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that they may, thrive the better, and that we may know where to go for what we want.

13. How delightful is the transition from confinement to liberty, and from pain to pleasure! but how much more, from the perturbation of tempestuous passions, to a settled serenity of mind! This is peace after war, light after darkness, beauty after deformity, order after confusion, and happiness after misery. Here conscience, as well as our feelings, is concerned.

14. The imputation of selfishness falls away on the pains we take for our bodies, or our worldly affairs; never for those we lay out on our souls. The soul then must be the true self, that self, which to consult and serve, is not a vice, even in the opinion of him, who is at no pains for his soul. Besides, the care we have for our souls hurts nobody, and may benefit many. Mankind therefore are no way interested to thwart us here; and so are willing to give a better name than that of selfishness, to a species of sedulity, that does not interfere with their pursuits. The man who crosses us in our way to riches, or titles, never thinks of stopping us in our way to heaven. Spirits do not occupy space, and therefore need not justle.

15. My prosperity having tempted me into sin, God reversed my condition, and brought me, through affliction, to a better mind. How have I merited such a mark of paternal pity? How merciful is God even in his severities? How can such a wretch be an object of love to a Being so infinitely holy? And yet, he saith,' whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth.'

16. We have better herbs of our own to help out a breakfast, than tea; but they grow in the next field or garden, and therefore are good for nothing. Every leaf and insect exhibits a glaring proof of divine wisdom and power; every sunbeam and shower of rain, of his goodness, who made the world for our accommodation. What occasion then for recourse to philosophical researches for proof of these things? What occasion to go to the farther end of a room for a chair, when there are two or three just at hand? There is little more than pride and affectation in philosophy, as well as in tea-drinking.

17. When we know not the motives or designs of this

or that conduct in a man, we find it often extremely difficult to account for his actions; yet if we have a good opinion of his understanding, we do not presently pronounce that conduct foolish. The different regards he aims at (if he hath several ends at once in view, especially if he hath his eye on the past, the present, and the future) make it sometimes exceedingly difficult to guess, what he would be at. The very thing, his large grasp of thought, which does high honour to his understanding, gives it all its appearance of folly or inconsistency in our eyes, which gave us a sight only of one or two of his views. Though I am a rational creature, as well as he, yet perhaps I have not force of thought sufficient to comprehend his schemes, were they explained to me in the most intelligible manner they admit of. How then shall I comprehend the schemes of Providence? There is hardly one thing in nature that hath not a thousand faces, or respects to other things. While Providence is adjusting the endless variety of relations to one another, and rendering every thing so many ways useful to other things, and taking into consideration the past, the present, the future; the shortsighted wretch, fixing his eye on some single regard, which does not appear to be immediately provided for, objects to a disposal, as unwise or unjust, for no other reason but because it is, in so many different respects, the highest instance of wisdom and justice. Yet this very man finds the time of day by his watch, the machinery of which he so little understands, that nothing could appear more trifling and impertinent to him, than some of its parts, when detached from the rest. However, he gives the workmen credit for the good contrivance of the whole. He, who gives up to a watchmaker, calls in question the wisdom of God. As to the dispensations of Providence towards mankind, considered as moral agents, there is one common article of faith, which, if well understood, and applied, would not only make us content under all sorts of troubles, but enable us either to account for, or cheerfully acquiesce in, every thing that befalls us; which is, that this life is a state of trial.

18. Hosius hath so many virtues, and carries them all to so high a degree of perfection, that he could not fail to be almost universally hated and persecuted, were he not

subject to such a happy mixture of weaknesses, and sometimes sins, as excuse his virtues, and procure him a toleration.

19. There is hardly any thing in nature from whence a contemplative mind may not draw either useful admonitions, or apt representations of our condition here. Every thing acts its proverb, or utters its parable, to a right thinker. I have now my eye on a fruitful meadow, wherein I see a picture of human life. All the various vegetables, which people (if I may be allowed the expression) its whole extent, though they draw their being and aliment from the same soil, yet, each following its own nature, how widely do they differ in size, colour, shape, and other qualities, not obvious to the eye! How the strong and the weak, the upright and the crooked, the tall and the low, the beautiful and the ugly, the wholesome and the baneful, spring together from the earth, and grow promiscuous! How the lower fret the stems of the higher! and how the higher drain the nourishment from the roots of the lower, and with their tops intercept the sunshine and the dews! How the plebeian grass crowds itself into one appearance, and is not seen but together! How the higher plants, for the most part, weeds, overtop their neighbours with the state and grandeur of nobles, and assume the appearance of protecting, while they do but oppress the inferior vegetables near them! How those thrive that rose in a proper season! How they dwindle that made their appearance too soon or too late, or are situated under the ill influence of overgrown neighbours! How such as are up hinder those from rising that are down! How the beautiful flowers or wholesome herbs, are hidden or overborne by the noxious weeds! While I am amused with this meditation, behold! a mower enters, and with his ruthless scythe cuts down all before him. Neither the stiffness of the strong, nor the pliancy of the weak; neither the uprightness of the straight, nor the crookedness of the straggling; neither the stateliness of the tall, nor the lowliness of the humble; neither the prettiness of the beautiful, nor the ugliness of the ungraceful; neither the usefulness of the wholesome, nor the noxiousness of the baneful, can defend them from the fatal stroke of this promiscuous leveller. With impartial cruelty he mows down

all. Against another season, the lord of the meadow shall extirpate the useless and noxious plants, shall improve the soil, and raise again the nutritious and medicinal plants, with the fragrant and beautiful flowers, to a sun that shall shine upon them, without night or winter.

20. After the battle of Salamis, every Grecian chief, in their suffrages for preference, voted himself the most meritorious, and Themistocles the second. Each religious sect votes his own way of worship the best, and the church of England the next, in soundness and conformity to Scripture. In these instances, second signifies first. A man, in choosing a husband for his daughter, says, that personal merit is the first, and fortune only the second recommendation in a pretender. Another goes into holy orders, and says his primary view is to serve God, and save souls, and his secondary, to acquire a comfortable maintenance. In these instances, generally speaking, secondary signifies primary, and primary signifies nothing.

21. Which was Cæsar's greatest victory? that of Pharsalia, in which he conquered Pompey? or that of Munda, wherein he conquered Pompey's son? Neither; but his kind treatment of Catullus, who had lampooned him with a great deal of wit and severity. In this he conquered the conqueror of Pompey and Pompey's son.

22. It is true I was educated a Christian; but what should hinder me from turning a Deist, or Infidel, as well as many others, so educated, and some too in holy orders? If I am by institution prejudiced in favour of Christianity, have I not as strong passions, affections, and love of moral liberty, to use a soft expression, as any of them? And may not these lay as strong a bias on the one side of my mind, as education hath laid on the other? It is by my knowledge of God and myself, that I regulate my thoughts of religion. I know there is but one God, and that he is holy, just, and good. I know that my own nature is corrupt, and ill-disposed, both to virtue, and the necessary means of my own happiness, for without a thorough reformation, I cannot be happy. Knowing these things, and laying them down as data to my religious reasonings, I apply myself to Paganism, and find it smiles upon me with the promise of liberty, to be as loose and dissolute as its gods. Gods! there is but 2 D

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one God. Dissolute! I am lost, if i

dissolute. I therefore cannot be a Pagan. Next, I apply myself to Mahometism, which indulges my inclination to lust, rapine, and slaughter. These vices, God cannot indulge me in nor can I hope to be happy, if I do not abhor them, and love the contrary virtues. I therefore cannot be a Mahometan. Again, I apply myself to Deism, which bids me be my own priest and lawgiver, bids me fear nothing, bids me follow the bent of my own nature in every thing. How soothing! But here I cannot rest, because I know my own nature is the worst guide I can choose, and I myself the worst priest and lawgiver for myself. My nature could not have taught me a right knowledge of God, no more than it did the Negroes or Labradors; and teaches me no farther knowledge of myself, than that I am corrupt and miserable, and unable either to mend myself or my condition. As sure therefore as there is a God, and he is good, he must have made a farther provision for my reformation and happiness, and consequently I cannot be a Deist. Again, I apply myself to Judaism, and by ten thousand irrefragable proofs perceive it came from God; but perceive at the same time, that, by Judaism itself, God forbids me to rest in mere outward ordinances, and represents this religion, as only preparatory to another, more internal, more universal, and therefore more excellent, whereof Judaism is but the shadow. I therefore cannot be a Jew, any farther, than in order to somewhat infinitely more worthy of God, as author of religion, and more capable of reforming, and making me happy. Lastly, I apply myself to Christianity, and, instead of smiling upon me, I find it frowns upon me at first, calls me a sinner, threatens me with everlasting misery, proposes mysteries to my faith, which my reason cannot easily digest, and austerities to my passions and affections, which it is still harder to bring my licentious nature to comply with. But then I see plainly, it represents God to me, just as he is, and me to myself, just as I am. I perceive in the sanctions it sets before me, and the grace it offers me, the most efficacious means of my own reformation, which if I labour to promote in myself, it begins to smile upon me, in ravishing hopes of pardon, through the great atonement, which it provides, of paternal love from God, in case I do my utmost to be like

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