take this man's exhibition of nature as approaching the exhibition of nature in its normal condition. We can judge of that life from a study of its tendencies, and the result of its actions. We thus come to know the nature of man, and the life for which God designed him.

Now, it was somewhat in this way that the Stoics came to look at man. According to their formula, as Cicero' has given it to us, they held that to take any thing that was another's, and to advance our own. interests by injuring him, is more contrary to nature than death, or poverty, or grief. We say that in the natural course of events we must die, we may come to poverty, and we shall probably suffer grief. These changes appertain to us: we cannot avoid them. They do not depend on our intention. God has so made us, and placed us in such a state of probation, that these changes will come upon us. We say that they come because we are men, partakers of the common human nature. We do not say any thing of the kind about dishonesty or injury to our neighbor. We say that we were never made for such purpose. We say, in the words of the author of the Book of Proverbs, that the one who does such things "wrongs his own soul" (Prov. viii. 36). The wrong is done because he has violated his nature. He has not acted the man. It is not difficult in this instance to

1 De Officiis, lib. iii. 4.

see that the Stoics were right, and that they had made a right deduction from the principles of human nature as they were exhibited to them. It is not difficult to see that man, in following out his nature, in striving not to wrong his own soul, would avoid dishonesty, lying, covetousness. His nature in its normal state did not lead to these sins; neither did it as a constitution. These sins were only a perversion of his nature. And this was manifest to those who studied nature only in its fallen condition, and without the light which revelation cast upon it. They studied a nature which had not received the help of grace which gives it a superhuman power, and brings it into nearer resemblance to the divine. The nature of man, as it was viewed by the Stoics, showed so unmistakably its tendencies, that they deduced the chief virtues which should characterize that nature, the virtues which would arise out of a right development of that nature.

II. In an attempt to construct a system of morals, we should find that it was impossible to lay down every obligation and virtue. However we might study the nature of man, we should not be able to see every obligation which appertained to that nature, -every duty under every circumstance. There are many circumstances in life which modify the nature of the obligation, while it might be just as true under these circumstances that the nature of man led to

the virtue. Yet that nature in one place, and in one condition, and in a certain time, would be influenced in a way which would be different when the place, condition, and time should change. The construction of the system, however, might all the while depend on the nature of man. For instance, we have the desire of family society and of political society. The one, no doubt, comes from the other. The state, in one view, is only an enlargement of the family, and the same general principles must govern the one which govern the other. The family exists because of the nature of man. It is evolved out of that nature. Man could not be a man unless the family existed. The regulation of the family, then, must be such as the nature of man requires. The whole subject of marriage, and the care and education of children, and of divorce, must be considered, and rules must be established with reference to that nature. We may take a short way to get at those rules. We may say it is enough that we read them in the Divine Law, that our Lord pronounced His judgment, and that judgment must regulate our conduct, and create our morality in this respect. This is, no doubt, true; and it is equally true of the Ten Commandments. But there is another truth behind these truths and all the moral regulations of the Bible. And this truth is, that the divine commands, which are commands to men as such, which

commands are moral commands, are in accordance with the nature of man. The moral commands given from Sinai were not for the first time revealed. Those commandments did not make murder and stealing and covetousness to be wrong. God had made them to be such when He established the nature of man, when He gave him the constitution which He did. It was only an authoritative exposition of His own laws of creation when He audibly proclaimed them from Sinai. The same is true of marriage. The law of our Saviour is the law which is suitable to man's nature, and which comes out of that nature. He did not create a morality in regard to marriage which had not existed, but He made an exposition of that law which removed from it doubt and ambiguity. And so the question which is now agitated, whether the marriage with a deceased wife's sister is permissible, depends on the extent of the command in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus. If it was a regulation for the Israelites, then it is not binding; but if it is a law which the nature of man requires, then it is plain that God intended it for all the race, and it should be violated by none, - that it is not within the reach of law, either civil or ecclesiastical. extensive violation of that law, if it arises out of the nature of man, would show itself, and would, no doubt, confirm the opinion that it was not only for Israel, but for all men. So all the regulations of the

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state ought to be such as to establish and maintain the rights of man as man. When Aristotle said that man is a political animal, he evidently meant by it that he is so constituted that he will associate with other men in the family and in the state. He must do this because his desires and affections and sentiments are always carrying him in this direction. Obedience to law, then, comes from our nature. Our nature could not be rightly developed and cultivated unless there was law, and the state was regulated by positive law. Obedience to law becomes, therefore, a part of the morality of nature. It must be a universal obedience, for none other can maintain the state, and make it to be that institution which shall meet the wants of man. We should say that every law and every regulation of the community did not originate in expediency, but in the wants of man's nature. It might be said that the law did not touch morals, but was only a civil or police regulation, or was for the convenience of the community. This may be very true. But there is something beyond this, which is the maintenance of the community which meets the wants of man. The state is founded in this nature; it is intended to fulfil its desires; and every law and regulation contribute toward that purpose, and are therefore founded on that want.

I think it may thus be shown that even the rules and regulations of a society have a moral character, and