extravagance of phrenzy, than the works of many, who are regarded by their followers as most distinguished moral philosophers. With respect to all such, I identify myself fully with Erasmus in his indignant vituperation.

I do not however agree with the Reviewer in another observation on this subject. "All knowledge," says he, "if it be genuine, i. e. if it be knowledge at all, is alike certain." This observation does not discover the penetration of a metaphysician. It confounds knowledge with truth; and asserts of the former, that which is true only of the latter. Truth is an attribute of a proposition; but knowledge is an attribute of mind. If a thing is true, it cannot be more true; but my knowledge of truth may be made more certain. In truth there are no degrees; in knowledge there may be many. Now if this metaphysician jumbles things so palpably distinct, are we to depend upon the accuracy of his powers, in things beyond the ken of human intellect, or at least residing on the utmost verge of its province. If his eye cannot distinguish between well-defined lines upon paper, shall we give him credit, when he pretends to draw a line between the various colours in the rainbow?

In his allusion to religious tracts, we have a specimen of the purest malignity, rancour, and bigotry, that ever were exhibited. "Such trash as blackguard boys go about vending for a penny," &c. I shall not say one word in vindication of the obnoxious tracts. That is not my business at present. My business is with the candour and integrity of the Reviewer in this charge. Why are the boys who sell religious tracts called blackguard boys? Is the connexion between the selling of religious tracts and blackguardry (if I may use the word) a necessary connexion. To me this single expression manifests the mind of the writer, more authoritatively than whole_volumes of profession and cant about religious liberty. The man who has designated a whole class of his fellow-creatures as blackguards, merely as the venders of tracts whose doctrines he does not relish, is a calumniator. I would not trust him on the bench, when religion is concerned. Had he absolute power, notwithstanding all his boasting of religious liberty, to the hated Evangelicals, at least, persecution would be certain. Ballad-singers and Atheistical metaphysicians might find protection, but the venders of evangelical tracts would suffer as a public nuisance.

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Blackguards surely ought to be restrained. But all who go about vending evangelical tracts are blackguards.— Ergo, as our Reviewer would say, tract-venders ought to be restrained.

The benefits which, the Reviewer says, the science of mind promises, are "freedom from prejudice, and a power to detect all manner of sophistry." If so, he has made small progress in the science himself. With respect to the point at issue between Hume and Dr. Reid, the Reviewer asserts, "The Doctor merely begged the question in dispute." Here again is an instance of a want of metaphysical discrimination. I say nothing of the merits of the two systems. But even granting that all Dr. Reid's first principles are false, it is not true that he begged the question in dispute between him and the sceptic. In the begging of the question, the truth of the thing is inadvertently assumed: on false first principles, the thing taken for granted is avowed, and assent demanded on the evidence that must appear to the mind of the opponent himself. When Dr. Reid takes for granted, that there are such objects as the senses testify, he does not beg the question, but demands the assent of his opponent as a rational being: if he refuses it, he turns away from him as a lunatic. "If common sense," says the Reviewer, "drive men, as it did Dr. Reid, to appeal from the reflecting and well instructed few, to the thoughtless and ill informed multitude, in proof of philosophical positions," &c.

Never was an instance of grosser calumny put on paper. Dr. Reid did not "appeal from the reflecting and well instructed few, to the thoughtless and ill informed multitude." His appeal is to all men who are not simpletons. His appeal is not to the ignorant, in opposition to the learned; but to men in general, having an ordinary portion of understanding. His appeal then includes both classes, and does not address one to the exclusion of the other. And all men, learned and ignorant, except a few metaphysical madmen, have decided in his favour. The great body of the learned, as well as of the ignorant, in all ages, have believed the testimony of the senses. Nay, Dr. Reid had the practical testimony even of his opponent's in all their lucid intervals. It was only during the paroxysm of their lunacy in their study, that they were able to divest themselves of the common belief. Nor is it true, Mr. Studont, that this appeal respected "philoso

phical positions." It respected self-evident truths, of which the ignorant were as good judges as the learned. The eye of a common drayman is as good a judge whether a carriage is meeting him, as the metaphysical eye of The Student himself. If a philosopher, the humblest, the soundest, that ever received the name, is so used by this disciple of the new school, what can evangelical tract-venders expect but the appellation of "blackguard boys!?" His principles of common sense Dr. Reid considered selfevident truths; let us then hear his definition of a selfevident truth. "Self-evident propositions," says he, “are those which appear evident to any man of sound understanding, who apprehehends the meaning of them distinctly, and attends to them without prejudice."-Vol. I. 242. Is this an appeal from learning to ignorance?

Dugald Stewart, though he designates the same truths fundamental laws of human belief, yet is careful to clear Dr. Reid of the charges, which uncandid opponents might take occasion to ground on the term. He represents them merely as title-page readers, to whom the appellation, common sense, "had the appearance of appealing from the verdict of the learned to the voice of the multitude." If, then, the sentiments of an author in the hands of all are so much misrepresented by this metaphysician, is he to be trusted, when he pretends to explore the darkest recesses of the soul? Is he above the suspicion of perverting the facts which he pretends to produce from the human mind? Are his conclusions from these facts to be viewed as the unprejudiced voice of science?

Some may think that I am rather unceremonious with The Student. After reading the following sentence, let all judge. "I wish the Synod of Ulster, in order to redeem the character of a few of their number from the contempt of all educated men, would appoint the Select Committee to draw up an abstract of the aforesaid book (Mill's Work) on the mind, as a manual for their students, for whose infantine understandings they are in such pain." Here it is slyly hinted, that even the Select Committee of the Synod has not as much acquaintance with the science of mind, as to enable them to draw up an abstract of a metaphysical book. And even if this work were executed, it would redeem only a few of the Synod from the contempt of all educated men. After reading so severe a lesson to the Ministers of the Synod, The Student cannot justly com

plain, if his own pretensions are estimated without peculiar tenderness.

The Student represents it as a consequence of one of the arguments of his opponent, that it would make it "imperative in women to cultivate ignorance." This would be a peculiar grievance. Ignorance itself is bad enough. To be obliged to labour in the cultivation of it would be intolerable. But I thought that ignorance needed no cultivation. It exists in the highest degree without culture or toil. When The Student sends the anachronism of Erasmus to Miss Edgeworth, I beg that he may forward the cultivation of ignorance, as an additional

bull."

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Erasmus had said, “the visionary notion of Plato concerning ideas amused the heathen philosophers and Christian divines, and even tinctured the philosophy of Locke. Berkeley availed himself of it to disprove the existence of the external world, and Hume to deny the existence of spirits or minds." Now, Sir, this would have passed with me for truth. And it is still received by me as truth. But what says The Student? "There is not a word of truth in the two sentences." Language strong and unceremonious indeed. But if it is false, what is the impudence of the writer! What, then, makes the first sentence untrue? Why "the visionary notion of Plato concerning ideas," says The Student, "did not amuse the heathen philosophers and Christian divines; it was seriously entertained by them." Fie, fie; is this the spirit of philosophy? Was it the design of Erasmus to assert, that Plato's theory of ideas was not seriously entertained by those whom he represents as "amused" by it? Whether the expression of Erasmus be felicitous, is not the question. But it must be obvious to every reader, who has a soul superior to that of an Ourang Outang, that Erasmus means that Plato's theory of ideas was adopted by heathen philosophers and Christian divines. If this is so, what shall we say of The Student's assertions? The writer must ei. ther be in no common degree obtuse in his intellect, or he must be a very uncandid adversary.

But The Student speaks of " the no less visionary notions of Dr. Reid." Dr. Reid's notions no less visionary than Plato's doctrine of eternal ideas! I appeal to all men who know the extravagancies of Plato, with respect to ideas, and have read the works of Dr. Reid, to judge of

the truth of this assertion. Even if Dr. Reid's philosophy could be overturned, no sober mind will ever charge him with any thing visionary. As a Christian I often differ from him; but I always respect him.

Now let us see how The Student makes out that the second sentence is untrue. "That the philosophy of Locke was tinctured with the visionary notion of the Grecian sage, is an affirmation betraying an ignorance, either of the nature of Plato's notion, or of Locke's philosophy, or more properly of both. What is the notion concerning ideas ascribed to Plato? That they are eternal and immutable; and that men in a pre-existent state, having been put in possession of them, bring them with them on their introduction into this world." But, Mr. Student, you here very unphilosophically confound things entirely distinct. You confound the attributes of things with the things themselves. Plato's "ideas" were eternal and immutable, eternity and immutability were the attributes of his ideas, not the things themselves. Plato's theory is, that ideas or images are the objects of all knowledge. The nature of these ideas he explains by the cave. These ideas he held to be eternal and immutable. Now suppose I should say, that The Student is a candid, discerning critic, I do not mean that candour and discernment are the critic himself, but that they are his attributes. Erasmus did not say that Locke adopted any part of Plato's doctrine concerning ideas. He understates the fact when he says, that Plato's theory tinctured the philosophy of Locke. The English philosopher held, as fully as Plato, that the external world was perceived by ideas or images in the mind or brain. Every one knows that this is what is meant, when it is said that Plato's theory was received by philosophers till the time of Dr. Reid. The Student exclaims, "Locke, John Locke, in his essay on the human understanding, expressly and formally wrote against it." Did Locke, John Locke, expressly write against Plato's theory of perceiving external things by means of ideas? The Student, more than any writer I ever examined, wants perspicacity, or candour.

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Did

'Berkeley and Hume," says The Student, "did not assume, but prove, as they thought, at least, the justness of the theory, and that in the most elaborate manner.” Berkeley and Hume attempt to prove, that we perceive external objects by means of ideas? Did they not both