appropriated. The angry feelings in the rudest conditions of life rise at this, and it is considered an infringement of the rights of another. Not even an

Indian tribe can hold together without some respect to the idea and conception of property. The very nature of each one, each individual of the tribe, requires this. The moment there is a conception of a thing being appropriated, there is a recognition of the right of property. And no rude tribe is destitute of the conception. The same is true of personal safety. Whatever disregard of the value of human life there may be in a rude state of society, yet it is visible that there is a preference for safety, and that there is a respect for life. This conception may not be very clear, nor may life be protected in any great degree. But it is manifest that it exists. Frémont, in his journey over the Rocky Mountains, came into the vicinity of an Indian fight between two tribes. The women of one tribe besought him, in the most piteous terms, for his interference in behalf of their husbands and sons. The same appreciation and the same feeling were manifested as in civilized society, but probably in a more pronounced manner, for it was the real expression of their nature uncontrolled. But it showed their conception, that they had a conception of the value of human life, as well as we. It was the feeling of their nature that safety and protection were desirable. So they have the con

ception of mutual understanding. They enter into agreements. Smoking the pipe of peace is as significant as an agreement written on paper, signed, and sealed; and it is respected. It marks their conception. That agreement may extend to a very few simple matters; but those few matters indicate distinctly that they have, in their rude society, and have had from the beginning, a conception of the binding force of a promise, or of mutual understanding. The same is true of the family. There is the conception in any people who do not live as a herd of cattle, that there are certain rights belonging to a family; that the family has a distinct existence; that there may be the infringement of the rights of a family. These conceptions may not be clear or very extensive; but they exist, and exert their influence, and guide, in some degree, the actions of the members of the tribe. And we can only account for the existence of the feeling or conception by saying that it comes out of our nature. The family is never merged into the tribe, even in a rude state of nature. That only arises in a communistic community, where the lower parts of our nature predominate, and blind the perceptions. The same is seen in government. Every tribe has a government of some sort, as every family has. There are the chief and the subordinates. There are an order of society, and a ruler, and obedience. The government may be adminis

tered with an iron hand, but it is recognized. It is a necessity which is felt. It is not reasoned out, but it comes into existence because no other way is perceived by which the tribe can be held together. No more expedient way is devised or suggested in such a state of society. The desires and passions may often lead to resistance, and to the infringement of the purpose of even such a rude government. But this does not indicate that there is no government; nor does it indicate that this conception of government does not come out of the nature of man, that it does not spring out of the necessities of that nature. They could not see how to dispense with it.

I have spoken of the recognition of rights in such a tribe. This is the language of information, and culture, and philosophy. It is not their language. But then it must be remembered that very few who use the word in civilized and cultivated society can give a very clear conception of it. We see that these people, in a rude state, where the tendencies of nature are manifesting themselves in an unrestrained way, have before their minds certain conceptions of all these relations, to which I have referred, by which they are guided. It is a general conception which guides them. We could state and define for them the principles on which they are acting, very much more lucidly than they could. Their rights are conceptions in their minds; and they are common con

ceptions by which they can understand each other, and by which they can act in common. In a civilized state, rights are expressed and established by law. We embody in a statute our conception. We make it very clear and definite. We can state in lucid language what are the rights of personal security, and of property, and of family. But this conception at the first was only in the mind, and expressed in a rude way, or possibly exhibited more by particular acts. Every rude tribe has its common law. It is the enforcement of their conception of rights. But in a civilized and enlightened society, those rights are expressed and enforced by definite law. The idea of civilization is this, that men see these relations to each other, and that they express and enforce those relations. The perception of rights becomes more precise, and that advances the civilization to a higher degree. The laws express those rights, and enforce them, and protect each one in the enjoyment of them. This makes a more elevated. civilization. The influence of the Christian religion is brought to bear on the conception of rights and the enforcement of them, and that makes those conceptions still more definite, and the civilization one of a still higher order. It is this rude conception of an almost lawless tribe more clearly perceived, more definitely expressed, and more certainly enforced, that elevates the tribe into a civilized and enlightened

society. But there is really no new principle brought into operation. It is the reason, in the rudest state of society, which perceives the wants of nature, and which recognizes the tendencies of nature. In this rude state the reason is only partially developed. It cannot perceive very clearly, and cannot express very forcibly, the relations which exist, but it does perceive them. And it is in their case the operation of the reason. The nature of man cannot unfold but In this respect,

through the operation of reason. there is nothing going on in the rude state of society which is not going on in the highly civilized society. It is only a question of degree; but that the reason is brought to bear on these rights, in bringing them into greater prominence, and in showing their application to a greater number of instances in every condition of society, is only the more manifest operation of nature. It is bringing the condition of man more and more into conformity with that life which his nature demands for him. It is the reason by which we see more in our present state than we could in a rude state. But in each state, man proceeds only so far as he is guided by his reason.

Now, this will account for the different forms of morality in different countries, and in different states of society, and in different times. Their general conceptions will, I think, be found to lie at the foundation of all the details of obligations, duties, and