VII. General Gage's treat ment of pris oners in Boston. In such a step, also, there would be a risk of making CHAPTER enemies of those, who were willing to be friends.* General Gage commanded the British troops in Boston. 1775. Prisoners had fallen into his hands on the eventful day at Bunker's Hill, and he had seized other persons accused of disaffection to the King. These he had thrown indiscriminately into prison, no distinction being made between officers, soldiers, and citizens. The report went abroad that they were treated with great severity. Justice to his country, and the calls of humanity, made it incumbent on Washington to remonstrate against such conduct. He wrote to the British general. The occasion awakened recollections of more than common interest. Just twenty years had elapsed since he and Gage fought side by side on the bloody battle-field of the Monongahela. There was also a plan for engaging the eastern Indians in the Continental service, and agents were sent among them for that purpose, but with very little success. During the former wars in America between the English and French, it had been customary on each side to solicit aid from the Indians, and employ them as auxiliaries. Such had been the uniform practice from the first settlement of the country, and it was to be presumed that the same system would be pursued in the Revolution. Considering the ferocity of these people, and the wild and savage manner in which they engaged in all the enterprises of war, it is no wonder that the policy of seeking their alliance, or even permitting their aid, should be regarded by every friend of humanity with unqualified reprobation. Writers of all parties have united in condemning a practice, so unjustifiable in itself, and so hostile to the principles of civilization, while at the same time belligerents of all parties have continued to follow it, even down to the late war between England and the United States. It has been usual in America to represent the English as much the most censurable on this score in the revolutionary war, and if we estimate the amount of deserved censure by the effects produced, this opinion is no doubt correct. But such is not the equitable mode of judging on the subject, since the principle and intention are chiefly concerned, and not the policy of the measure, nor the success of its execution. Taken on this ground, historical justice must award to the Americans a due share of the blame. Before the rencontre at Lexington and Concord, the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts had enlisted in their service a company of minute-men among the Stockbridge Indians residing in that colony. CHAPTER An intimacy then subsisted between them, which was VII. cherished afterwards by a friendly correspondence. Far different was the relation in which they now stood to each other, at the head of contending armies; the one obeying the commands of his sovereign, the other upholding the cause of an oppressed people. 1775. Washing ton remonstrates. Their letters were significant of the change. The remonstrance of Washington, clothed in dignified but pointAugust 11. ed language, represented the impolicy as well as cruelty of ill treatment to prisoners, since it would impose upon him the necessity of retaliating, and there would be no end to the horrors of war, if such a system were pursued. General Gage denied the charge of harsh usage, and took credit to himself for his clemency in sparing persons, "whose lives by the law of the land were destined to the cord." As to difference of rank, he professed not to know any, which was not derived from the King. Retaliation meditated, but not carried into effect. These principles set at nought all the rules of honorable warfare, and indicated that the highest officers in the American army, if captured, would be treated as culprits. The only apparent remedy was retaliation. The prisoners in Washington's possession were immediately ordered into the country, and he gave directions that they should receive in every respect the same treatment, as was known to be practised on the unfortunate sufferers in Boston. Such was his first impulse; but, however justified by the laws of war, he could not reconcile to himself an act, which should inflict punishment on innocent men for the folly or obduracy of a commander. The order was countermanded, while the prisoners were on the road to Northampton, the place of their destination; and Colonel Reed, one of his aids-de-camp, wrote to the committee of the town, directing that the prisoners should be at liberty to go abroad on their parole. He added; "The General further requests, that every other indulgence and civility consistent with their security may be shown to them, as long as they demean themselves with decency and good manners. As they have committed no hostility against VII. the people of this country, they have a just claim to mild CHAPTER treatment; and the General does not doubt, that your conduct towards them will be such, as to compel their grateful acknowledgments, that Americans are as merciful as they are brave." In replying to General Gage's letter, Washington said; "You affect, Sir, to despise all rank not derived from the same source as your own. I cannot conceive one more honorable, than that which flows from the uncorrupted choice of a brave and free people, the purest source and original fountain of all power. Far from making it a plea for cruelty, a mind of true magnanimity and enlarged ideas would apprehend and respect it." The indiscretion and weakness of the British general's conduct admit of no defence; yet it should be remembered, that he was taught by his superiors to look upon the asserters of liberty in America as rebels, and to treat them as such. Little can be said, however, in praise of his political sagacity, knowledge of human nature, or enlargement of mind. The army was soon augmented by the companies of riflemen from Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, which had been raised in compliance with a resolution of the Continental Congress. The companies were filled up with surprising quickness, and on their arrival in camp the numbers of several of them exceeded the prescribed limit. Within two months from the time the orders were sent out, they had been enlisted and equipped, and had marched from four to seven hundred miles to the army at Cambridge. 1775. Reply to General ter. August 20. Companies join the ar of riflemen my. September. ments of mi General Washington had the satisfaction to find, also, Reinforcethat the reinforcements of militia, which he had request- litia. ed from the New England governments to strengthen his camp, came in as expeditiously as could be desired. against Que Before these accessions to his force, he had meditated Expedition an enterprise, which held out a fair promise of success. bec. General Schuyler had been ordered by Congress to the command of the northern department on Lake Champlain, with instructions to take possession of St. John's, Mont VII. 1775. CHAPTER real, and other parts of Canada, if it should be found practicable and not displeasing to the inhabitants. This step, it was foreseen, would draw General Carleton from Quebec, with all the troops he could collect, to defend the invaded frontiers. That city and fortress would thus be left an easy conquest; as there was no probability that they could be reinforced from England before the winter would set in, and close the river with ice. If the main object of taking Quebec should not be attained, the attempt would at least call back General Carleton for its protection, and open the southern borders of Canada to the incursions of the American troops. General Schuyler approved the enterprise, and agreed to act in concert. Troops detached under Arnold. Sept. 14. Arnold's instructions. Difficulties and result of The plan was carefully matured, and put into immediate execution. General Washington detached eleven hundred men, including three rifle companies, with orders to march into Canada, through the wilderness, by way of the Kennebec and Chaudière Rivers, and then to act as circumstances might dictate. The command of the expedition, regarded by Washington as "of the utmost consequence to the interest and liberties of America," was intrusted to Colonel Arnold. This officer had lately returned from Lake Champlain, where he had performed a conspicuous part with Ethan Allen in the capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point. His reputation for courage, energy, and military talents already stood high. The instructions he received from the Commander-inchief were humane, politic, and peremptory. He was forbidden on any pretence to disturb the quiet or offend the prejudices of the Canadians, and ordered to respect their religious observances, to pay them liberally for such articles as he should want, and to punish with rigor any improper acts of the soldiers towards them. He was to seek and annoy the British forces in Canada, but not to molest the people, or do any thing to alienate their good will from the American cause. To detail the fortunes, sufferings, romantic incidents, the expedi- and various results of this expedition, is not consistent with tion. In a VII. 1775. our present design. It is enough to say, that it was con- CHAPTER ceived on just principles, well conducted, and partially successful. It was weakened on the route by the defection and return of a colonel, with a large detachment, who assigned as a reason the want of provisions. little more than two months from the time he left Cambridge, Arnold was encamped on the Plains of Abraham under the walls of Quebec, his effective strength being five hundred and fifty men. He summoned the town to surrender, but his force was too small to warrant an assault. The other aim of the undertaking was effected. It caused a diversion of the enemy favorable to the operations of General Montgomery, who, at the head of the American army, entered Canada from Lake Champlain, took Montreal, and ultimately formed a junction with Arnold near Quebec. conduct ap The conduct of Arnold, in the management of the ex- Arnold's pedition, was approved by the Commander-in-chief, and proved. applauded by the country. He had overcome obstacles of the most formidable kind, sustained the fortitude of his men when sinking under incredible hardships from cold, hunger, and fatigue, and proved the confidence in his resources and activity not to have been misplaced. powder in The deficiency of powder in the camp at Cambridge Deficiency of continued to be a cause of extreme anxiety to Washing- camp. ton. Small quantities were collected, but in no proportion to the demand. What added to his concern was, that the enemy might discover his weakness on this account, and march out to attack him. In such an event, the whole army must inevitably be routed and dispersed. Secrecy was indispensable; and consequently the people at large were as ignorant of his condition, as the enemy within their lines. Murmurs began to be audible that the army was inactive, and that a superiority of numbers might justify an attempt against the town. The subject was referred to a council of general officers, who unanimously opposed such an experiment. A report next gained credit, that tenderness for the inhabitants of the town, Oct. 18. |