the disposition of all contracted and little minds, when they have attained any eminence above their fellows, to spurn and abuse the ladder by which they had ascended.

Should you think, or know him, to be worth an advice, I wish, Mr. Editor, that you would advise him to attend, for at least twelve months, the Head Master in the English Department of the Royal Institution, that he may learn to express himself in intelligible English; and when, in the Logic Class, he shall have learned something of accurate definitions, and the lucid arrangement of ideas, he may become, in reality, a Student of Moral Philosophy; and you might then recommend him to that elegant and erudite philosopher, Professor Ferrie, who, I am informed, is able to convert the feminine into a masculine mind, to demonstrate that all men are endowed originally with equal capacities for science and ears for music, and who has a "MILL," in which he can manufacture perfect stupidity into pure intelligence.

At present the poor boy has much to unlearn before he can study to advantage. In almost every thing he mistakes himself. He imagines that he is witty, though totally destitute of wit, and learned, though devoid of lite. rature. He is self-important without dignity, flippant without facility, and through the whole Article he asserts superiority over his opponent, where every one sees, that he is like a dwarf looking big at a giant.

Where he is intelligible, his philosophical absurdities are too palpable and gross to require pointing out. They can do no other harm to your readers than defrauding them of so many pages of useful matter. “Truth,” says he, "is either an attribute of mind, or it is nothing," in proof of which he quotes, "truth in the inward parts." Does the novice believe that truth must be an attribute of mind because it may enter and dwell in it? Then on the same principle, his head is a mere attribute of his hat, be cause forsooth it is often in it. "Truth," says he again, "is either in the mind, or it is no where." Then it was not a truth that the earth revolved on its axis till the discovery entered the mind of an astronomer, that the same blood circulated through the veins and arteries till the fact was taught by Hervey, or that earth, air, and water were compound bodies till modern chemists made the discovery. But I must not waste your time with such genuine "TRASH." The Student says, "a proposition is

a series of words," and that "truth cannot with any propriety be called an attribute of words." Now as his whole twelve closely printed pages are "a series of words," it is not strange if truth is not even an attribute of them, nor to be found in them.

I hope when you are next compelled to do an "act of justice" to a correspondent, it will be less an act of injustice to your readers; and am

Yours faithfully,

NE SUTOR ULTRA CREPIDAM.

[We beg to assure our Correspondent, that we had, in last Number, actually prepared a key to the Student's lock, by a running commentary of foot notes. The want of room prevented their insertion, We owe an apology to our readers for commencing and continuing a metaphysical subject. But we feel that its paramount importance to the education of students for the ministry, demanded, and continues to demand, attention. We have good reason to know that the Remarks on the Student's letters have produced a deep impression upon the minds of the Presbyterian Ministers of Ulster, and that they will lead to resolutions and results, which the Student and his friends should wisely endeavour to render unnecessary.

When we published the Student's unintelligible, and almost interminable reply, we did so from a sense of justice to all parties. We think we also obliged the public. For we have often been asked for a definition of metaphysics-and as often felt our utter incapacity to afford it. But in our last Number, without a definition, we presented a genuine specimen from a "Master of the science of mind!" thus furnishing our readers with a draught of metaphysics, sparkling like English soda water, "fresh from the fountain" wherefore we conceive ourselves entitled to their thanks, rather than to their displeasure. However, as some of our readers seem dissatisfied, we shall, in our next Number, put an end to the present correspondence,

The text which the writer of the above letter has prefixed to it is appropriate. For the following reply, by "A Lover of true Philosophy," the next verse, "Answer not a fool according to his folly," would have

been an equally suitable motto.-EDIT.]

PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE ORTHODOX PRESBYTERIAN.
SIR,

I AM not surprized that the Student of Moral Philosophy has vented his choler by the most insolent abuse, for I certainly made a terrible exposure of his shallow pretensions; and abundantly demonstrated that he is a philosopher only in name. The petulance with which he treated Erasmus and the Ministers of the Synod of Ulster, demanded the most severe castigation; and his writhing under the lash, shows that the discipline has not been in vain. It is not bad practice in the medical art to take

a little blood, in order to lower the pulse; and his explanations sufficiently indicate that the fever is a little abated. Did any reader of the Review expect such an explanation about tracts, and the catechism? I found him a Neologian, I have lashed him into Orthodoxy. But the difference between my severity and his abuse must be obvious to any discerning eye at a glance. My charges against his penetration are all founded on the evidence before me. His abuse is a mere scold, without any foundation in my remarks. Accordingly, I am as good humoured as ever; while he is maddened from defeat. His virulence, without having found any thing in my strictures that he could justly expose, must appear to all who are able to judge between us, as giving me the hilt of his sword. I have already put him under my feet, and I shall now grind him to powder.

The dangerous tendency of his doctrine is what chiefly solicited my attention to the production of the Student; but my severity was owing to the indignation I felt at his insolence, while his own acquirements appeared so contemptible. My Remarks were intended to be as brief and as caustic as possible. That he should reply with keenness was very justifiable. Had he been able to expose me, I would have blamed him for sparing me. But what provoked him at Erasmus, who had treated him with such mildness and courteousness? Had Erasmus uttered one disrespectful word towards him? It is very likely that, with respect to religious doctrine, Erasmus and I might differ widely. I could not, however, but treat such a writer with respect, even where I differed from him. The letters to a literary lady, notwithstanding some oversights, such as will be found in all hasty publications, are a production that the Student will never equal. They bear the impression of a mind deeply imbued with polite literature, a concern for the morality and happiness of the human race, and an acquaintance with metaphysical writers, amply sufficient for a general scholar. But this pedant thought he had got him at an advantage, and he was resolved to let the world see that he had been reading modern metaphysics. Reading is very necessary, where excellence is aimed at. But no reading will make a philosopher. The man who does not possess a nice and strong power of discriminating between things that are different, though usually confounded, and of detecting identity when distinctions are made without a real difference, will never succeed in philosophical investigation. Without this talent truth cannot be deeply investigated, nor sophistry effectually exposed. Now I have charged the Student as being remarkably deficient in this respect; and he has not been able to deliver himself from the charge. I could have given many more instances than those which I selected; but from the most of these he has not even attempted to free himself. In one instance he has endeavoured to extricate himself from my grasp. How successfully let us

now see.

"The first thing meriting observation," says the Student, "is the criticism on the following passage in the Review:-'Alf knowledge, if it be genuine, i. e. if it be knowledge at all, is alike certain.' I hold this to be not only a correct, but an important statement. These are the terms in which it is spoken of by the Lover of true Philosophy. This observation does not discover the penetration of a metaphysician. It confounds knowledge with truth, and asserts of the former that which is true only of the latter. Truth is an attribute of a proposition, but knowledge is an attribute of mind. If a thing is true, it cannot be more true, but my knowledge of truth may be more certain. In truth there are no degrees;

in knowledge there may be many.'" The Student replies, that as his remark asserts nothing about truth, it cannot be charged with confounding truth with any thing. But may not two things be confounded, where only one of them is mentioned? He asks, is certainty not predicable of knowledge? Did I deny this? I ask, is all knowledge equally certain? Are there not degrees in knowledge?

"That the author," says he, "wrote the above remarks on my statement, is a fact that he knows." Very true; but am I as certain of every thing that I can call my knowledge, as I am that I wrote these cutting Remarks? Let a child judge between us.

"All that you know," says the Student, "is truth, and all truth is knowledge." Now here is another instance in which I will fix down on him the charge of want of philosophical acumen. All I know is truth, but all truth is not knowledge. Knowledge is not truth, but the perception of truth. Knowledge has truth for its object. There is much truth where there is no knowledge. Many truths would remain the same, had we no mind to perceive them. But there can be no knowledge where there is no mind. What think you of this metaphysical distinction, Mr. Student? Have I got this in my note-book? But is it not strange, that after rebuking me for supposing that he has confounded knowledge with truth, he should assert that all truth is knowledge?

He asks, "What is a proposition? Is it not a particular series of words?" A proposition is expressed by a particular series of words; but words abstracted from the thing they express, are not a proposition. The proposition is the assertion expressed by the words. This obvious dis tinction takes away the force of the question "Can truth, with any propriety, be called an attribute of words?" Truth is not an attribute of words, but it is an attribute of the assertion which the words express. "Not content, however," says the Student, "with affirming that truth is an attribute of words, you must deny that it is an attribute of mind." I have not assumed that it is an attribute of words; and I still affirm that it is not an attribute of mind. But the Student puts me down with Scripture. If he could do that fairly, I would submit with contrition and acknowledgments. My understanding I will submit to God; but on the figments of philosophers I will trample. "What think you," says the Student, "of truth in the inward parts?" I think highly of it; but I have the utmost contempt for the understanding that could so misapply the text. Is truth in the inward parts an attribute of the inward parts? Truth in this expression is represented as residing in the mind, not as an attribute of the mind. Is the man an attribute of his house? The Spirit of God is said to dwell in his people. Is he an attribute of their minds?

"What think you," says the Student, "of those who have not the truth in them?" Very badly, indeed, Mr. Student; very badly. Were they the best metaphysicians on earth they shall perish. The truth, however, dwells in the mind, whether it respects the Gospel, which is the great truth, or truth in general. Veracity is the word which expresses that attribute of mind, which prompts to tell truth. What stupidity or dishonesty does it indicate to quote such passages to prove that truth is an attribute of mind! What pity the Student would hot think of giving us a commentary on the Scriptures! From this specimen there can be no doubt that the lovers of the accommodation plan would have the richest mental feast.

Truth, Sir," says the Student, "is either an attribute of the mind, or it is nothing." Truth might be something, although no mind existed. Is there nothing but what is an attribute of mind? "It is either in mind, or it is no where." But is it the same thing to be in mind, and to be an attribute of mind? Is the soul an attribute of the body because it is in it? To say that truth dwells in the soul is a figurative way of saying, that the soul has a knowledge of the truth.

"The truths of chemistry," he adds, "do not lie folded up in chemical books, they are in the minds of chemists, else they have no existence in the world." On the contrary, the truths of chemistry were as really truths, before they were discovered, as they are now; and they would have been equally true, if men had never been created to observe them. These truths may be said also as far as they are discovered, to lie in chemical books. What expression more common than the truths contained in the Bible? What a sorry critic is this Student! Were it not for the importance of preventing this cholera morbus from spreading through the Province of Ulster, I would not waste a moment with him. Does that man deserve refutation who asserts that chemical truths cannot properly be said to lie in chemical books? This critic is below my contempt.

The Student says, he has no serious fault to find with my assertion, that knowledge is an attribute of mind; but he cautions me "against such an application of the word attribute, as it may lead on to the opinion that the mind, in course of time, acquires a vast multitude of attributes, and loses also a vast multitude," &c. I am not to be schooled in the use of words by authority so contemptible. My application of the word attribute is justified by the best use, nor is there any danger of the apprehended consequence. If knowledge in the abstract is said to be an attribute of mind, does this imply that every instance of the acquisition or loss of knowledge, is the acquisition or loss of an attribute? Knowledge absolutely considered is an attribute; a particular instance of knowledge is not an attribute. Does the man deny that my application of the term is according to the use of the language? Mr. Student, your eriticism is founded in your ignorance.

"He asks me, why no degrees in truth?" and he thinks that he refutes me by the question, "Can one man not have more truth in his mind than another has in his? One man may have more truth in his mind than another has in his, that is, one man may know more truths than another; but in truth itself there are no degrees. The thing that is true cannot be more true. If he cannot see this in the terms, I must give him up as a hopeless blockhead. He attempts however to perplex me with the -question, "does any one portion of knowledge admit of degrees." My knowledge of any truth, which I know imperfectly, admits degrees. It is easy to bring the matter to the test. Is it not usual to speak of imperfect and of perfect knowledge? This is the universal decision of mankind against the Student. I am sure that I might appeal to the Ladies of Belfast for the distinction between truth and knowledge, which their ignorant instructor confounds. Though their education was so shamefully neglected before he came among them; though he represents them as persons who have yet to make the exertions that will establish their claim to the rank of reasonable and accountable creatures, I think there is not one of them that could not teach him the proper use of English words. I think their good taste would set a higher value on the rebuke of Erasmus, than on the grossly indelicate defence of the Student,