as the Black Prince's conduct at Limoges; yet these two princes have ever been regarded with admiration for their courage, certainly not greater than the Burgundian's, and their victories, far more prejudicial to the interests of their own country, as well as more cruel towards that of their adversaries, than any of the Burgundian's successes.

NOTE LXIII. p. 318.

Such interferences of popular clamour with the course of the Government and against the best interests of the country are not confined to the fifteenth century. The unavoidable ignorance of the multitude upon delicate questions of foreign policy has often been noted as a sufficient reason for all statesmen being very slow to follow the dictates of the public voice on these important subjects-important, indeed, when it is considered that neither more nor less than the question of peace or war is involved in their discussion. Two remarkable illustrations of this danger have been afforded in the history of England, the one a century, the other half a century ago. After Walpole's truly wise administration had preserved the peace of the country at home and abroad, as well as its free government, for twenty years, he was reluctantly driven into hostilities with Spain by a war-whoop which his adversaries raised for merely factious purposes; they afterwards admitted to Mr. Burke that they had not the shadow of a case against Spain or against Walpole; they acted entirely through the clamour of the ignorant multitude. Again, in 1803, the clamour of the country, acting through, and excited by the Press in the attacks upon Napoleon, if it did not occasion, certainly hastened the war which raged for eleven years, and from the burthens of which we shall not recover for a century to come. It may be added that Lord Chatham had a decided opinion in favour of exchanging Gibraltar against Minorca, by which sacrifice he expected to obtain the inestimable advantage of Spain's co-operation against France; but his letters remain, in which

the boldest of ministers, and the least under dread of the people, betrays the excess of his apprehensions that such a proposal would raise a popular outcry enough to overwhelm himself and his ministry.

It is not a sound view of these important subjects which should conclude that the public opinion ought to have no weight on questions of this description. The just inference is that all pains should be taken to diffuse as much as it is possible to diffuse accurate knowledge, and inculcate right opinions respecting them, while statesmen are bound to exercise their own judgment, formed upon their better opportunities of discussion and ampler means of information, and fearlessly to resist clamour which they know to be groundless, proceeding, as too often it does, from some temporary delusion.

NOTE LXIV. p. 327.

In 1788, the precedents on the subject of a Regency were examined by Committees of both Houses of Parliament. The Report of the Lords is to be found in their Journals, Vol. xxxviii. 277, "Precedents respecting proceedings on the prevention or interruption of the Royal authority by infancy, sickness, infirmity, or otherwise."

In each House two questions were raised, the power of providing for the defects of the Royal authority, and the mode of exercising that power, whether the Regent should be appointed by address or an Act of Parliament; and whether the Act should confer the government with or without restrictions. Upon both questions, but especially upon the former, the arguments, as far as precedents were concerned, turned mainly upon those of Henry VI.'s reign. Mr. Pitt, 16 Dec., 1788, after adverting to those of Edward III. and Richard II., which were of Councils appointed to exercise the Royal authority, relied chiefly upon Gloster's having called the Parliament, and the Act mentioned in the text having been passed to ratify the assembling

of it, and afterwards appointing the Regent, with the denial implied in the proceeding of all right in the heir to the Crown, who, though only heir-presumptive, was equal to an heir-apparent in the circumstances of the case. Mr. Fox held any appeal cheap to the precedents of a barbarous age, when the country was on the eve of civil war; and he dwelt strongly on the fact of parliamentary privilege being so little understood, that at the period of the later precedents the Speaker of the Commons was in prison under a commitment by the Lords, upon a judgment in favour of the Duke of York, then claiming the crown. In the House of Lords the precedents were much more fully and learnedly discussed, 23 Dec., 1788. Lord Camden held the earlier one of Henry VI. to be a "good, substantial, and legal precedent," and affirmed that the proceedings "were then as grave and formal as at any period of our history." Lord Loughborough impeached the Report as singularly inaccurate; but he only pointed out one or two omissions of little moment. Lord Stormont entered into some details to show the distracted state of France, and contended that the times were any thing rather than tranquil. Lord Grenville did not argue the precedents except negatively, holding that there were none strictly in point, and that the question must be determined on principle and the analogies of the constitution. By far the ablest speech delivered in either House on this great occasion was that of Lord Lansdowne, whose views were enlarged and truly statesmanlike. He considered, that instead of throwing the responsibility of so momentous a proceeding upon Parliament, by calling for Resolutions on which to ground a Bill, the Ministers should have made up their minds to act upon their precedents, or if those failed, then to act upon principle; whereas they shifted their responsibility upon Parliament. He blamed this novel practice, introduced in the American War, as confounding the executive and legislative functions, lessening the responsibility of the Government, and weakening the control of the Parliament. That some risk would be run by whoever affixed the Great Seal without the Royal authority, he admitted; but then great offices, he said, were created for the

performance of great acts; and no one who was unwilling to run great hazards should accept great situations.

The result of these debates was the adoption by both Houses of resolutions, that the right to appoint a Regent had devolved upon them; that the appointment should be made by Bill; and that the office should be given under restrictions touching the grant of peerages, pensions for life, and patent places, and with the exclusion from making household appointments which were vested in the Queen, as having the custody of the Royal person. The Bill which was brought in upon the Resolutions, passed through the Commons with considerable majorities, though much less than on ordinary occasions; and it had reached the last stage before any period was fixed at which these restrictions were to cease-Mr. Pitt's extraordinary plan being, that Parliament should again be resorted to for another measure, if it appeared that the King's illness was likely to continue. Just as the Bill was about to leave the House, he agreed to insert a provision confining the restrictions to three years. It had been read a second time in the Lords, when the King's recovery put an end to the whole proceedings. But in the mean time a Commission had been sealed without any authority except the votes of the two Houses, and the Session was opened under it. The adoption of this by the King on his recovery has been considered as making the precedent of 1788-9 an authority of all the three Estates of Parliament in favour of proceeding by Bill, and not by Address, and in favour of two Estates acting, not without the third, which would be intelligible, but with the third's concurrence only given by themselves.

In Ireland an entirely different course was pursued. The two Houses there proceeded by address, calling upon the heirapparent to take upon himself the Government as Regent of Ireland during the King's illness, with all the regal powers and prerogatives belonging to the Crown. All the questions that arose in that country were determined by large majorities, the

On the peerage restriction, 268 to 204, instead of above two to one, which at that time was under the usual proportion.

opposition appearing to be in possession of the Government even before the Regency commenced.

In 1810 the King again fell ill, and never recovered. The precedent of 1788 was followed, and the Regency was conferred on the heir-apparent by an Act which continued in force till the demise of the Crown in January, 1820. The principal alteration made was in the time of the restrictions continuing; it was reduced to one year. Narrow majorities only sanctioned the adoption of the precedent; on the Peerage question 226 to 210; and on the Household appointments the clause of the Government was rejected.

The Union having destroyed whatever of authority the Irish proceedings might pretend to, the English precedents of 1788 and 1811 must be understood to have fixed the law of the Constitution. That they sin against its fundamental principles is certain. They introduce a proceeding wholly anomalous and absurd the pretence of passing an Act by the three branches when only two are in existence; and they rudely violate the monarchical principle by sanctioning a capitulation of the undoubted heir to the Crown with the other Estates, thus armed with the power of making terms or imposing conditions. Both precedents were the result of the relative position of parties in Parliament, and the way in which they were balanced against each other.

66

In 1423 the Commission does not set forth that the King is unable to attend (Rot. Parl. iv. 197); but in 1455, when he was ill and incapable, it is stated that he cannot be present propter certas justas et rationabiles causas" (Rot. Par. v. 278). Sometimes the Commission sets forth his illness as the cause, and that attending to business would prevent his recovery (Rot. Par. v. 453). In Commissions now, when the King does not attend, it is said, that "for divers causes and considerations we cannot conveniently be present in our Royal person," or "do not think fit to be present in our Royal person." (See Note LXXII., infra.)