legislature may confer authority upon a municipal corporation to levy' and collect retrospective taxes, and for this purpose the assessment rolls of a previous year may be used. New Orleans v. Poutz, 14 La. Ann. 853. And see Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71. But it has been held that the legislature cannot authorize a municipal corporation to tax, for its own local purposes, lands lying beyond the corporate limits. Wells v. City of Weston, 22 Mo. 384. But see Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Gratt. 661; Waterville v. County Commissioners, 59 Me. 80. The constitution of the United States prohibits the States from levying any duty on tonnage, without the consent of congress. See U. S. Const., art. 1, § 10, ch. 1. But the assessment of a vessel owned in a city, by the city assessor, for city taxes, is held not to be a "duty of tonnage" within the meaning of the constitution. The North Cape,

6 Biss. (C. C.) 505.

The courts of the United States can impart no taxing power to a municipal corporation, and an attempt by them to compel by mandamus the levy of a tax not authorized by the laws of the State would be an abuse of the writ. Vance v. City of Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435.

That the legislature may constitutionally confer upon municipal corporations the power to make local improvements, such as grading and paving or otherwise improving streets and sidewalks, constructing drains, sewers, and the like, at the expense of the adjoining proprietors, is said to be as firmly established as any other doctrine of Ameri. can law. Palmer v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593. And see Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Penn. St. 255; Matter of Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. (11 Sick.) 261; Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676; City of Newark v. State, 34 N. J. Law, 523; Woodhouse v. Burlington, 47 Vt. 301; Morange v. Mix, 44 N. Y. (5 Hand) 315; Moale v. Baltimore, 5 Md. 314; Gilkeson v. Justices, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 577; Cleveland v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 303; Hoyt v. City of Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; S. C., 2 Am. Rep. 76; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525; Johnson v. Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174. It is likewise held to be competent for the legislature, in the absence of special restriction, to require the abutters to pay the cost of the improvement in front of their respective lots, instead of having the whole expense of the improvement assessed or apportioned among all, on the basis of frontage, or of benefits. Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa, 31; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, 258. And see Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243. But see Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274, in which case the court were equally divided on the question. And see Cooley's Const. Lim. 50S. Where a city charter requires property to be assessed to pay for improvements according to the benefits received, it is not sufficient to

assess each lot according to its frontage. The commissioners must exercise their judgment as to the amount of benefit each lot receives, and must assess the property accordingly, and the report must show that the assessment has been so made. State v. City of Hudson, 5 Dutch. (N. J.) 104; State v. Town of Bergen, id. 266. The general rule is to consider the effect of the improvement upon the market value of the property, and to make the assessment in view of that fact, without regard to the present use or the purpose of the owner in relation to its future enjoyment. People v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. (18 Sick.) 291. Nor does the requirement of the statute that "each lot shall be charged in proportion to the frontage thereof" contemplate that the work in front of each lot shall be necessarily charged to that lot, but that the amount of the whole work shall be ascertained, and each lot shall be charged in the proportion that its frontage bears to that of all the lots. Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 525. As to the distinction between "benefits," and "frontage," see Clapp v. Hartford, 35 Conn. 66, 79.

An authority to "prescribe by ordinance that paving of streets and of footways should be done at the expense of the owners of ground" fronting them, does not confer upon a city the power to tear up a pavement which is good and in no need of repair, and to relay and charge the owner again with one excessively costly. Wistar v. Philadelphia, 80 Penn. St. 505; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 112. But a general power to pave implies a power to repair, and repave when the condition of the cartway or footway requires it, and of this, prima facic, the munici pal authorities may judge. McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo. 33 ; S. C., 14 Am. Rep. 440; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Gurnee v. Chicago, 40 Ill. 165; Municipality v. Dunn, 10 La. Ann. 57. And see Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush (Ky.), 508; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 480; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush (Ky.), 667; S. C., 3 Am. Rep. 309. So, it is held that the power to pave includes the power to gravel streets. Burnham v. Chicago, 24 Ill. 496. And the expense of grading a street preparatory to paving is incident to paving, and may properly be included in the assessment. State v. Elizabeth, 1 Vroom (N. J.), 365. See, also, McNamara v. Estes, 22 Iowa, 246. And abutters may be assessed for paving street crossings. Creighton v. Scott, 14 Ohio St. 438. See Hines v. City of Lockport, 41 How. (N. Y.) 435; S. C., 60 Barb. 378; 5 Lans. 16; S. C. affirmed, 50 N. Y. (5 Sick.) 236.

In Pennsylvania it is held that the legislature has no authority to compel the owners of farm lands, lying within one mile on each side of a public highway, to pay for grading, macadamizing and improving

it, by an assessment upon their lands by the acre. Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 352; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 255.

A statute, enacted by the legislature of Kansas, authorized towns to issue bonds to raise money "for the purpose of providing the destitute citizens of such townships with provisions and with grain for seed and feed,”—the object being to relieve farmers whose crops had been destroyed, and the authority was held to be unconstitutional, in not being conferred for a public purpose. State v. Oswakee Township, 14 Kans. 418; S. C., 19 Am. Rep. 99. See, also, Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454; S. C., 15 Am. Rep. 39, 56; Loan Association v. Topeka 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655.

A charitable corporation, which is, by its charter, "exempted from taxation of every kind," is not exempted from special assessments against its property for improvements in a street on which it abuts. Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo. 155; S. C., 11 Am. Rep. 412. So a general statute, which provides for the exemption from assessment and taxation of property used for religious purposes, does not exempt such property from assessments for local improvements. First Presbyterian Church v. Fort Wayne, 36 Ind. 338; S. C., 10 Am. Rep. 35; Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Penn. St. 69; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush (Ky.), 508; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 480; Matter of the Mayor, etc., 11 Johns. 77. So, the exemption of property of a cemetery company from "any tax or public imposition whatever," does not exempt it from a paving tax for improving a street in front of the property. Baltimore v. Cemetery Company, 7 Md. 517. And see St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468; Paterson v. Society, etc., for Useful Manufactures, 4 Zabr. (N. J.) 385; Lafayette v. Male Orphan Asylum, 4 La. Ann. 1; Brightman v. Kirner, 22 Wis. 54; Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kans. 525.

The power of the State to tax trades, professions, and occupations, is unquestioned (Simmons v. State, 12 Mo. 268; Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush [Ky.], 406; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525; Gilkeson v. Justices, 13 Gratt. 577; Nashville v. Althrop, 5 Coldw. [Tenn.] 554); and this authority may be delegated to municipal corporations, but it should be done in clear and unambiguous terms. St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559. An authority conferred on a city to collect taxes on "auctioneers, transient dealers, and peddlers," will justify it in imposing a tax, either upon the amount of the sales of such persons, or in the form of a license upon the privilege of selling. Carroll v. Mayor of Tuskaloosa, 12 Ala. 173. Although a city ordinance imposing taxes speaks only of persons or firms doing business in the city, yet an incorporated company, as, for instance, a telegraph company doing business in the city, will be

deemed to be included. Corporations are to be deemed and taken as persons when the circumstances in which they are placed are identical with those of natural persons expressly included in a statute. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Richmond, 26 Gratt. (Va.) 1. Thus, where authority was given to a village corporation "to raise money by a tax to be assessed upon the freeholders and inhabitants according to law," it was held that a banking corporation located and doing business in the village was an inhabitant, and taxable. Ontario Bank v. Bunnell, 10 Wend. 186. See, generally, as to taxation of banks and bank stock by municipal corporations, Madison v. Whitney, 21 Ind. 261; Nashville v. Thomas, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 600; Gordon v. Balti more, 5 Gill (Md.), 231; O'Donnell v. Bailey, 24 Miss. 386; State v. Dowling, 50 Mo. 134. As to the liability of railroads, their property and stock, to municipal taxation in the towns and cities where situated, see Sangamon,etc., R. R. Co., 14 Ill. 163; Providence, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 R. I. 459; Elizabethtown, etc., R. R. Co. v. Trustees of Elizabethtown, 12 Bush (Ky.), 233; Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159. As to liability under special statute or charter provisions, see North Mo. R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 482, 490; City of Richmond v. Richmond, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 604; Ordinary of Bibb Co. v. Central R. R., etc., 40 Ga. 646; Dun leith, etc., Bridge Co. v. City of Dubuque, 32 Iowa, 427. It is held by the supreme court of Iowa, that an action at law can be maintained by a city for the recovery of municipal taxes upon the property of a railroad, notwithstanding the legislature has provided a special remedy therefor. City of Burlington v. Burlington & Mo. R. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 134; City of Dubuque v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 39 id. 56. But see Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 318; City of Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 398; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169.

The power to tax, conferred upon municipal corporations, must be fairly and impartially exercised by the municipal authorities; and they have no power to discriminate, in taxing privileges, between merchants and manufacturers and other dealers residing without the corporation, and members of the same class residing within the corporate limits. Such discrimination is beyond the authority of either State or munici pal legislation. City Council v. State, 2 Speers (S. C. Law), 719. And a municipal ordinance which attempts to create a discrimination in the matter of taxation between merchants selling by sample, and those doing business in a different manner, is without authority and void. Mayor, etc., of Nashville v. Althrop, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 554.

The power to create a municipal corporation carries with it the

power to fix the geographical boundaries thereof, and to change the same by extension or contraction. And while the courts will not interfere with the boundary limits, for the reason that mere extension, without the municipal imposition of taxation, is not in itself detrimental, yet they will control and limit the taxing power, whenever practicable, to that point or line where it ceases to operate beneficially to the proprietor in a municipal point of view. Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr. (Ky.) 491; Henderson v. Lambert, 8 Bush (Ky.), 607; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271. It is therefore held that lands within a city kept and alone used for agriculture, and not capable of being used as city property, and not demanded for that purpose, nor possessing a value based upon adaptation for the purpose of dwellings or business, cannot be considered directly benefited by the fact of their being within the city limits, and shall not be taxed for general municipal purposes. Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Iowa, 194; Buell v. Ball, 20 id. 282. But see Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Kalbrier v. Leonard, 34 Ind. 497; Groff v. Mayor, etc., 44 Md. 67.

That the products of mines are personal property which may be taxed for municipal purposes, see Virginia v. Chollar-Potosi, etc., Co., 2 Nev. 86.

ARTICLE IV.

OF CORPORATE LIABILITIES.

Section 1. In general. Municipal corporations are invested with certain powers, which, from their nature, are discretionary; such as the power to adopt regulations or by-laws for the management of their own affairs, or for the preservation of the public health, or to pass ordinances prescribing and regulating the duties of policemen and firemen, and for many other useful and important objects within the scope of their charters. Such powers are generally regarded as discretionary, because, in their nature, they are legislative; and although it is the duty of such corporations to carry out the powers so granted and make them beneficial, yet it has never been held that an action would lie against the corporation, at the suit of an individual, for a failure on their part to perform such & duty. Barton v. City of Syracuse, 37 Barb. 292; S. C. affirmed, 36 N. Y. (9 Tiff.) 54; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Weightman v. Corporation of Washington, 1 Black (U. S.), 39. But where a duty of general interest is enjoined, and it appears that the burden was imposed in consideration of the privileges granted and enjoyed, and the means to perform the duty