any greater power than the State itself possesses, and it must observe the restrictions and limitations of the organic law. Osborne v. Mobile, 44 Ala. 493; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush (Ky.), 667; S. C., 3 Am. Rep. 309; O'Donnell v. Bailey, 24 Miss. 386; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.), 383; State v. Linn County Court, 44 Mo. 504; Primm v. City of Belleville, 59 Ill. 142. The authority must be given either in express words, or by necessary implication, and it cannot be collected by doubtful inferences from other powers, or powers relating to other subjects, nor deduced from any consideration of convenience or advantage. St. Mary's Industrial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 310.

In the absence of any constitutional restriction, it is held that the