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use of the stream by others for reasonable and proper purposes. Mason v. Hill, 2 Nev. & Man. 747; S. C., 5 B. & Ad. 1; Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter, 7 Hurlst. & N. 160; Holsman v. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N. J. Ch. 335; Merrifield v. Lombard, 13 Allen, 16; Dwight Printing Co. v. Boston, 122 Mass. 583. So, the rule is general that any person interested in the use and enjoyment of the water of a running stream is entitled to maintain an action for any special injury he may sustain from the corruption of the water by any other person, directly or indirectly, whatever may be the cause, pretense or occasion. Carhart v. Auburn Gas Light Co., 22 Barb. 297; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130; Story v. Hammond, 4 Ohio, 376; Mayo v. Turner, 1 Munf. (Va.) 405. And the pollution of the waters of a navigable stream, so as to impair their value for domestic purposes, is as much a nuisance and actionable as though the stream was not navigable. See Wilts, etc., Navigation Co. v. Swindon, etc., Co., L. R., 9 Ch. App. 451; 9 Eng. R. 546; Conservators of River Thames v. Mayor of Kingston, 12 L. T. (N. S.) 667; Watson v. City of To ronto, etc., 4 Up. Can. R. 158; Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 71 Penn. St. 140. It is not, however, every interference with water imparting impurities thereto that is actionable, but it must be such interference as substantially impairs its value for the ordinary purposes of life. Atty.-Gen. v. Gee, L. R., 10 Eq. Cas. 131; Robertson v. Stewart, 9 G. & M. (S. C.) 189. The abatement of a nuisance does not necessarily mean the entire and absolute removal of all pollution of a stream, and all disagreeable odor, but such diminution of pollution and smell as to render it such as ought fairly and reasonably to be submitted to. Id. A proprietor of land has a right to enjoy the use of the waters of a river which flows upon his land, for his cattle and for domestic purposes, without having their purity destroyed by the discharge of slops, manure and other offensive and deleterious substances from a distillery, cattle stables or hog yard maintained by an upper proprietor on the same stream (Atty.-Gen. v. Steward, 20 N. J. Eq. 415; Smith v. MeConathy, 11 Mo. 517; Greene v. Nunnemacher, 36 Wis. 50); and a violation of this riparian right may be such ground of special damage as will entitle him to maintain a private action, as for a nuisance, against such upper proprietor. Id. So, for placing and keeping a deleterious substance so near a well as thereby to occasion damage to another, an action is maintainable, although from such keeping no damage would have occurred, except for the extraordinary, yet not uncommon, action of the elements. Woodward v. Aborn, 35 Me 271. So, the erection of a cess-pool so near a well as thereby to contaminate the water of the well, and impair its value for domestic purposes, is an

actionable nuisance. Norton v. Scholefield, 9 Mees. & W. 665. And see Brown v. Illins, 25 Conn. 585. And the maintenance of dams, drains or ditches which emit disagreeable or unwholesome odors, is not only an actionable, but also an indictable nuisance. Mills v. Hall, 9 Wend. 315; Rogers v. Barker, 31 Barb. 447; Story v. Hammond, 4 Ohio, 376; Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304.

As it regards the question of liability for the pollution of water, it is immaterial whether the pollution arises from private works, or is the result of the drainage of towns under legislative authority. Thus, it is held that riparian owners and the public have the right to take water from navigable streams, and the pollution of such water, so as to destroy its value for primary purposes by leading into the same the sewage of the town, is a nuisance (Conservators of River Thames v. Mayor of Kingston, 12 L. T. [N. S.] 667); and the fact that sewage has been sent there for many years does not give a prescriptive right to continue it when, by the increase therein, it becomes a nuisance. Id.; Wood v. Sutcliffe, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. 217. See, also, Iudson River R. R. Co. v. Loeb, 7 Robt. (N. Y.) 418. And the fact that the public convenience, or the preservation of the public health, requires the sewage of a town to be removed, conjoined with the fact that the only method by which it can be disposed of is to discharge it into a running stream, will not justify its discharge into such stream to the injury of riparian owners. Att.-Gen. v. Leeds, L. R., 5 Ch. App. 589; Att.-Gen. v. Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum, 4 id. 147. But the rule is otherwise when the water has been given over to secondary uses. If, in such case, the water becomes polluted by the emptying into it of city sewers, so that a riparian proprietor cannot use it for manufacturing purposes as he has been before accustomed to do, he cannot recover against the city for the pollution, so far as it is attributable to the plan of sewerage adopted by the city (Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216; S. C., 14 Am. Rep. 592); though he can recover. for it so far as it is attributable to the improper construction or unreasonable use of the sewers, or to the negligence or other fault of the city in the care or management of them. Id. See ante, tit. Municipal Corporations.

Where a prescriptive right to foul a stream has been acquired, the fouling must not be appreciably enlarged to the prejudice of other people. Any sensible or appreciable increase is a nuisance, actionable or indictable as such. Crossley v. Lightowler, L. R., 3 Eq. Cas. 279; L. R., 2 Ch. App. 478. And the fact that the stream is fouled by others is no answer to an action or indictment for the nuisance. Id. And see

Lewis v. Stein, 16 Ala. 214; Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N. H. 585; Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells, etc., Co., L. R., 1 Ch. App. 349.

And where a large number of persons are mining on a small stream, and each deteriorates the water a little, so that their combined acts render the water utterly unfit for further use, each cannot successfully defend an action on the ground that his act alone did not materially affect the water. Hill v. Smith, 32 Cal. 166. See Chipman v. Palmer, 9 Hun (N. Y.), 517; Thorpe v. Brumfitt, L. R., 8 Ch. App. 650; S. C., 6 Eng. R. 554.

§ 22. Municipal corporations. The powers and liabilities of municipal corporations with respect to nuisances have been sufficiently discussed under the title Municipal Corporations. It may, however, be observed generally in this connection, that in order to secure and promote the public health, safety, and convenience, municipal corporations are liberally endowed with power to prevent and abate nuisances. And when a municipal corporation, as, for instance, a city, has ample power to remove a nuisance, it is liable for injuries resulting from a failure on its part to keep its streets, lanes and walks free from obstructions, such as steps, fences, posts, or other nuisances existing therein, or dilapidated walls along the street in such a state of decay as to endanger the safety of persons passing along the street. Coggswell v. Lexington, 4 Cush. 307; Willard v. Newbury, 22 Vt. 458; Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43 N. II. 356; Sweet v. Gloversville, 12 Hun (N. Y.), 302. And the fact that these nuisances are upon private property is no excuse for its failure to remove them, nor any defense against an action for injuries resulting from its neglect. Parker v. Mayor, etc., of Macon, 39 Ga. 725. See Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. Nor has a municipal corporation any more right to erect and maintain a nuisance than a private individual possesses, and an action may be maintained against such corporation for injuries occasioned by a nuisance for which it is responsible, in any case in which, under like circumstances, an action could be maintained against an individual. Pittsburgh City v. Grier, 22 Penn St. 54; Donohue v. Mayor of New York, 3 Daly, 65; Harper v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365. A municipal corporation is likewise liable to indictment for a public nuisance maintained by it (People v. Albany, 11 Wend. 539), or permitted to exist upon its property. St. John v. Mayor, 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 483; Administrator v. Insurance Co., 1 Disney (Ohio), 336.

§ 23. Dangerous animals. See ante, Vol. 1, tit. Animals. See, also, tit. Negligence. A dog per se is not a nuisance. People v. Board of Police, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 167. But a ferocious dog, accustomed to bite mankind, is a common nuisance, and if found at large may be

destroyed by any one. Id.; Brown v. Hoburger, 52 Barb. 15. So, a mad dog, or one that is justly suspected of being mad, or that is known to have been bitten by one that was mad, is a nuisance, and may be killed by any person, if at large, or in a situation that is liable to escape. Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121. And see Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp. 482; Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332. And a dog which haunts the premises of another, and by barking and howling becomes a nuisance, if he cannot otherwise be prevented, may be killed. Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354.

§ 24. Miscellaneous. The erection of a dam across a navigable stream, so constructed as to cause the ice to accumulate in the spring to the injury of adjoining fields, is an actionable nuisance. Bell v. M'Clintock, 9 Watts (Penn.), 119. So, if a canal constructed by authority of law on the land of A, by his consent, throws back the water of a natural water-course on the land of B, it is an actionable nuisance. Delaware, etc., Canal Co. v. Lee, 22 N. J. Law, 243. So, the defendant dug a ditch so as to convey the washings from his brewery into a clay pit in the plaintiff's back yard, and this was held to be an actionable nuisance. Shaw v. Cummiskey, 7 Pick. 76.

To cause a whole neighborhood to become sickly, by erecting a dam across a stream, thus causing the water to stagnate and corrupt the air, is a public nuisance, for which an indictment lies. So, also, it is a public nuisance, and indictable, if the pond, without causing sickness, produces smells and stenches, which render the enjoyment of life and property in the community uncomfortable. State v. Rankin, 3 S. C. 438; S. C., 16 Am. Rep. 737.

A dense smoke laden with cinders, continued for twelve hours twice in each month, falling upon and penetrating houses and premises, at distances varying from forty to two hundred feet, is held to constitute a legal nuisance. Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294. So, an action lies against the owner of property who negligently or willfully misuses his own property to the annoyance of his neighbor, by putting up a smokepipe in such a manner that the smoke escaping therefrom becomes a nuisance or injury to the occupants of the adjoining premises. Whalen v. Keith, 35 Mo. 87. So, a cooking range or stove erected so near to the partition wall of two houses as to injure, by its ordinary use, the goods of the adjacent proprietor, and render his house uncomfortable and disagreeable, is a nuisance. Grady v. Wolsner, 46 Ala. 381; S. C., 7 Am. Rep. 593. And where the roof of a building, in a large city, is so constructed as to render the snow falling upon it liable to be precipitated upon the sidewalk, and there is no adequate guard at the edge to retain it, it is, in judgment of law, a nuisance. Walsh v. Mead, 8

Hun (N. Y.), 387.

See, also, Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 251; S. C., 3 Am. Rep. 346.

To turn aside a useful element from premises is as much a nuisance as to turn upon them a destructive element. In both cases, the injury may be equally material. Thus, a ditch constructed to carry off water, rightfully flowing to a mining claim, is as much a nuisance as a dam to flood the premises. Parke v. Kilham, 8 Cal. 77.

It is the absolute duty of an occupier of premises, having a lamp overhanging the footway, to prevent its becoming dangerous to the public; and if, in fact, it becomes dangerous, it is a nuisance, and for any injury caused by such nuisance, he is liable. Nor can he shift the liability arising from such a duty from himself by having employed a competent person to repair the lamp. Tarry v. Ashton, 34 L. T. (N. S.) 97; 24 W. R. 581. And it is the general doctrine that any act of an individual done to a highway, though performed on his own soil, if it detract from the safety of travelers, is a nuisance. Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend. 447. Thus, ejecting a stream of air and dust, through a pipe from the defendant's factory, across the towing-path of a canal, whereby the plaintiff's mules became frightened, and jumped into the canal and were drowned, was held to be a nuisance, for which the defendant was held liable in damages. Conklin v. Phenix Mills, 62 Barb. 299. So, if a person makes an excavation in his own ground, adjoining a highway, so that the use of the highway is rendered unsafe to the public, using ordinary care, the person so making the excavation is liable in damages for all the consequences. Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. Vale v. Bliss, 50 Barb.

392; Hadley v. Taylor, L. R., 1 C. P. 53; 358. See ante, 734, § 4.

A tenement house, cut up into small apartments, inhabited by a crowd of poor people, in a filthy condition, and calculated to breed disease, is a public nuisance. Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397. Keeping a large quantity of gun-powder ina wooden building, insufficiently secured and in close proximity to other buildings, is likewise a public nuisance. Bradley v. People, 56 Barb. 72. So, it is a public nuisance to place on the footway of a public street a stall or stand for the sale of fruit, although the defendant pays rent to the adjoining proprietor. Commonwealth v. Wentworth, Bright. (Penn.) 318.

A tomb erected upon one's own land is not necessarily a nuisance to his neighbor; but it may become a nuisance from its locality and other extraneous facts. Barnes v. Hathorn, 54 Me. 124. And see Begein v. Anderson, 28 Ind. 79; New Orleans v. Wardens, 11 La. Ann. 244; vol. 2, 132.

So, the trade and occupation of carriage-making, or of a blacksmith,

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