hoe county has recently decided that the said act of 1879, which purports to repeal said section 1686, and to change the period of limitation from three to six years, is void, not having been properly enacted, and that said section 1686 is still in force," etc., and asked to file an amended answer setting up not only the three years' limitation, but also the general act of six years.

Although the district court may have held as stated, it not being a court of last resort, such decision was far from being conclusive of the question, and could hardly be deemed a proper basis for the action of a court of concurrent jurisdiction. It certainly could not be regarded as a reason for filing a plea of the six years' statute of limitations.

We do not intend to discuss or decide the constitutionality of the act repealing the three years' limitation act. Suit was instituted March 11, 1889. The supposed answer of the Olathe Company by defendant Owers was filed November 18, 1889; the answer of Owers, November 22, 1889; the answer of Scott and Manning, January 29, 1890; replications filed February 17 and March 19, 1890. The application to plead the statutes of limitation by amended answer was made July 30, 1891, nearly a year and a half after the issues had been made up.

In Cross v. Moffat, 11 Colo. 212, it was held: "This statute (of limitations) is a personal privilege to be relied upon or not as the debtor may choose. There is no legal presumption that he will elect to plead it." It may be waived, and where not pleaded in the first instance, it is presumed to have been waived.

"Another general rule of great practical importance is that the bar of the statute must be interposed by the diligence of the debtor and as early as possible." Wood on Limitations, sec. 7.

"The statute being a strict defense, if a party omit to plead it the court will not relieve him by allowing him to amend by adding the plea." Angell on Limitations, sec. 285; Jackson v. Varick, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 294.

"The plea of the statute cannot be amended, though the amended plea is filed before the rule day has expired. But if the plaintiff amends his declaration, the defendant may plead the statute anew." Johnson v. Green, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 381; Reed v. Clarke, 3 McLean (U. S. C. C. ), 480; Nelson v. Bond, 1 Gill (Md.), 218. "Nor will a default be taken off to allow the plea of the statute to be made." Sheets v. Baldwin, 12 Ohio, 120. And see Cross v. Moffat, supra; McIver v. Morse, 1 Cr. (U. S. C. C. ) 90; Wilson v. Turberville, 1 Cr. (U. S. C. C. ) 492; Thompson v. Afflick, 2 Cr. (U. S. C. C. ) 46.

It follows that, regardless of the questions presented in regard to the constitutionality of the repeal of the statute, the pleas not having been filed in apt time, the court was justified in refusing the amendment of the three years' statute, and it is to be presumed that his refusal was based upon that reason, and it might with equal propriety have been extended to the refusal of the plea of the general statute of

six years.

It is ably urged and contended by counsel for appellants: First, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the record of the trust deed from the county records of Lake county; second, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the copy of the trust deed attached to the deposition of Kendrick; third, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn copy of the articles of association of The Olathe Silver Mining Company, attached to the deposition of Kendrick. In the affidavit of Owers it is said that Manning and Scott were ignorant of the facts stated in regard to the pleas of the statute of limitation; that if the said defendants had been aware of the facts, they would have each interposed the pleas. Nothing is said in regard to the interposition of the plea by the debtor, the Mining Company. In his answer he prays to be permitted to defend as a stockholder on behalf of the company, and make such answer as the company might or could make in the premises.

It clearly appears that after verifying and filing the an

swer of the company as its attorney, Owers abandoned the claim to the position, and, so far as the company was concerned, it was without defense, and in default. For the purposes of this opinion, Owers, Manning and Scott must be regarded as intervenors as between the bondholders seeking foreclosure and the mortgagor, tacitly confessing the justice of the claims. This remark becomes necessary in connection with the discussion of the questions raised, suggesting, as they do, the further question,-to what extent the defendants could go in a collateral attack upon the bona fides and regularity of corporate proceedings when the debtor (mortgagor) admits the justice and regularity of the claims, where the rights attempted to be asserted by the defendants originated long subsequent to the mortgage and the record of the same, which, according to the affidavit of Owers, occurred while he was the attorney of the company, and supposed to be looking after its interests. It also appears from his sworn statements that at the time of the purchase by him of the Britton and Gray judgment, and the sale to others of undivided interests in the property, he remained the attorney while asserting an adverse title, and afterwards brought the suit for services during the time he was obtaining, asserting and selling the adverse title, and obtained a judgment of $2,000, which he is now attempting to assert as a lien against the property.

A serious question is raised by his sworn statements of the facts in regard to his relations with the company. Did not his course toward his client during the time of his employment preclude him from asserting any rights or title in the premises? The suit was in equity, in which it is a fundamental maxim that he who seeks its aid must "show clean hands;" at least show his own conduct fair and honest, such as entitles him to equitable consideration. The claim of title sought to be enforced by him was shown by himself to have been so antagonistic to his employer, and so in fraud of its rights, as to warrant a court in rejecting and disregarding it.

The question suggested in regard to the admission of evidence will be briefly discussed. The Mining Company was a

foreign corporation organized under the laws of Great Brit ain. Its organization, its validity, and the validity of its proceedings as a corporate body were under the statutes of that government, and controlled by them; hence the laws of this state or the United States were inoperative in regard to the home administration of its corporate affairs. The land sought to be foreclosed was in this state; the proceeding for foreclosure was governed by the lex loci.

It is contended that the mortgage, not having been acknowledged as required by our statutes, could not be admitted in evidence, and that the court erred in admitting it. In Holladay v. Dailey, 1 Colo. 460, it was said, in regard to a deed of conveyance: "Whether it was acknowledged in conformity with the statute or not is a matter of indifference, for the acknowledgment is but a means of proving the execution and authenticating the record when the instrument shall be thereafter recorded; and the statute which requires it being in the affirmative, and without any negative implication to exclude the common law, the conveyance will be valid, as between the parties thereto and those having notice thereof, even though not acknowledged at all." The case was taken. by writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, and there affirmed. 19 Wall. 606.

We are not aware that the doctrine there asserted, that the acknowledgment was but a means of proving the execution, -not the only means,-and, as between the parties and those having notice, would be valid without any acknowledgment whatever, has ever been questioned. The acknowledgment entitles it, under our statute, to record. The record is solely for the purpose of notice. The validity is in no way dependent upon either. The requirements are for the purposes of evidence only, and for the protection of creditors and subsequent incumbrances, bona fide, without notice. The question of notice is one of fact, and may, when necessary by reason of defective acknowledgment, be established by other competent evidence, aside from the record. Owers, who obtained

the entire adverse title, as the attorney of the company, was chargeable with notice at the inception of his supposed title.

At the time of the trial the company had been compelled to go into voluntary liquidation and be wound up. The high court of chancery had the jurisdiction, and was in possession of all the papers and records pertaining to the corporation; and although, by permission of court, access was had for the purpose of securing verified copies, it was shown by the testimony of two witnesses, and unquestioned, that the original papers could not be withdrawn from the custody of the court.

Section 217, Gen. Stats., is as follows: "Deeds, bonds and agreements in writing, for the conveying or encumbering of real estate, or any interest therein, shall be deemed from the time of being filed for record, notice to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers, though not acknowledged or proven according to law, but neither the same, nor the record thereof, shall be read as evidence, unless subsequently acknowledged or proved according to law, or unless their execution be otherwise proved in the manner required by the rules of evidence applicable to such writings, so as to supply the defects of such acknowledgment or proof; this section shall apply as well to all such deeds, bonds and other writings heretofore recorded, as to those hereafter to be recorded."

Though not acknowledged or proven according to law, they are from the date of record notice to subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers, but neither they nor the record can be used as evidence, "unless their execution be otherwise proved in the manner required by the rules of evidence applicable to such writings." The section clearly allows and recognizes proof as at common law of their execution.

In Greenleaf Ev., sec. 557, in speaking of such documents. as deeds, bills and notes, it is said: "These must be produced, and the execution of them generally proved, or their absence duly accounted for, and their loss supplied by secondary evidence."

In Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 134, it is said: "It is an axiom in the law of evidence that the contents of any writ