It is claimed, further, that the acts and declarations of Christopher C. Dexter, about the time of procuring the charter, and in endeavoring to effect a sale of shares in the corporation, estop, not only Dexter himself but all the defendants, to deny that the lime-rock incorporated, extended to the place where they are now excavating. These representations, as charged, consist in representing that the rock of the corporation extended under the meadow and under the whole farm of which he was part owner.

If the other parties to this act of incorporation have been by representations of the defendants misled to their injury, and upon the faith of such representations have been induced to vest their money or their property in the stock of this company, and must now suffer loss unless such representations are held to be true, the general rule of law would require that the defendants should be estopped to deny that they were true.

The objection in his case is, first, that the representations were not made by all the defendants or by all the owners of the rock claimed, but by one tenant in common only, and the remedy asked can not be given without at the same time doing an injury to the other tenant in common, who is not responsible for the representations made; it would be in effect compelling A to make good B's default. There is another objection, that while Christopher Dexter, one of the defendants, was making the representations here charged, other members of the corporation, and who became such by virtue of their ownership of lime-rock on the western farm, were making representations of precisely an opposite character; that no lime-rock upon the farm was designed to be made corporate property except the ledges then worked, and that it was not intended to include other lime-rock. There is a third objection, that whatever the representations were which were made by C. C. Dexter, it does not appear that the corporation, or any member of the corporation, was misled by them, or ever acted upon them, either in applying for the charter or in the purchase of stock in the corporation.

The plaintiffs having failed to establish their right to the lime-rock which the defendants are excavating, this bill, which prays that the defendants be enjoined from further excavating, must be dismissed with costs.

SNODGRASS V. WARD.

(3 Haywood, 40. Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee, 1816.)

Privilege extended by local evidence of description. Articles of agreement were made for erecting iron works. Such articles called for a conveyance of a half interest in five acres, part of a certain 100 acres called the Cat-tail Meadow. Such 100 acres were parcel of one 640-acre tract at that time. The articles further provided "that Snodgrass shall have free privilege of timber necessary for coal and building that may be requisite for said works:" Held, that evidence of the local situation of the entire tract was admissible, and that the privilege would extend to the entire tract.

Personal liability where title fails to pass. And it was further Held, that the articles did not prevail against a deed to a stranger, though the maker was personally liable on the articles to make good his privilege.

PER CURIAM.

Ward sued Snodgrass in the County Court of Carter, in an action of trespass for prostrating and destroying his trees. The defendant pleaded not guilty; and secondly, that the place where, etc., belonged to the father of Snodgrass, who entered by his father's command, which is the same trespass, etc. Replication that the place where, etc., was the soil and freehold of the plaintiff, and not the close of James Snodgrass, and that the defendant did not enter the close, etc., as his servant; upon this issue is joined. Verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment, and the defendant appealed to the circuit court. In September term, 1816, there was a verdict in the circuit court for the plaintiff, a bill of exceptions was filed, an appeal taken to this court, and errors assigned.

The bill of exceptions states a deed produced by the plaintiff, on the trial, from Johnson to him, for 640 acres of land. This land, it was proved the plaintiff purchased from John Wills, who had a deed from Johnson, unregistered. Johnson, at the request of Wills, took back this deed and conveyed the same lands to the plaintiff. It was also proved that this land joined a hundred acres called the Cat-tail Meadow, on which hundred acres the defendant's father and said Wills erected a forge in partnership; before which partnership Wills had purchased the said 640 acres.

That Snodgrass used it for some years, cutting timber on it

for the forge, Wills acquiescing. On this tract of 640 acres, the trespass declared of was committed. Whilst the title was in Wills, articles were made between the father and Wills, for erecting said iron works, dated the 16th of April, 1808, by which Wills is to convey to Snodgrass the one half of five acres of land, part of a 100 acres, called the Cat-tail Meadow; and amongst others, there is a clause "that Snodgrass shall have free privilege of timber necessary for coal and building, that may be requisite for said works, for his part of the same likewise," etc. The defendant offered in evidence two depositions, which the court rejected. These depositions explained the articles so as to make them comprehend the 640 acres as part of the land on which Snodgrass was to take timber. Evidence describing the property where a deed speaks of property contracted about, is admissible to enable the court to apply the deed to it or not, according to the words of the deed; but it is not admissible to show that the meaning of the terms contained in the deed extends to it or not. Therefore the depositions were properly rejected, and the evidence to show the local situation of the 640 acres, and other parts of its description was proper. The court is of opinion that the words of this article did extend to the 640 acres, for that and the 100 acres were all one tract at the date of these articles.

Timber requisite, etc., does not confine him to any particular part of the land, but leaves him at liberty to take it from any part. He might as well be confined to the 640 as the 100, and thus alternately he could be excluded from both. But when we have progressed thus far, what next is to be done? These articles do not give an interest in the land; ́ they only make Wills personally liable for a breach, and if he convey the land to a third person, it is in his hands exclusively, his own against all mankind, the articles notwithstanding, and he can maintain an action against any who shall trespass upon it.

The defendant's remedy is upon his articles against Wills. Judgment for the plaintiff in the circuit court.

1

JOHNSTON ET AL. V. SHELTON ET AL.

(4 Iredell Eq. 85. Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1845.)

1 Vague entry, insufficient—Notice. An entry so vague that it affords no notice to a second enterer, who both surveys and pays before the first entry is made sufficiently specific, is void as to such subsequent entry. Insufficient description. An entry of "640 acres beginning on the line dividing the counties of Haywood and Macon, at a point at or near Lowe's Bear-pen on the Hogback mountain and running various courses, for complement," is in itself too vague and indefinite; it would amount to a floating right.

An entry must amount to notice. An enterer has no equity or collateral claim independent of the entry; the entry should be definite in itself or be made so by a survey, otherwise it gives no notice to affect the conscience of others.

Cause removed from the Court of Equity of Haywood County, at the Fall Terin, 1845.

The case, as far as concerns the questions determined in the Supreme Court, was as follows:

On the 30th day of August, 1842, the plaintiffs made their entries, in the office of the entry-taker of vacant land in the county of Haywood. The first was, "No. 1440, for 640 acres of land, beginning on the line dividing the counties of Haywood and Macon, at a point at or near Lowe's Bear-pen on the Hogback mountain and running various courses for complement." The two others were each for 640 acres adjoining the first; the one lying east, and the other north of it, the Hogback mountain was in a wild tract of country, nearly all mountains, but little explored, and having very few inhabitants.

The object of the plaintiffs in making the entries, was to obtain lands that were then supposed to be rich in minerals, and particularly gold, at the heads of Tuckasegee river; and about the same time, they entered a number of tracts on the opposite side of the line, in Macon. The plaintiffs were unacquainted with the part of the country in which the lands

1 A gold mine had been discovered and was "the bone of this contention" between the date of the plaintiffs and defendants' entries. An "entry" was the original notice preparatory to perfecting title to North Carolina public land and corresponds in many particulars to the present district or county record of a mining claim.

were situate, and received from other persons the information, on which they selected the locations and descriptions of their entries. The Hogback mountain consists of two distinet knobs, now known as "The Hogback" and "The Little Hogback," extending together about four or five miles, and having between them a deep depression or gap, two miles wide or near it; though formerly, both knobs were known by hunters as "The Hogback," simply, and it so continued, as understood by some persons, to the beginning of this controversy. The Big Hogback and the Little Hogback are both in the line between Haywood and Macon, which there runs nearly east and west for six or seven miles. On the former was a Bear-pen, which was known to some as "Lowe's Bear-pen," and to others as the "Locust Bear-pen;" and west from the Little Hogback, near the county line, there were two Bearpens, that had been built by a hunter, named Lowe, which were within six or seven hundred yards of the western foot of the Little Hogback mountain, in a valley or gap of the Blue Ridge.

In September, 1842, the defendants, Reeves, Shelton and C. Hooper, made an entry of 640 acres lying also on the county line west from the Little Hogback somewhat more than a mile and running north from the county line, and then west, south and east to the beginning. At the time they made their entry, they saw the previous entries of the plaintiffs; but they say that, from their knowledge of that part of the country, they be lieved their entry would not be within five miles of the plaintiffs' land as described in their entries; and that, when the entry-taker saw the defendants' entries, he was of the same opinion. Thereupon the defendants made their entry.

At the same time, they took copies of the entries of the complainant, in order that they might submit them to the judgment of others, as to the lands they would cover, and with the intention of abandoning their own entry, in case it would interfere with the plaintiffs' entries. At that time, the defendants had discovered near the county line a deposit gold mine, and it was the object of their entry to obtain a grant for it; and their entry was so laid as just to include it in the south-east corner of the tract, being that part of it which lies nearest to the entries of the plaintiffs. The defendants