sentiments of his heart will accord with his judgment, and will more and more give tone to his life. It would appear, then, that, when the New Testament speaks of the conscience, it is such a conscience as this, one which is a voluntary exercise of the mind in order to form a judgment, or in order to give the understanding the opportunity to have a clear perception of our actions, and to let the sentiment of the heart assert itself, and to give its approval and its comfort. That there are many acts erroneously ascribed to the conscience, is possibly due chiefly to the figurative language which has been employed, and to the manner in which the conscience has been personified. Figurative language is intended to give more clear and more vivid expression to our conceptions of abstract thought by a comparison with material things. Such, no doubt, is the object which is accomplished. But when the concrete image is taken for the abstract conception, we are very apt to ascribe to it qualities and attributes which do not belong to it. Thus, the conscience has been called the voice of God in the human soul. Properly understood, this is very correct; but it may be so applied that it will teach that the declaration of the conscience is an ultimate judgment, and that the conscience is infallible. Butler, in his "Sermon on Compassion," says the same of nature,-"that it is not only true that our nature (i.e., the voice of God within us) carries us to the exercise of charity," etc. Now, he means that God has so constituted and formed us, that we do certain things. It is just as much the voice of God when we perceive that the tendency of man's nature is to exercise charity, as when we listen to the declaration of the New Testament. There are certain indications in that nature, and in the nature of every thing. And when we see those unmistakable tendencies arising out of our constitution, which we call nature, we say that it is the voice of God. In this sense, the conscience is a part of nature; and it speaks a language, which, as far as it goes, is plain. It certainly indicates that man is a moral being, and that some actions are right, and that other actions are wrong. The conscience proclaims this. It proclaims it, even before there is a revelation. We are so made. But this is not the infallible voice of God proclaiming a judgment on each action, and whether our conduct is right or wrong. It only means, that, in the right exercise of the conscience with all the light that we can attain, when we have made use of the right standard, and, without prejudice or partiality, have compared our actions with the standard, we shall be able to form a correct judgment. Again: Prerogatives have been ascribed to the conscience as if it was an independent power in - the human soul. Thus, Butler said, that, "had the conscience strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." This, when it is understood according to the exposition which Butler has given, is true. He means, as he has fully explained, that it is part of our nature which is to be viewed as a constitution. The human soul, as it has been exhibited in the Second Lecture, is made up of various parts. Those parts were intended to work together in harmony, and towards the accomplishment of one purpose. We were not to be ruled by the appetites, or desires, or the affections, or the reason; but all these were to be in subordination to the conscience. It was by means of this that man was to determine his actions. It was the man himself -the I, the Ego- that was to act, and to act through his capacities. We are not to abandon ourselves to the appetites, we are not to let the desires rule us, we are not to let the affections be the sole directors of our actions, we are not even to let the reason alone prescribe our course of life; but, above all these, we are to listen to the conscience. Its decisions are to shape our conduct, and to proclaim what is right, and what is wrong. We are to be guided by obligation, by right, by duty, which come within the province of that part of our minds of the human soul, which we call the conscience. The appetites have power, the desires have strength; but it is the powerful tendency towards some bodily want, it is the strong drawing towards some supposed good. These appetities and desires are the tendencies of our nature. They have no separate existence. They are the soul itself acting. So the conscience is the same soul acting in another direction. It is an action of the soul telling us that we must not abandon ourselves to the appetites that we must not eat and drink beyond the wants of our nature, beyond what is required to maintain our health and strength and our physical capacities to perform the acts of our bodies. This prerogative of conscience is only the manner in which we are to exercise this part of our human nature. If we would exercise it in such a way that all the other parts of our nature shall be subordinate to the conceptions of moral obligation and duty, then we shall be exercising a power which will make us good: if each man would thus exercise the moral powers within, the world would become a good world, and sin would cease to have dominion over us. Another prerogative ascribed to conscience by Butler, and which has probably been more perverted than any other one ascribed to it, is supremacy. But Butler is not the author of the doctrine which has been deduced from this expression. When he speaks of the supremacy of the conscience, he means, that, of the various parts of our nature, proceeding in a series from the lowest, the conscience is the highest, and that we should listen to it rather than to any which stands below it. He speaks of the appetites and passions and reason and conscience, and he says that the reason or prudence is a guide, and that we should listen to it, but that conscience is more important than prudence, and that we should, therefore, listen to it rather than to any other of the powers of the soul. The supremacy which he ascribes to it is the supremacy of order. He says, "Considered as a faculty in He kind and in nature, it is supreme over all others." So again, he says, that "self-love is in human nature a superior principle to passion ;" and again, he says, that conscience, "from its very nature, manifestly claims superiority over all others." He obviously goes no farther than to say, that, of all the principles in our nature, this one is superior, and, over them, is supreme; and, therefore, that we should be guided and ruled by the conscience rather than by any inferior principle. It is very obvious why he uses this language, because he was speaking in an age in which there was the attempt made to reduce all the principles of our nature to one. Thus, Hobbes strove to show that all actions spring from one principle, which was selfishness; while Cumberland, the Bishop of Peterborough, was no less eager to show that every |