three relating to celebrated ports and voyages, two to whaling and deepsea fisheries, and two to the coastwise and lake trade. The story is told in a charming and graphic manner, and is replete with phrases such as these: "It was true then of many more American towns than tideencircled Boston, that each street leads downward to the sea.' Down those streets went most of the young men who had dreams in their heads and iron in their blood, and they always found ships waiting." Then again, in speaking of a later period, we are told that "the American Union was no longer a thin fringe of commonwealths along the edge of the sea. Brave and determined men had turned westward to the wilderness as well as eastward to the ocean." The author's description of the various kinds of ships in vogue at different times in the American commerce is very clear. He gives us a graphic picture of the good and bad sides of the American sailor's character, but his admiration for the Union Jack is so strong that he makes us believe in the dominating sterling qualities of the sailor. In delineating the vicissitudes of the American merchant marine, the author admits that manifold influences are responsible for its growth and decay, but so strong is his belief in protection that the reader is led to believe that the latter is the all-powerful factor. For example, in speaking of the first tariff act under the constitution he says: Thus the first law of the fathers of the republic was specifically a protective-tariff act, but it aimed to give American shipowners and seamen the same consideration which it bestowed upon American manufacturers and mechanics. . . . . The tariff and navigation act of 1789 was amended by Congress in the year 1794 and made still more energetic. Protective duties on foreign merchandise as originally imposed had proved inadequate. The predominating features of these early acts were, first and foremost, revenue; second, protection to our shipping, while protection to manufactures was decidedly incidental. The author characterizes as "inhospitable" the policy of Great Britain toward the United States during the thirty years following the adoption of our constitution, and shows a tendency to blame the former for subsidizing her merchant marine - although this policy of protection he would fain have the United States adopt. The book deals not only with history, but with romance. "The picturesque aspect of our ocean adventure is not," says the author, "less important than the economic and political." In this phase of his subject the writer is especially fortunate. The following quotation from his preface illustrates his point of view: No heroes of the Iliad or the Crusades were bolder than the merchant navigators of the young republic. Our national independence was really won and maintained for us upon the sea by the splendid constancy, valor, and skill of the armed crews of our trading ships, whalers, and fishermen, who in the Revolution were almost as numerous as, and far more effective than, the entire army of Washington. Again, in the Civil War, it was the sea power of the Union, composed largely of merchant ships and four-fifths of merchant officers and sailors, which swung the balance against the seceding states. Even in our short conflict with Spain, the merchant fleet proved a reserve ready and indispensable. G. M. F. La France et le marché du monde. By GEORGES BLONDEL. Paris: L. Larose, 1901. 12m0, pp. xi + 164. THE last volume of the JOURNAL contained (December, 1901, pp. 127-30) a review of Georges Blondel's book on The Industrial and Commercial Rise of the German People. In discussing the development of German manufactures and commerce, the French economist called the attention of his countrymen to the causes of the much greater progress made in Germany than in France. In a more recent pamphlet, entitled France and the World Market, which represents a collection of papers read by M. Blondel in eastern France at the request of the Committee for the Defense of the National Interests, he treats the causes of the inferiority of France in a somewhat different light: his purpose is "to show the progress made today by the young nations, to prove by figures that France, although better endowed than most of its neighbors, adapts itself less well than they to the contemporary evolution and presently loses its superiority, its customers, its prestige." In a brief introduction Blondel points to the progress of machinery and the means of transportation, and to the influx of agricultural products into Europe from abroad. He then describes (pp. 12-51) the economic rise of the "new countries." He begins with the United States, sketches the rapid increase of its exports in the last decade, and attributes it to a better utilization of the capabilities of the workers, to a wider use and greater perfection of tools and machinery, and to the standardization of products. He points to the rise of the mineral, metal, and textile industries in the United States, to the development of the trusts, and to the canals and railways. He subsequently takes up the development of Canada, Mexico, South America, Japan, China, India, and Australasia. The treatment of Japan is especially full of interesting details. In a second chapter (pp. 51-89) he attempts to show by what methods the other European countries aim to adapt themselves to the economic evolution. This discussion is necessarily extremely fragmentary; yet it contains some details which are very suggestive. I would especially call attention to his description of the commercial rise of northern Italy. The main reasons for the slow development of France are, according to him (pp. 89-124), as follows: (1) the small fecundity, which from a military standpoint is a national danger, slackens the colonization of the foreign possessions of France, which is the more difficult on account of the dislike of the French to emigrate, and makes both the parents and the children less diligent and energetic; (2) the insufficiency of the inland navigation, mainly due to the lack of canals and the awkward arrangement of the existing canals, and to the lac of co-operation between the railways and the water transportation; (3) the spirit of individualism; (4) the defects of the educational system, producing too strong a trend toward the liberal professions and the governmental service, and insufficiently preparing the young Frenchman for industrial and commercial pursuits. In his conclusion (pp. 124-37), however, he warns his compatriots against being too pessimistic. The qualities of the French people, the admirable resources of the country, the rise of some industries in eastern France give him some hope of betterment. The remedy is not so simple as certain persons imagine; it is even very complicated. But it essentially consists in a better use of our qualities and our resources, of our forces and our good will, in a more disinterested effort to combine forces which up to the present time we seem willing to put in opposition to one another, in a more constant care of the general interests of our country, which we sacrifice to our personal hobbies and our mean ambitions. As in the case of his earlier writings, Blondel again deserves credit for the large number of bibliographical notes accompanying his discussion. R. R. KUCZYNSKI. BERLIN. Die amerikanische Gefahr. By M. PRAGER. Berlin: Leonhard Simion, 1902. 8vo, pp. 33. MR. PRAGER'S earlier investigations of American economic conditions were devoted to the monetary and banking question. This paper 1Die Währungsfrage in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika. Stuttgart, 1897. Die Währungs- und Bankreform in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Berlin, 1900 (cf. this JOURNAL, December, 1900, p. 150). represents an address delivered on January 16, 1902, before the Munich Economic Society on the general problem of the present relations between the United States and Germany. It is one of the few among the many pamphlets on "the American danger" published in recent years which, on account of the unbiased and critical mind of its author, deserves to be studied by everyone interested in the question. The quintessence of Prager's argumentation is about as follows: "The American danger" has become the pretext of all high-tariff tendencies in Germany. The "danger" is said to consist in the active balance of trade, the increasing American manufacturing competition, and the growing strength of the capital of the Americans. Mr. Prager, after a careful investigation of these three points, reaches the conclusion that none of them constitutes a real danger for Germany. L'Impérialisme allemand. By MAURICE Lair. R. R. K. Paris: Armand It THIS is a book for general readers rather than for students. opens with a chapter of general reflections on the spread and present status of commercial imperialism among the greater powers, which is followed by a survey of the events, military, political, industrial and commercial, that have given Germany her policy of armed peace and commercial expansion. It is well and fluently written, from the standpoint of a sympathetic observer, though not with the animus of a friend or apologist. The upshot of the argument is that Germany as a commercial world-power, and therefore also as a military world-power, has reached, if it has not passed, its culmination. The thirty-years' period of prosperity has been of the nature of a speculative inflation, the advantages of which have inured to the large capitalists and have not been balanced by any comparable amelioration of the lot of the populace. The outcome is a lowering and coarsening of national ideals and a spread of popular discontent. Germany is at the end of her career of brilliant commercial and military achievements, because she is short of resources, as compared with her rivals, and is politically unstable because of class antagonism and moral deterioration. Imperialism: A Study. By J. A. HOBSON. New York: James THOSE readers who hold that a well-balanced judgment consists in always finding as much in favor of any political course as against it will be discon tented with the treatment here given. For the study is distinctively one of social pathology, and no endeavor is made to disguise the malignity of the disease. (Preface, p. vi.) Although the new imperialism has been bad business for the nation, it has been good business for certain classes and certain trades within the nation. The vast expenditure on armaments, the costly wars, the grave risks and embarrassments of foreign policy, the stoppage of political and social reforms within Great Britain, though fraught with great injury to the nation, have served well the present business interests of certain industries and professions. (Pp. 5) Ab These influences, primarily economic, though not unmixed with other sentimental motives, are particularly operative in military, clerical, academic, and civil-service circles, and furnish an interested bias toward imperialism throughout the educated classes. [But] by far the most important economic factor in imperialism is the influence relating to investments. (P. 54.) It is not too much to say that the modern foreign policy of Great Britain is primarily a struggle for profitable markets of investment. . . . This is, perhaps, the most important fact in modern politics, and the obscurity in which it is wrapped constitutes the gravest danger to our state. (P. 60.) 55.34 If, contemplating the enormous expenditure on armaments, the ruinous wars, the diplomatic audacity of knavery by which modern governments seek to extend their territorial power, we put the plain, practical question, Cui bono? the first and most obvious answer is, The investor. (P.) 5 The investor needs new fields of investments because the home domain does not afford a field for investment equally profitable with the investments already made. This state of the case, which furnishes the most substantial ground of imperialist expansion, is due to two circumstances: (1) because of a very unequal distribution of income, which leaves the greater part of the population unable to satisfy their reasonable needs, the output of industry exceeds what there is a demand for at remunerative prices; (2) because the incomes from the larger holdings of invested wealth exceed the consumptive powers of the holders, there results an automatic accumulation of wealth in the hands of the large holders, and this increment can not find investment at profitable rates within the community and so seeks opportunity elsewhere under the protection of the flag. This is the "economic tap-root of imperialism." In this connection Mr. Hobson restates, in cogent terms, his well-known theory of over-production, or under-consumption; but the criticism of this theory does not belong here. He points out that the incentive to the employment of the governmental machinery and the public funds for private gain in this way is very direct and strong, since the burden falls on the nation, while the gain goes to |