DISCOURSE, SECT. IX. 176 St. Chrysostom. Of lay-deprivation. Du Pin's testimony PREFAT. of slaves, and had no head in law': and when St. Chrysostom was deprived and banished by the emperor, not only a great part of his own flock, though great sufferers for so doing, but far the greatest part of Christendom adhered to him, as if he had never been deprived. They saw not the consequence from putting to death to deprivation, because they believed that this belonged as much by God's appointment to the spiritual or ecclesiastical, as the other did to the temporal power, and that as bishops were taken into the sacerdotal college, and made fellows of it by bishops, so none but their colleagues, who took them in, could lawfully turn them out. As for learned men who are as much for the magistrate's power, and upon much better principles, than our author, many such have been and are of opinion, that deprivation of bishops doth not belong to the civil power. I shall name but one, viz., Dr. Du Pin, in his Præloquium to his seventh dissertation, De Antiqua Ecclesiæ disciplina, which I have put in the Appendix1, because it was written against the papal usurpations over princes, and in behalf of the State against the claims and practices of his own Church. There, after a short but clear discourse of the difference between the ecclesiastical and civil power, he concludes, 'that neither kings nor emperors can make or depose bishops, nor bishops make or depose them.' I have said all this only to shew the inconsequence of our author's argument for deprivation of bishops, in asserting that the magistrate may deprive them, because he can put them to death. What I have said also sheweth his other fallacies in the pursuit of this argument, as where he saithm, that "to affirm, as non-jurors do, that the magistrate cannot deprive a bishop, but by taking away his life, is to say he cannot remove some part of the punishment which he might justly inflict, without remitting the whole." It is certain, death puts an end to the relation betwixt the bishop and his flock, because it destroys him who is the correlate to them; but it doth not follow from thence, that the Captivity or banishment does not deprive. 177 magistrate hath any authority to deprive him, any more than DEPRIVATION, &c. to excommunicate him, or turn him out of the Church, into which he can take nobody in. This supposes that deprivation of bishops is a punishment belonging to the civil magistrate, which is the question; and he argues as if a Roman of old had said, to affirm that a president of a province cannot banish a man, but by banishing him out of life, is to say he cannot exact part of the punishment without remitting the whole; for a president of a province, though he had a power of life and death, he had no power of deportation by the Roman constitution"; and as the subordinate magistrate is to the supreme, so the supreme is to God; he can inflict no punishments but such as God hath given him power to inflict. He saith farther, that "it is not by death only that the magistrate can deprive a bishop, but by perpetual imprisonment or banishment, with a prohibition to his subjects of corresponding with him :" to which I say again, this is still supposing what he ought to prove, that perpetual banishment or imprisonment with such a prohibition, doth dissolve the relation between the bishop and his flock. It would not dissolve the relation between a father and his children, or between a husband and his wife; and he knows that those of the other opinion think the same of the relation of the bishop to his flock. They are of opinion, whether right or wrong I shall not here determine, that perpetual banishment or imprisonment can no more deprive a bishop, than perpetual captivity; but that as long as he lives undeprived by the spiritual power, his relation will continue to his flock. And in the same loose manner that he argues against the power of excommunication, he also disputes against the power of ordination, as inconsistent with the magistrate's right to protect the commonwealth.' And why forsooth? "because then the bishops may put not only men of the best abilities to serve the commonwealth, but such great numbers n [Deportatio was the form of banishment introduced by Augustus in place of the aquæ et ignis interdictio. The power of inflicting it was in the emperor, by whom it was conceded only to the Præfectus Urbis. Præsidem deportare non posse, nulla dubitatio est. Ulpian, Dig., lib. xlviii. tit. xix. sect. 2. § 1. deportandi in in HICKES. N sulam jus præsidibus provinciæ non P Ibid., p. 47. [§ 23.] PREFAT. DISCOURSE, into orders, the better to carry on their common interest, SECT. IX. (which we see actually done in popish countries,) as may tend to the infinite prejudice of the state." Here is the same fallacy again of arguing against just power from the supposed abuse of it; and were there any sense in it, it would be good against all power, but that of God and good angels, which cannot be perverted or abused. At this absurd rate may men argue against the legislative or supreme executive power in all countries, and particularly in our own. The independent power of our parliaments, may a man say, to give away our money, is inconsistent with the rights of the people, because then they may give away all we have, and make us as poor, and slaves as much as in other countries. The independent power of our kings and queens, may another say, to make war, is inconsistent with the happiness of the kingdom, because they may make war a hundred years together, and thereby utterly waste both the treasure and people of the land. The independent power of our kings and queens to make peers, only whom, and when they please, another may say, is inconsistent with our constitution, because by refusing to make peers for two or three long reigns together, they may extinguish the peerage, as in Denmark, and with it one of the three estates; or reduce the peers to such a small number, as will not make a house. Nay this formidable way of disputing against the power of the clergy in behalf of the magistrate, had it any force in it, would be as valid for the clergy against the independent power of the magistrate, as it is for the magistrate against that of the clergy. The independent power of our kings and queens, may an Englishman say, to nominate and choose bishops, is inconsistent not only with the well-being, but the being, of the Church, because they may nominate not only the most illiterate and immoral men for bishops, but choose whether they will nominate any at all, and so in twenty or thirty years destroy not only one of the three estates, but the true Church of God among us. Nay, at this idle rate of arguing, especially in [In 1660, by a movement of the unprivileged classes, the king was made absolute, and the privileges of the nobles taken away. They lost all influence and rapidly declined in num ber and position.-See Lord Molesworth's account of Denmark, published in 1694, c. vii. and the Universal History, vol. xxviii. pp. 359, 360. 1782.] Magistrate enforcing the sentence of the Clergy. 179 his beloved way of speaking, a man may say, the power which the parliament assumes to itself of depriving bishops and priests, is against the fundamental rights and liberties of the Church, because then they may deprive not only men of the best abilities to serve her, but such great numbers, as may tend to her infinite prejudice; and how can we be certain they may not deprive all. Such is our author's way of writing in quirks and sophisms through his whole book, as I could make it appear, had I room and time to go through it all. In this manner he argues in several places, as invidiously as he can, against 'the obligation, the clergy say the magistrate hath, to protect the Church, and assist them in doing their duty, and putting their decrees in execution.' This he saith', makes the magistrate "their deputy, or rather their executioner;" and that 'this obligation of executing their decrees supposes they have a right to command it, and that the magistrate, as well as the laity, is only their executioner, being obliged, right or wrong, to enforce their commands.' To which I answer, here is a slander, and more than one fallacy. First, here is couched a foul slander upon the clergy, as if they asserted, that the magistrate was bound to protect them in evil, as much as in well-doing, and to assist them with the secular arm in wrong, as well as right, and in executing unrighteous, as well as righteous decrees. Secondly, here are several fallacies; as first, in saying this obligation of the magistrate to help and assist the governors of the Church to execute their decrees and censures, gives them a power to command it, because they have a right to ask it, and to ask it when it is necessary with prayers and tears, and to ask it in God's name and for His sake; as one part of a family may humbly and earnestly ask the protection and assistance of the father and master, against the insolence and injuries of the other, and to protect them in doing their duty; and when this happened, would it not be a fine speech in the delinquents to say to him, 'Sir, these insolent fellows only complain to you, to shew the power they think they have to command you, and to make you their servant and executioner.' Or to bring the comparison a little nearer to the case of two independent r Rights, pp. 56, 57. [§ 36, 37.] DEPRIVA TION, &c. DISCOURSE, 180 Instances of independent powers co-operating. PREFAT. Societies in one place, as of the universities and cities of Oxford and Cambridge; let us suppose, that a certain number of scholars outraged by townsmen, should complain of them in either place to the mayor, or a certain number of townsmen outraged by scholars, should prefer their complaints to the vice-chancellor, would it be a good and reasonable answer in either of those magistrates to say, 'get ye gone you insolent fellows, do you think you have a right to command me, and that I will be your executioner?' To conclude, this way of false reasoning, were it true, would make the clergy as much the magistrate's deputy and executioner, as the magistrate the clergy's. As for example, if in a notorious flagrant sedition or rebellion, the magistrate (for I still use his own term) should convene the clergy in convocation, and desire or require the aid of their censures against the Corahs and Dathans of such a sedition or rebellion, they might by his logic, instead of assisting the magistrate according to their duty, return him this answer, 'what, doth he suppose he hath a right to command us? we will be none of his deputies or executioners.' The vanity of this argument might also be shewn by application of it to two independent kingdoms or states, the sovereigns of which are bound by the laws of nations, upon notification, not to protect or assist one another's rebels, but to drive them out of their dominions, or deliver them up, that is, in his scurrilous expression, 'to be one another's executioners;' but I hope I have said enough to detect the folly and malice of this way of reasoning, in which our author delights so much. For he uses the same argument against the clergy, to prove that "if their power were judicial, they might save, or damn, as they think fit, and that God is bound to execute their sentences, though they condemn a good, and absolve an ill man; because a sentence pronounced by a competent authority is valid, though it is not right; and consequently on this supposition men ought to pay Divine worship to these judges, rather than to God Himself, since the power of saving and damning is in them, and God Himself is no more than their executioner.” S According to this silly way of reasoning he may say, first, that all criminal judges may save, or damn, as they think fit, * p. 68. [chap. ii. § 5.] |