The following is a correct abstract of the indictment :—

"The traversers stand indicted for having conspired and confederated together to raise and create discontent and disaffection amongst her Majesty's subjects, and to excite them to hatred and contempt of the government and constitution of the realm as by law established, and to unlawful and seditious opposition to the said government and constitution, and to stir up hatred, jealousy, and ill-will between different classes of her Ma esty's subjects, and especially to promote amongst her Majesty's snbjects in Ireland, feelings of ill-will and hostility towards and against her Majesty's subjects in England; and to excite discontent and disaffectiou in the army; and to cause large numbers of persons to meet together at different times, and at different places, for the unlawful purpose of obtaining by means of the intimidation to be thereby created, and by means of the exhibition and demonstration of great physicial force at such meetings, changes and alterations in the government, laws, and constitution of this realm, as by law established; and particularly by those means to bring about and accomplish a dissolution of the legislative union between Great Britain and Ireland; and also by means of imflamatory and seditious speeches and addresses, and by seditious publications, to intimidate parliament, and thereby bring about changes and alterations in the laws and constitution of this realm, as now by law established; and to bring into hatred and disrepute the tribunals established for the administration of justice, and to diminish the confidence of the Queen's subjects in the administration of the law therein; and to assume and usurp the prerogative of the crowm in the establishment of courts for the administration of the law."

The Attorney-General then rose to address the jury, and said they had been empannelled on the present occasion to perform the important duty of deciding upon the guilt or innocence of the several traversers arraigned npon the partly read indictment. It was not necessary for him (the Attorney-General to impress on their minds the necessity of giving their anxious and undivided attention to the momentous questions which would be brought before them. His learned friend Mr. Napier, had already stated to them the charge which had been brought forward against the several traversers; but in order to impress it upon their minds, and that they might be enabled to understand the case as it proceeded, he would take leave again to call their attention to the general nature of the charge brought against the defendants, The traversers stand indicted for having conspired and confederated to create disaffection and discontent, and to create hatred against the constitution and government as by law established, and to stir up ill-will among various classes, especially towards her Majesty's subjects in England, to render the army disaffected, and by unlawful means and demonstrations of physical force to alter the laws and constitution of this country as at present established, and by means of these proceedings dissolve the legislative union between Great Britain and Ireland; also discontent and want of confidence in the administration of the law, and with usurping and assuming the prerogatives of the crown in the formation of courts for the administration of law though the country. He(the Attorney-General) wished to bring under the notice and

consideration of the jury the precise nature of these charges. He thought it would be convenient and proper before he opened the facts of the case, that he should make some observations relative to the law of conspiracy; by doing so it would enable the jury to apply the observations he would have to make, and enable them to understand more distinctly the case in all its bearings as he proceeded in the statement of it; and, of course, in stating the law, he stated it in the presence of the court, the jury bearing in mind, that they were not to take the law from him, nor from the counsel for the traversers, except so far as it might meet with the concurrence and approval of their lordships. With respect to the law of conspiracy, it was a crime which consisted either in a combination and agreement by persons to do some illegal act or acts, or to effect a legal purpose by illegal means; and a confederacy to effect either an illegal object, or even a perfectly legal object by unlawful means, is, in contemplation of law, criminal, and amounted to á conspiracy.

This definition was given of the crime by Lord Denman and the other judges, in the case of the King v Jones, in 4 Barnwall and Adolphus, 349 and 350, Mr. Justice Parke stating that the indictment ought to have shown a conspiracy to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. The same principle and rule of law was laid down by the late Chief Justice Bushe, in that court, in the case of the King v Forbes and others, in Mr. Green's (the present Solicitor General) report. Chief Justice Bushe, in giving the judgement of the court, stated that, "where two or more persons confederate together for the effecting of an illegal purpose, or to effect a legal purpose by unlawful means, even although such purpose should never be effected, the merely confederating constitutes the crime, though the object be not effected." In a more recent case the Queen v Murphy, 8, Carrington and Payne, page 310, the law of conspiracy was described by Mr. Justice Coleridge. He says " You have been properly told that this being a charge of conspiracy, if you are of opinion that the acts, though done, were done without common concert and design between these two parties, the present charge cannot be supported. On the other hand, I am bound to tell you, that although the common design is the root of the charge, it is not necessary to prove that these two parties came together and actually agreed in terms to have this common design, and to pursue it by common means, and so to carry it into execution, This is not necessary, because in many cases of the most clearly established conspiracies there are no means of proving any such thing, and neither law nor common sense requires that it should be proved. If you find that these two persons pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part of an act and the other another part of the same act, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object which they were pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion that they have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.

The question you have to ask yourselves is-Had they this common design, and did they pursue it by these common means, the design being unlawful? I ought also to tell you that by finding the defendants guilty you will not (as has been said) affect the right of petitioning. It is not wrongful to assemble in a public meeting to petition parliament against

that which is alleged to be a public grievance; neither is it unlawful to refuse payment of the church-rate in money, and to leave the collector to obtain payment by taking the goods of the party, as is constantly done in the case of the Quakers; but it is unlawful by means like those charged in this indictment; it need not be proved that these defendants met to concoct this scheme, nor is it necessary that they should have originated it. If a conspiracy be already formed, and a person joins afterwards, he is equally guilty. You are to say whether, from the acts that have been proved, you are satisfied that these defendents have been acting in concert in this matter. If you are satisfied that there was concert between them, I am bound to say, that being convinced of the conspiracy, it is not necessary that you should find both Mr. Murphy and Mr. Douglas doing each particular act, as, after the part of a conspiracy is once established in your minds, whatever is either said or done by either of the defendants in pursuance of the common design, is both in law and in common sense to be considered as the act of both. After evidence has been given that parties are engaged in a conspiracy to carry out an unlawful design, the acts of one are evidence against the other; and what a person writes with the view of carrying out that common design is evidence against all, the legal principle being that scribere est agere"-Rex v. Stone, 6 Term Reports, 527. In the King v. Watson, 32, State Trials, case 7, Justice Bayley said, "It is not necessary to show previous concert amongst the persons charged to carry out an arranged plan. It is enough to show that at some stage he has co-operated in furtherance of the common object of all." That then was the general law relating to conspiracy, and it was also laid down in the 9th C. and P. 275, and the 25th vol. of Howell's State Trials, 1004, 1151, and 1153. The learned gentleman then called the particular attention of their lordships to a case of great moment, as bearing upon the subject of unlawful assemblies. In the same reports (Starkey's), page 103, the same judge (Bayley) who had tried the case of the King v. Hunt, said—" All persons assembled to sow sedition and bring into contempt the constitution are an unlawful assembly; all persons assembled in furtherance of this object are unlawfully assembled too" In the next page the same judge says, "If the object of the drilling is to secure the attention of the persons drilled to disaffected speeches, and give confidence by an appearance of strength to those willing to join them, that would be illegal; or if they were to say, We will have what we want whether it is agreeable to law or not;' a meeting for that purpose, however, it may be masked, if it is really for a purpose of that kind, would be illegal." In page 112, in the case of Bedfor v. Birley and others. Lord Tenderton said, "It was therefore of the utmost importance to shew what was said by persons going to, or preparing to go to, such a meeting. Doubtless, in an assembly of this kind, many persons would go from different motives; some would go from mere curiosity; there would be others who would think there were public grievances which a meeting of this description might prevent; others might go meditating mischief immediately; others might again go there who meditated mischief at a future time, whom those drilled, who up to this period had been without arms, might have arrived at a future stage in military discipline." In the case of the Queen v. Vincent, Frost, and Edwards, 9

Carrington and Payne, 275, the traversers were found gulty on this charge. "A conspiracy to excite discontent and disaffection amongst the subjects of the crown, and to excite them to hatred and contempt of the government and constitution, and to unlawful and seditious opposition to the government, is an undoubted crime, and of a most serious character," He would be told, forsooth, that the meetings dispersed peaceably. Why the dispersion of those meetings peaceably, and the intention that should disperse peaceably, was one of the most aggravated parts they of the whole proceeding. The multitude were peaceable, because the parties new that the time had not arrived for an outbreak, "The hour of England's infirmity was to be Irelands opportunity!" That was the language of oue of the traversers. "Wait-will you be ready to come when we call you? You must wait till the time arrives.' If that course were not adopted, the conspiracy would necessarily be broken up at a much earlier period, because part of the conspiracy was to have the organization complete from north to south and from east to west. Then the signal was to be given; therefore it was that those meetings peaceably dispersed. In the case of the King v. Yorke, which was an indictment for a conspiracy to excite discontent and disaffection amongst the subjects of the crown, and to procure large numbers of persons to assemble together to hear seditious and inflammatory speeches, villifying the House of Commons and the government, Mr. justice Rooke in his charge to the jury said "You are, therefore, to consider whether it was the intention of the defendants to enlighten the minds of the people upon a speculative point, or to carry them a step further and excite a spirit of discontent, disaffection and sedition in their minds.

If you be of opinion that the defendant uttered those speeches with that view, or that they had that tendency, even though he may not have had that design; yet if a man will in a public assembly utter words having a seditious tendency, he must take the consequences; and he can no more justify himself for what he has done by saying he did not think it would have had that consequence, than a man who would fire a pistol among a crowd would be allowed to say, I did not think my pistol would have gone so far, or that a man shall be allowed to say, I only loved the effect of powder, and did not think it would have killed the man." Mr. Justice Rooke further said-" The defendant supported his speculative principles of annual parliaments and universal suffrage, and says he has uttered no more than what may be found in the speeches of such men as the late Lord Chatham, Lord Camden, and others." And he then says"If the conduct of the defendant here had been merely a speculation of his own it would have been a different thing; but when those speculations are gone forth in a large assembly, it will be for you to judge whether you will give him credits or the finnocence of his intentions; and whether he did not address them with a view to inflame their minds and their passions." Again-" Others again might go there (as Lord Tenderden. said) who meditated mischief at some future time, when those drilled, who up to this period had been without arms, might have arrived at a further stage in military discipline." In page 113, he proceeded― "When we consider that these country people came marching in this way, through the town of Manchester, bearing flags and banners,

inscribed with mottoes, not merely containing high sounding words, but inscriptions of No Corn Laws'- Better die like freemen than sold like slaves,' and various other expressions of defiance, it is manifest that there was an avowed intention to insult those who were entrusted with the administration of justice and the laws; and, if possible, by a show of numbers, to overawe and prevent them from interfering with the object their leader might be supposed to have had." In the case of Bedford v. Birley, reported 3 Starkie's Nisi Prius Cases, p. 99, an action was brought against some of the persons who dispersed the Manchester meeting, pleas of justification were put in, and there was a verdict for the defendant. Mr. Justice Holroyd, who tried the case, in summing up to the jury, said "There is likewise another plea which has let in a great deal of the evidence, viz., that there was a previous seditious conspiracy to excite discontent amougst the King's subjects, entered into by divers seditious persons for the purpose of exciting disaffection, and hatred and contempt of the government and constitution as by law established; and by unlawful means and combinations to alter the government and constitution of the realm; and then in one of the pleas the drillings are alleged which are stated to be clandestine. But whether they were clandestine or not, if they were done for the purpose of exciting tumult or resistance to the civil power, they would be unlawful." In another part of his charge to the jury he cites the opinion of Judge Bailey. Lord Tenterden having given judgment, Justice Bailey followed; and in page 116 he said; "It appears by the evidence in the case, that the meeting was composed of an immense number of persons; a very large display, therefore, of physical strength. Judge Bailey, in his charge to the jury, in the King v. Hunt, stated that "all persons assembled to sow sedition, and bring into contempt the constitution, are an unlawful assembly; all persons assembled in furtherance of this object are unlawfully assembled too." Mr Justice Holroyd also cited as the law another part of Judge Bailey's charge in the King v. Hunt, which is as follows:---"What are the objects of the leader; the person who means to occupy the chair; the persons intending to take distingushed parts in it? What are the objects of those who bear the flags or banners? Those are to be considered with reference to the inscriptions. What are the objects of those who have been drilled? If the object of the drilling is to secure the attention of the persons drilled to disaffected speeches, and give confidence by an appearance of strength to those willing to join them that would be illegal; or if they were to say, ‘we will have what we want, whether it is agreeable to law or not, a meeting for that purpose, however it may be masked, if it is really for a purpose of that kind, is illegal," A motion for a new trial having been made, the case was carried into the Court of Queen's Bench. Lord Tenterden, in giving judgment, stated, amongst other matters, "the conduct of persons probably and apparently going towards the meeting would undoubtedly be evidence, for it is by such evidence only you are able to discover that which, though not the professed, was the real object of the meeting; for it is evident such a meeting would not be held at all, if they did not at least take care to hold forth a legitimate object.