and covers the goods and not the insurer's interest only. Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co., 93 U. S. 527. Goods "held in trust are goods with which the insured is intrusted, and the words do not imply any technical trust (Hough v. People's Ins. Co., 36 Md. 398; Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co., 93 U. S. 527); they cover every thing in which the insured has a qualified interest by possession while the ownership is in another. Turner v. Stetts, 28 Ala. 420. Thus, cloth in the possession of the insured is covered by these words (Stillwell v. Staples, 19 N. Y. [5 Smith] 401); or goods on which he had made advances, he having represented the security of these as his object. Parks v. Gen. Ass. Co., 5 Pick. (Mass.) 34. An insurance on "all the articles making up the stock of a porkhouse" covers every thing belonging to the stock without regard to individual ownership. Etna Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 16 B Monr. (Ky.) 250. On freight cars owned or used by the company covers cars of other roads in their possession. Com. v. Hide and Leather Ins. Co., 112 Mass. 136; 17 Am. Rep. 72. Blankets used to protect a store from fire are not covered by an insurance on the stock. Welles v. Boston Ins. Co., 6 Pick. (Mass.) 182. On logs piled along the line, does not cover those belonging to others though the railroad may be liable for burning them. Monadnock Railroad v. Man. Ins. Co., 113 Mass. 77. Where the place in which the goods are insured is limited, they are not covered in other places. Annapolis Railroad v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 32 Md. 37; 3 Am. Rep. 1112. As a rule the fact that they are described as in a certain building is enough. Severance v. Continental Ins. Co., 5 Biss. (U. S.) 156; Maryland Ins. Co. v. Gusdorf, 43 Md. 506; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Farrish, 73 Ill. 166. But this may depend on the nature of the article and the apparent intention.

§ 4. Termination of risk. The risk may be terminated either by the expiration of the term for which the insurance was effected, by a voluntary abandonment of the contract, by mutual consent, by a cancellation by the insurer, or, a surrender by the insured; in. either case, under some power reserved in the contract; by a breach of some condition by the insured of which the insurer takes advantage, or by the happening of the contingency insured against. Where the policy expires in its regular course, it is only a question of interpretation. If it is a time policy, its expiration is fixed by its beginning, which we have already discussed, or the exact time of its termination may be stated in the policy. If it is intended to cover a particular risk, it expires when the risk ceases. Thus, an insurance for a voyage, or a journey, would terminate when the voyage, or the journey, terminated.

Where the contract is once entered into and has become bind

ing, it cannot be canceled by either without the consent of the other. The agreement to abrogate must be perfected by a mutual assent to it. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Swift, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 433; Sands v. Hill, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 651; Fabyan v. Union Ins. Co., 33 N. H. 203. The agreement may be by parol. Where the right to cancel is reserved to the insurer, and he attempts to exercise it against the will of the insured, he must bring himself strictly within the terms of the right reserved. A mere notice of a desire to cancel, with an agreement that the policy may remain till other insurance is got, is not enough. Goit v. Nat. Prot. Ins. Co., 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 189. If the contract is terminable on a refusal to pay an assessment on demand, the assessment must be a valid one. In re People's Ins. Co., 9 Allen (Mass.), 319. If the notice is given a longer time before loss than the contract requires, the insurers are not liable, and it is immaterial, that an earlier date is stated in the notice, than the facts required. Emmott v. Slater Ins. Co., 7 R. I. 562. A temporary contract made by an agent giving protection subject to the approval of the insurer, is terminated when the insured receives notice of their disapproval. Goodfellow v. Times Ass. Co., 17 Up. Can. 411. And the neglect of the agent to give such notice continues the contract. Franklin Ins. Co. v. Massey, 33 Penn. St. 221. Where the right to cancel is upon notice and payment of return premium, the policy does not terminate till the return premium is paid, or tendered. Van Valkenburgh v. Lenox Ins. Co., 51 N. Y. (6 Sick.) 465; Lyman v. State Ins. Co., 14 Allen (Mass.), 329; Home Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 32 Mich. 402. Where the notice was required to be served on the defendant personally, but was sent by mail, it is good if actually received by him without objection. Hollister v. Quincy Ins. Co., 118 Mass. 478; Plath v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 23 Minn. 479. A surrender is governed by the same rules as a cancellation. If the policy is set up by one who has attempted to surrender it, it would require less evidence than if he set up a surrender as a defense to an assessment or premium note. In case of a claim that the insurance has been forfeited by breach of some condition, it will depend on its terms whether the policy becomes void at once, or the company must avoid it by some act on their part. In the case of all warranties or conditions, the non-performance of which lies within the knowledge of the insured, the rule would not require any action by the insurers till the breach came to their knowledge. If after that they treat the policy as binding, it is a waiver of the breach. Finley v. Lycoming County Ins. Co., 30 Penn. St. 311; Forbes v. Agawam Ins. Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 470; Allen v. Vermont Ins. Co., 12 Vt. 366. The act may be explained as a mistake. Thus where under a vote to assess all

policies in force, the treasurer made out an assessment on a policy which had been forfeited, it did not revive the policy. Diehl v. Adams County Ins. Co., 58 Penn. St. 443; Beatty v. Lycoming County Ins. Co., 66 Penn. St. 9; 5 Am. Rep. 318. As a rule, a policy is terminated by a total loss. But in some mutual companies, while the company is no farther liable, the liability of the insured upon his premium note continues for the full original term. Boot and Shoe Manuf's Ins. Co. v. Melrose Soc., 117 Mass. 199. In case of a partial loss, the sum at risk by the insurers is diminished by the amount which they pay, and the policy remains valid for the remainder. If the policy provides that so long as a forbidden use is made of the premises, or some other provision is violated, the policy shall cease, it will revive when such violation ceases. Ins. Co. of N. A. v. MeDowell, 50 Ill. 120; U. S. Ins. Co. v. Kimberly, 34 Md. 224; 5 Am. Rep. 325; Moore v. Protection Ins. Co., 29 Me. 97.

ARTICLE VIII.

LOSS AND ITS ADJUSTMENT.

Section 1. In general. The amount payable for a loss is the sum which will fairly remunerate the party insured. In cases where that sum cannot be ascertained by ordinary rules of computation, the parties usually agree upon some arbitrary sum. Thus, in life insurance, where the loss is total, the policy is valued, and the sum stated on it is final. Even here, where the interest, as in case of a creditor who insures his debtor's life, is a definite one, any great excess of insurance over the amount of the debt would be evidence of fraud, and tend to bring the policy within the class of wagering or gambling policies. Mitchell v. Union Ins. Co., 45 Me. 104. And in case of double insurance there may be contribution. Hebdon v. West, 3 Best & Sm. 579. In case of fire, where the end is to indemnify the insured, all loss caused immediately by the fire is to be included in the estimate. Underhill v. Agawam Ins. Co., 6 Cush. (Mass.) 440; Peddie v. Quebec Ins. Co., 1 Stuart (L. C.), 174. Remote and consequential damages, such as the loss of custom to an inn (Sun Ins. Co. v. Wright, 1 Ad. & El. 621; S. C., 3 Nev. & Man. 819), or of the use and profits of a mill, or loss of services of operatives while rebuilding (Mengies v. North British Ins. Co., 9 Ct. Sess. Cas. [Scotch] 694; Niblo v. N. A. Ins. Co., 1 Sandf. [N. Y.] 551), or of prospective rcnt (Leonarda v. Phanix Ass. Co., 2 Rob. [La.] 131), cannot be recovered. But by special contract either of these losses might have been covered. The expense of reVOL. IV.-10

storing the lost property is not the standard. In marine insurance, onethird is allowed for the advantage of new for old, but in fire insurance, the jury must determine the whole question. Brinley v. National Ins. Co., 11 Metc. (Mass.) 195. The loss payable in fire insurance has no reference to the relation of the amount of damage to the whole value, but is fixed absolutely by the injury. Miss. Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 Miss. 215; Liscom v. Boston Ins. Co., 9 Metc. (Mass.) 205. The fact that the article to be replaced is patented does not alter the rule of calculation. Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Sennett, 37 Penn. St. 205. Where the insurers reserve the right to rebuild, if they elect to do so the policy becomes a contract to rebuild, and they are liable for imperfect performance. Morrell v. Irving Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. (6 Tiff.) 429; Times Ins. Co. v. Hawke, 5 H. & N. 935. This right to rebuild can only be gained by special contract, and then the insurer has the election to pay the loss, or to rebuild. Wallace v. Ins. Co., 4 La. (O. S.) 289; Com. Ins. Co. v. Sennett, 37 Penn. St. 205. The election must be made within a reasonable time, which is for the jury, and in the mean time all right of action is suspended. Haskins v. Hamilton Ins. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.), 432. An election within a month after the proofs were furnished was held reasonable, in Sutherland v. Sun Ins. Co., 14 Ct. Sess. Cas. N. S. (Scotch) 775; Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Hope, 58 Ill. 75; 11 Am. Rep. 48. Where the insurers partially completed their repairs, they are to be allowed for the value of what they have done. Parker v. Eagle Ins. Co., 9 Gray (Mass.), 152; Morrell v. Irving Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. (6 Tiff.) 429. If the insurer undertakes to rebuild, but is refused permission to do so, or prevented by the public authorities, it is no defense to him, and if he has begun the work he must bear the loss. Brown v. Royal Ins. Co., 1 E. & E. 853; Brady v. North Western Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425. After an election to rebuild, and while the work is going on, the right of action on the policy is suspended. Beals v. Home Ins. Co., 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 614; S. C., 36 N. Y. (9 Tiff.) 522. If the insured refuses permission to rebuild, he loses his right of action. Id. But, where the insured, before an election, removed the goods so that the amount to be replaced could not be determined, or began himself to rebuild, it may be evidence against him, but it was held not to bar him of his remedy. N. Y. Ins. Co. v. Delavan, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 419. The acceptance of an order to pay the loss to some other person than the insured is not an election not to rebuild, and does not deprive the insurers of their right to do so. Tolman v. Manufacturers Ins. Co., 1 Cush. (Mass.) 73. If the insurance is for a specific amount, for a given period, the insurers may be obliged to repair more than

once, if there is a second loss. Trull v. Roxbury Ins. Co., 3 Cush. (Mass.) 263.

Even after an election, the repairs must be completed in a reasonable time, or the insured may sue on the policy. Haskins v. Hamil ton Ins. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.), 432; Home Ins. Co. v. Garfield, 60 Ill. 124; 14 Am. Rep. 27. The insurance company are not liable for rent while they occupy the premises for the purpose of making repairs. St. Paul's Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 77 Ill. 598. Neither a mortgagee nor a judgment creditor who has a lien can control the action of the parties under this clause, even after the time provided for an election has expired. Stamps v. Conn. Ins. Co., 77 N. C. 209.

The fact that the building destroyed was on leased land, and that the lease would have expired in a few days, so that the building must have been removed or forfeited, was held to be immaterial. Laurent v. Chatham Ins. Co., 1 Hall (N. Y.), 41. insured had been seized on execution. Co., 10 Pick. (Mass.) 40. So when the that the duties are unpaid.

And so that the interest of the Strong v. Manufacturers' Ins. goods are in the custom house, Wolfe v. Howard Ins. Co., 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 124; S. C., 1 N. Y. 583; Cory v. Boylston Ins. Co., 107 Mass. 140; 9 Am. Rep. 14. But where liquor, subject to the internal revenue tax, was destroyed, it was held that the real loss was the value less the tax. Security Ins. Co. v. Farrell, 2 Ins. L. J. 302. The question, in either case, would be the market value, and so long as the tax was a lien on the goods, it would be an element in the market value of all like goods. A special temporary depression may be disregarded. McCraig v. Quaker City Ins. Co., 18 Up. Can. 130; contra, Grant v. Etna Ins. Co., 11 Low. Can. 128. Where a leasehold interest is insured, the length of the term unexpired is to be considered. Niblo v. N. A. Ins. Co., 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 551. A mortgagee recovers according to his interest at the time of loss, and it is immaterial that the property was afterward restored or improved. Sussex County Ins. Co. v. Woodruff, 26 N. J. 541; Foster v. Equitable Ins. Co., 2 Gray (Mass.), 216; Carpenter v. Washington Ins. Co., 16 Pet. (U. S.) 495. The mortgagee can ordinarily recover the full amount insured, as he is entitled to have the whole value of the mortgaged property kept good as his security. State Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Penn. St. 513. So in case of a vendor after his insurance has been in part paid. If there is a surplus, it must be arranged between the vendor and the vendee, and the insurer cannot interfere. Id.; Boston and Salem Ice Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 12 Allen (Mass.), 381. The value of what is left as security for his debt is immaterial. Kernochan v. N. Y. Bowery Ins. Co., 5 Duer (N. Y.), 1; S. C., 17