XIII. 1781. British genfers the seat eral trans of war to the Chesa peake. then known, it appeared afterward that he aimed to trans- CHAPTER fer the seat of war to the Chesapeake, and if possible to Pennsylvania.* This scheme was urged by Lord Cornwallis, who was of the opinion that it ought to be pursued even at the expense of abandoning New York. To aid in effecting it, Sir Henry Clinton sent another detachment to Virginia, consisting of two thousand men, under General Phillips, who was ordered to coöperate with Arnold, and ultimately with Lord Cornwallis, it being presumed that Cornwallis would make his way through North Carolina, and be able to succor these troops in Virginia, and probably to join them with his army. The first object of Lafayette's expedition was to act The secret designs of the British commanders could not, of course, be understood, except as they were unfolded by events. But General Washington was always well informed of all the principal transactions within the enemy's lines, and was thereby enabled to judge very accurately of the force and situation of the opposing army, and to anticipate any important operation that was about to be undertaken. Throughout the war he had spies in New York, who were unacquainted with each other, and whose intelligence came through different channels. By comparing their accounts he was commonly well informed of all the enemy's movements, and was able to judge with considerable accuracy what plans they had in contemplation. One individual was occupied in this way nearly the whole war. His letters were full, and the information he communicated was usually correct. He was on terms of intimacy with the British officers, and frequently obtained his intelligence from the highest sources. His letters were sent by way of Long Island, and thence across the Sound to Connecticut. At one period he had an agent in Bergen, through whose hands his letters passed. The principal officers near the lines were also intrusted with the business of procuring intelligence, and employed spies for that purpose, whose reports were transmitted to the Commander-in-chief. Various devices were practised for concealment. A cipher was used in part, but the most effectual mode was to write with an invisible ink, which could be made to appear only by rubbing over the surface of the paper a chemical fluid, prepared in a particular manner. The spies were supplied with this ink and fluid. A short letter would be written on some trivial subject with common ink, and the remainder of the sheet would be filled with invisible characters. Fictitious names were used for the signatures and superscriptions. With these precautions, the risk of detection was very small, even if the letter was intercepted. 1781. Object of Lafayette's CHAPTER in conjunction with the French fleet; but, as no part of XIII. the fleet entered the Chesapeake, he was disappointed in that purpose. His troops advanced no farther than Annapolis, although he went forward himself to Williamsburg. expedition. Having ascertained that an English squadron had entered the Chesapeake, instead of the French, he immediately prepared to return with his detachment to the main army near the Hudson. He proceeded by water to the Head of Elk, where he received additional instructions from General Washington, directing him to march to the south, and either meet the enemy in Virginia, or continue onward to the southern army, as should be advised by General Greene. April 8. Sentiments of Washing ing the con The enemy ascended the Chesapeake Bay and its printon respect cipal rivers, with their small armed vessels, plundering and laying waste the property of the inhabitants. One of when the en- these vessels came up the Potomac to Mount Vernon; and duct of his manager, emy landed at Mount Vernon. the manager of the estate, with the hope of saving the houses from being pillaged and burnt, yielded to the demands of the officers in a manner, which excited the regret and displeasure of Washington. In reply to his manager, who had informed him of the particulars, he said; "I am very sorry to hear of your loss; I am a little sorry to hear of my own; but that which gives me most concern is, that you should go on board the enemy's vessels, and furnish them with refreshments. It would have been a less painful circumstance to me to have heard, that, in consequence of your non-compliance with their request, they had burned my house and laid the plantation in ruins. You ought to have considered yourself as my representative, and should have reflected on the bad example of communicating with the enemy, and making a voluntary offer of refreshments to them with a view to prevent a conflagration. It was not in your power, I acknowledge, to prevent them from sending a flag on shore, and you did right to meet it; but you should, in the same instant that the business of it was unfolded, have declared explicitly, that it was improper for you to XIII. 1781. yield to the request; after which, if they had proceeded CHAPTER to help themselves by force, you could but have submitted; and, being unprovided for defence, this was to be preferred to a feeble opposition, which only serves as a pretext to burn and destroy." The reader need not be reminded of the accordance of these sentiments with the noble disinterestedness, which regulated his conduct through the whole of his public life. An extract from his diary, written on the 1st of May, will exhibit in a striking manner the condition of the army at that time, and the prospects of the campaign. the army. May 1. "To have a clearer understanding of the entries, which Condition of may follow, it would be proper to recite in detail our wants and our prospects; but this alone would be a work of much time and great magnitude. It may suffice to give the sum of them, which I shall do in a few words. Instead of having magazines filled with provisions, we have a scanty pittance scattered here and there in the different States; instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores, they are poorly provided and the workmen all leaving them; instead of having the various articles of field-equipage in readiness to be delivered, the quartermaster-general, as the dernier resort, according to his account, is but now applying to the several States to provide these things for their troops respectively; instead of having a regular system of transportation established upon credit, or funds in the quartermaster's hands to defray the contingent expenses of it, we have neither the one nor the other, and all that business, or a great part of it, being done by military impress, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people, souring their tempers, and alienating their affections; instead of having the regiments completed to the new establishment, which ought to have been done agreeably to the requisitions of Congress, scarce any State in the Union has at this hour an eighth part of its quota in the field, and little prospect that I can see of ever getting more than half; in a word, instead of having every thing in readiness to take the field, CHAPTER 1781. Arrival of May 6. we have nothing; and, instead of having the prospect of a glorious offensive campaign before us, we have a bewildered and gloomy defensive one, unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships, land troops, and money from our generous allies, and these at present are too contingent to build upon." Happily the train of affairs took a more favorable turn than he anticipated. In a short time he received the cheering intelligence, that Count de Barras had arrived in Boston harbor with a French frigate, that other vessels and a reinforcement of troops from France might soon be looked for, and that a fleet under the Count de Grasse would sail from the West Indies to the United States in July or August. Another meeting between the commanders of the allied armies was thus rendered necessary. It took place at Weathersfield, in Connecticut, on the 22d commanders of May. Count de Barras, having succeeded M. Destouches in the command of the French squadron, was detained at Newport by the appearance of a British fleet off the harbor; but the Marquis de Chastellux, a majorgeneral in the army, accompanied Count de Rochambeau. On the part of the Americans were the Commander-inchief, General Knox, and General Duportail. Conference between the American and French at Weathersfield. May 22. Objects of the confer ence. The two principal objects brought under consideration were; first, a southern expedition to act against the enemy in Virginia; secondly, a combined attack on New York. The French commander leaned to the former; but he yielded to the stronger reasons for the latter, which was decidedly preferred by General Washington. A movement to the south must be wholly by land, the French fleet being inferior to that of Admiral Arbuthnot, by which it was blockaded, and of course not in a condition to go to sea. The difficulty and expense of transportation, the season of the year in which the troops would reach Virginia, being the hottest part of summer, and the waste of men always attending a long march, were formidable objections to the first plan. It was believed, also, that the enemy's force in New York had been so XIIL much weakened by detachments, that Sir Henry Clinton CHAPTER would be compelled either to sacrifice that place and its dependencies, or recall part of his troops from the south to defend them. It was therefore agreed, that Count de Rochambeau should march as soon as possible from Newport, and form a junction with the American army near Hudson's River. Before leaving Weathersfield, a circular letter was written by General Washington to the governors of the eastern States, acquainting them with the result of the conference, and urging them to fill up their quotas of Continental troops with all possible despatch, and to hold a certain number of militia in readiness to march at a week's notice. If men could not be obtained for three years, or during the war, he recommended that they should be enlisted for the campaign only, deeming the exigency to be of the greatest importance, both in a military point of view and in its political bearings; for the zeal of the Americans, and their willingness to make sacrifices for the common cause, would be estimated by the manner in which they should now second the efforts of their allies, and contribute to give effect to their proffered services. A body of militia was likewise to be called to Newport, for the defence of the French fleet in the harbor after the departure of the troops. The two commanders returned to their respective armies, and prepared to put their plan in execution. 1781. Circular letgovernors of States. ter to the the eastern May 24. the people. It may here be observed, that, after the treaty of alli- Apathy of ance, the people of the United States, feeling secure of their independence by the powerful aid of France, became more and more remiss in complying with the requisitions of Congress. The eastern and middle States in particular, after the French troops had arrived in the country, and the theatre of war had been transferred by the enemy to the south, relapsed into a state of comparative inactivity and indifference; the more observable on account of the contrast it presented with the ardor, energy, and promptitude which had previously character |