was inserted without actual malice, and without gross negligence; and that before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, he inserted in such newspaper a full apology for the libel; or, when the newspaper or publication is published at intervals, exceeding one week-that he had offered to publish the apology in any newspaper or periodical publication to be selected by the plaintiff. The defendant may, also, pay into court a sum of money by way of amends for the injury sustained.

"To publish, or threaten to publish, a libel; or, directly or indirectly, to threaten to print or publish-or to propose to abstain from printing or publishing-or to offer to prevent the printing or publishing of any matter or thing touching other person, with intent to extort money, security, or any valuable thing; or with intent to induce a person to confer or procure any appointment or office of profit or trust, is an offence punishable by imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for not exceeding three years.

any

"Maliciously to publish a defamatory libel, knowing it to be false, is punishable with imprisonment for not exceeding two years, and with such fine as the court shall award.

66

Maliciously to publish a defamatory libel, is punishable with fine or imprisonment, or both, as the court may award; the imprisonment not to exceed one year.

"On the trial of an indictment or information for a defamatory libel, the truth of the matters charged may be inquired into, but shall not amount to a defence, unless it was for the public benefit that the matters charged should be published; and to entitle the defendant to give evidence of their truth as a defence, the defendant must, in pleading, allege the truth of the matters charged, and that it was for the public benefit that they should be published. To that plea the prosecutor may reply generally, denying the whole thereof; and if, after such plea, the defendant be convicted, the court, in pronouncing sentence, may consider whether the defendant's guilt is aggravated or mitigated by the plea, and by the evidence given to prove or disprove it.

CH. VII.]

NEWSPAPER REGULATIONS.

537

The truth of the matters charged can in no case be inquired into without such plea or justification; but the defendant may plead also the plea of not guilty.

66

If upon the trial of an indictment or information for the publication of a libel, on the plea of not guilty, evidence be given which establishes a presumptive case of publication against the defendant, by the act of any other person by his authority, the defendant may prove that such publication was made without his authority, consent, or knowledge; and that it did not arise from want of due care or caution on his part."1

The discovery of the parties responsible for libels in newspapers, was provided for by a statute passed in the reign of George III.,2 which has been superseded by a modern statute of similar purpose, but of more efficiency. It provides that no person shall print or publish a newspaper until the printer and publisher shall have delivered a declaration signed by them, to the commissioners of stamps and taxes, containing the title of the newspaper, the house or houses where it is to be printed and published; the name, addition, and place of abode of both printer and publisher, and of every proprietor, resident out of or within the kingdom; and if more than two proprietors, the proportional amount of their shares; a similar declaration, to be made when the shares are changed by the acts of the parties or by operation of law. A certified copy of the declaration, to be given by the commissioners on payment of one shilling, is in all matters, civil and criminal, evidence of itself against the makers of it. The names and residences of the printers and publishers must also appear at the end of every newspaper; and two copies of each newspaper, signed by the printer and publisher, must within three days be delivered to the commissioners (who pay for them), under a penalty of £20; such papers to be produced, within two years afterwards, at

1 6 & 7 Vict., cap. 96; amended as to Ireland by 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 75. 2 38 Geo. III., cap. 78.

the expense of the party applying for them, as evidence in any court of justice.1

General printers also are required to give notice to the clerk of the peace, to be transmitted to the secretary of state, of the place where their presses are used; and further, upon the front of every paper printed on one side only, and upon the first and last leaves of every book, to print the printer's name, with a minute description of his place of abode.2

1 6 & 7 Wm. IV., cap. 76, A.D. 1836.

2 39 Geo. III., cap. 79.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PEOPLE.

PERSONAL LIBERTY, HABEAS CORPUS, TRIAL BY JURY.

Personal Liberty.—Innocence Presumed.-—No Man obliged to criminate himself.-Commitment.-Warrant.-Bail.-Grand Jury.-Criminal Information. Trial by Jury.-Selection of Juries.-Challenging Juries.-Assistance of Counsel.-Habeas Corpus.

THE English constitution regards the personal liberty of the people as their normal and primary condition; to be interfered with only in conformity with the law, and through the instrumentality of the courts of justice. This constitutional principle is rooted in Magna Charta. "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." It has been confirmed and enforced by various statutes, and finally by the Petition of Right, which have before been reviewed.

Personal liberty is protected by a constitutional rule or principle, that every man accused of crime against the law, is presumed to be innocent, until he is proved to be guilty. That principle operates to protect the accused throughout the whole course of criminal proceedings. In the outset it prevents the sudden incarceration of a man accused or suspected of crime, until examination into the grounds on which he is accused or suspected. The executive government possesses no power of arbitrary imprisonment, al

540

CONSTITUTIONAL RULES FOR PROTECTION. [CHI. VIII.

though in extraordinary cases a warrant may be granted by the privy council or secretaries of state.1 In all ordinary cases, whether of treason, felony, or misdemeanour, when it is desired to imprison an accused person previously to trial, or to hold him to bail, application must be made to a justice or justices of the peace, for his or their warrant to apprehend the person accused or suspected; which can only be granted after proof on oath that a felony or other crime has been committed; and that there are cause and probability for suspecting the party against whom the warrant is prayed, to be the perpetrator. The warrant, which should be under the hand and seal of the justice, must set forth the cause for which it is granted; and it gives no further power to the officer authorized to execute it, than to bring the accused before the justices, either the same by whom the warrant was granted, or others; detaining him, in the meantime, for safe custody. The warrant must name the party to be apprehended; general warrants to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or describing any person, being illegal and void.

When brought before the justices, the accused is further protected by another constitutional principle, that no man can be obliged to criminate himself. He cannot be questioned; nor is he usually allowed voluntarily to explain or deny the charge, without being cautioned that if he deprives himself of the shelter of the constitutional rule, his words may be used as admissions against him. It is only by the examination of witnesses viva voce before them, and in the presence of the accused, that the justices can discharge the duty which the law assigns to them—that of determining, not the guilt, but the degree of suspicion attaching to the accused, of being the perpetrator of the crime with which he is charged. If by the examination, which must be taken down in writing, the suspicion is removed, it is their duty to discharge the prisoner; if it be confirmed, so as to render judicial inquiry necessary, they must by 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. iv. ch. 21.