which it is the province of taste to adjust. Each one engaged in them will still maintain, that only himself possesses a due proportion of feeling and judgment; and will pretend to the preference of his opinion. The only reply possible is, that experience alone must determine, whether the definition, which has been given of taste, be accurate; which I trust that it is. In this case, what I have remarked in the course of the short treatise on Beauty, must be repeated; that who possesses taste, is to be determined. only by the nature of each one's conviction. This, indeed, as was there also observed, is the sole standard, round which the learned rally, in opposing the pretensions of ignorance; and this is the last test of apparent and real evidence. For the consolation, however, of many, who may be inferior in the accomplishment of taste, to those with whom they imagine themselves to be equally possessed of this accomplishment, it must be recollected, that those who are superior to them in refinement, will frequently, from not feeling their refinement fully gratified, entirely refuse their admiration to what may partly deserve it. Hence, e. g. a person may deny some particular tree to be beautiful, although it may possess some beauties, because it does not fully correspond with his ideas of beauty. Thus, the opinion upon taste of this latter class 138 will often be less correct than that of the former. I I have now, I am inclined to conceive, treated these different subjects of Sublimity, Beauty, Genius, and Taste, explicitly enough for those who are conversant in them, and with a comprehension of all that appeared material. trust, therefore, that I have given to each of them the extent due to every just system, that of comprising all that relates to them, either in the language, in which they are expressed, or in such inferences as that language will sanction. Little room has been occupied with removing difficulties, from a sense, that, if what has been advanced be just, they must naturally vanish : if, in any part, not just, in that it would be improper to undertake its defence. APPENDIX. On the Cause of Pleasure excited by Tragic Representation. TRAGEDY, shocking as are the representations, which it exhibits, is a source of almost universal pleasure. Numerous have been the systems devised by modern critics, to explain the origin of this pleasure: all deeming the subject original to their age; and never to have been discussed by any former writer. But, had they been more inquisitive, they might have spared themselves the labour, which they undertook, without losing the benefit of antiquity they would have found the subject well explained by an ancient philosopher, equal to any one of them in subtility and penetration, the great St. Augustine. Mr. Burke, who was one of those who directed his attention to this matter, has proposed a system, which, as far as it extends, exactly coincides with the opinion of this distinguished critic. As, however, it does not reach to so comprehensive a compass, it did not seem so proper to be taken as a guide; at the same time it leaves an opportunity of paying due homage to antiquity and profiting by advantages already gained. St. Augustine's opinion, then, is thus expressed in the second chapter of the third book of his Confessions. Having been unnoticed, or, perhaps, never perused by critics, who have treated these subjects, it is, on that account, matter of greater curiosity. After mentioning that, in his youth, he felt a vehement passion for theatrical entertainments, he proposes to himself this question:* "How happens it that * Quid est quod homo vult dolere, cum spectat luctuosa atque tragica, quæ tamen pati ipse nollet? Et tamen pati vult ex eis dolorem spectator, et dolor ipse est voluptas ejus. Quid est nisi mirabilis insania. Nam eo magis his movetur quisque, quo minus a talibus affectibus sanus est: quanquam cum ipse patitur, miseria, cum aliis compatitur, misericordia dici solet. Sed qualis tandem misericordia in rebus fictis et scenicis? Non enim ad subveniendum provocatur auditor, sed tantum ad dolendum invitatur. Ec actori carum imaginum amplius favet cum amplius dolet. Et si calamitates illæ hominum vel antiquæ vel falsæ sic agantur, ut qui spectat non doleat, abscedit inde fastidiens et reprehendens. Si autem doleat, manet intentus et gaudens lacrymatur. Lacrymæ ergo amantur et dolores? Certe omnis homo gaudere vult. An cum miserum neminem esse libeat, libet tamen esse misericordem? Quod quia non sine dolore est, hac una causa amantur dolores. Et hoc de illâ venâ amicitiæ est. Conf. 1. iii. c. 2. 66 people are desirous of feeling the pain arising from the representation of melancholy "and tragical adventures, in which, neverthe less, themselves would object to be engaged? "That they do desire to feel this pain is cer"tain; for, it is the main enjoyment which they propose to themselves in these representations. Now, what but madness can give "birth to such a pleasure; every one being af"fected in proportion as he is subject to the "like passions with those exhibited? "To be in misery one's self, is called mis"fortune: to commiserate the distresses of "others, is called pity. But what kind of pity can be that, which can be excited only by "fictitious and exhibited calamity? For, on "these occasions, the audience is not solicited to give assistance, but to weep. The only 66 66 66 66 object, then, of these representations, must "must be to excite grief: hence, the more powerfully the actors awaken this emotion, "the more pleased is the spectator with their "performance. If it chance, whatever be the subject, whether feigned or historical, that "they exhibit it in a cold, inanimate manner, he immediately retires with contempt and disgust but, if they excite his grief, he "remains attentive, and feels pleasure while he "sheds tears. Love we, then, grief and tears? Surely, every one prefers joy. Must not, |