ent legal authority to arrest the appellee. This is true. We are aware of no provision of the statute, and counsel has called none to our attention, which permits process to issue against an unnamed person, or against one who, if unnamed, is not sufficiently identified and described in the warrant to permit it to be said that it runs against a particular person. It has always been the law that process might go against a person whose name was unknown, provided it contained such a descriptio persona as might supply the place of the name by which the accused person was known. Commonwealth v. Crotty et al., 92 Mass. 403; Alford v. The State, 8 Tex. App. 545; Scheer and Wife v. Keown, 29 Wis. 586; Melvin v. Fisher, 8 N. H. 406; Colter v. Lower et al., 35 Ind. 285.

Tested by these principles, the warrant under which the constable assumed to act was absolutely void. It gave him no authority whatever to arrest Prisk or anybody else. All his acts under it were trespasses, for which he was, and is, most undoubtedly responsible. It is this conclusion which relieves the sureties of any responsibility in the premises. The constable's acts were not performed by him while engaged in the discharge of the duties of his office, nor was the arrest of the plaintiff in any sense a breach of the obligation into which the sureties had entered. Being without a legal process, he had no official functions to perform, and no duty to execute. It is somewhat singular that in the multitude of suits which have been brought on the bonds of constables, sheriffs, and similar peace officers, there have been so few cases where there has been an attempt under similar circumstances to hold the sureties liable for the trespasses of the officer. The industry of counsel, and some little research on the part of the court, have brought to light but few wherein the question has been considered. There is no dissent among the authorities, and they all concur in the conclusion that for trespasses of this description, where the officer acts without either actual or apparent legal authority, a surety who undertakes for the faithful performance of the official duties of the officer cannot be made responsible. McLendon et al.

v. The State, 22 S. W. Rep. 201; State v. Long et al., 8 Ired. Law, 415; State v. McDonough et al., 9 Mo. App. 63.

To overcome the force of these decisions, the appellee cites a great many cases in which the sureties have been held liable for the acts of the officer in the levy of his writ on the property of B. when the process only ran against A. Of these, The People v. Lucas et al., 93 N. Y. 585, and Lammon et al. v. Feusier et al., 111 U. S. 17, are sufficient examples. There was long a diversity of opinion among the courts in regard to the proposition, but the weight of authority seems now to be that, since the officer, in a case of this kind, acts under a valid and legal process, the sureties shall be held for the tortious execution of his writ. We do not undertake to state our opinion respecting this proposition, and we have only referred to it as the basis of the appellee's contention. Their point is, that since, in such cases, the sureties are made responsible, they ought likewise to be held in the present case, because the constable assumed to act under a warrant issued by competent legal authority. We do not regard the cases as at all analogous, nor the principle, if correct, applicable to this case. The fundamental difficulty with the appellee's position is, that when Allison undertook to arrest Prisk with the warrant, he occupied no other or better position than would any person who was not an officer with a blank piece of paper. That it was in the form of a writ and signed by a magistrate did not clothe the constable with the right to arrest anybody. It was a trespass not committed in the execution of the duties of his office, and the sureties cannot therefore he held. The appellants put considerable stress upon what they insist was the error of the court in charging the jury that they, as sureties, were liable to respond for the exemplary damages which the court charged the plaintiff might recover for the wrongful acts of the officer. Whether sureties can ever be held liable under such circumstances is a difficult question which we need not determine, because on the main proposition the sureties are released. It need only be suggested that what is essential to

the recovery of such damages against the defendant has been. pretty well settled by two cases in the state. French v. Deane, 19 Colo. 504; Eisenhart v. Ordean, 3 Colo. App. 162. There is no difficulty in applying the law, and the trial court is not likely to fall into error on this proposition. We may, however, be permitted to suggest that the pleading seems to us a little inartistic with reference to this subject. If the plaintiff is bound to prove the facts which constitute the malice or show the reckless disregard of the other's rights essential to the recovery of punitive damages, it must be true that his complaint should contain an apt and sufficient allegation to permit the introduction of evidence on this subject. While we do not directly decide the complaint to be so far subject to criticism that a verdict under it would not be sustained, we think a slight amendment in this particular might be expedient. The judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. The district court will permit the plaintiff to amend his complaint as he may be advised in the particular suggested, should he desire to continue the litigation. Reversed.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FÉ RAILROAD COMPANY V. MAGGARD.

1. JURISDICTION-SOVEREIGNTY.

A state cannot exercise direct jurisdiction over persons or property outside of its territorial limits.

2. CONFLICT OF LAWS.

The exemption laws of a state have no extraterritorial force.

3. JURISDICTION.

The jurisdiction of a court to inquire into the obligations of a nonresident defendant, who has not appeared in the action, is dependent upon the seizure of property of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court.

4. JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS.

If there is no appearance of the defendant, and no personal service of process on him, the case becomes, in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the demand.

5. SAME-GARNISHMENT. The state in which services were rendered and in which the employer and employee reside is the situs of a chose in action for wages, and a creditor of the employee, who would reach the fund by garnishment, must proceed in that state. The fact that the employer is a railroad company operating a line through different states does not change the rule.

Appeal from the District Court of Arapahoe County.

MAGGARD (appellee), on May 10, 1893, sued out an attachment against one C. C. Shawver. On May 22d, the sheriff made return of the writ of attachment, with the indorsement that he had had the writ since the 10th day of May, and had failed to find the defendant in his county. On May 11th the complaint was filed, alleging that the defendant was indebted upon two promissory notes, made at Wellington, Kansas, the first for the sum of $61.00, dated May 12, 1888, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, payable to Maggard & Hunt, and by them indorsed to the plaintiff; the second, of the same date, $9.50, with interest at the same rate, payable to the plaintiff. Summons was issued May 18, 1893. On the 22d it was returned,-defendant not found in the county. On the 9th of June an affidavit was made and filed by the plaintiff of the nonresidence of the defendant. On July 7th an order for publication of summons was made; proof of publication filed August 7, 1893. On June 14th a garnishee summons against appellant was issued; returned served on June 24th. Appellant answered: "There is due defendant $69.10 for April wages, $78.61 for May wages, and $17.35 for wages for June, which is all there was due him at the time of the service hereof; that affiant is informed and believes that the defendant is a nonresident of the state of Colorado, a married man, the head of a family, and residing with the same; and that his wages are exempt to him under the laws of the state of Kansas."

June 24th the following motion was filed:

"Comes now The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Rail

road Company, and moves the court to dismiss and discharge said company as garnishee herein, for the reasons:

"First-That The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad Company is a corporation of the state of Kansas.

"Second-That the defendant is a resident of the state of

Kansas.

“Third-That the wages due defendant were earned outside of the state of Colorado, and without the jurisdiction of this court.

"Fourth-That his wages are exempt to him by virtue of the laws of the state of Kansas, where the same were earned," which was denied by the court on September 28th. The following stipulation of facts was filed on the same date :

"That the said The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad Company is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Kansas, and at the time of the service of garnishee summons herein, said corporation owned and operated a railroad within the county of Arapahoe and state of Colorado.

"Second-That the said C. C. Shawver was and is a resident of the state of Kansas; that the said James A. Maggard was and is a resident of the city of Denver and state of Colorado.

"Third-That the wages shown to be due the said defendant Shawver were earned outside of the state of Colorado.

"Fourth-That the wages so earned by the said Shawver were exempt from execution under the laws of the state or territory wherein the same were earned."

October 23, 1893, a default was taken against the defendant Shawver, an order of court was entered sustaining the attachment, and judgment entered for $130.35, and judgment against appellant (garnishee) for same amount.

Messrs. ROGERS, CUTHBERT & ELLIS and Mr. CHAS. E. GAST, for appellant.