THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE. FEBRUARY, 1851. Religious Communications. LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER AS tue is to be found in utility alone, relax the obligation of truth, to a SEMBLY OF DIVINES-ADDRESSED degree that to me appears highly TO YOUTH. LECTURE LIV. The ninth commandment, which we are now to consider, is "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour." This commandment "requireth the maintaining and promoting of truth between man and man; and of our own and our neighbour's good name, especially in witness bearing." The requisitions of the precept before us, as here stated, will form the subject of the present lecture: and the first thing to be considered, because it is fundamental in the whole of the discussion, is the nature and obligation of truth. The meaning of some words is so plain and obvious, that it cannot be made more so-It is, I think, scarcely practicable to give a definition of truth, that will impart a clearer idea of it than is conveyed by the word itself. "Truth, says Locke, is the joining or separating of signs, as the things signified agree or disagree." Johnson's definition is more plain and popular. He says it is "the contrary to falsehood; conformity of notions to things; conformity of words to thoughts." Those who maintain that the foundation and sanction of all virVOL. IX. Ch. Adv. exceptionable and dangerous. In many instances it is not easy, and in some utterly impracticable, even for a well informed and conscientious man, to say what utility, taken, as it must be here, in its large sense, as relating to the general good, does really dictate: and to leave every man to speak truth or falsehood, on every emergency, according to his own views of what will, on the whole, be for the general benefit, is to rest a virtue of the highest importance on a very uncertain and slippery foundation. I mention this, my young friends, because some writers on morals, who have fame and fashion on their side, have actually weakened the obligation of truth, as I apprehend, to a very dangerous extent, pleading utility as the justification of their doctrine. It is in the nature and will of God, that we find the true foundation, obligation, and standard, of every thing that deserves, in a moral sense, the name of virtue. It is the highest honour, true happiness, and indispensable obligation, of every moral being in the universe, to be and act, in moral concerns, like his Maker-to the utmost ex "Be ye tent of the faculties which have been bestowed upon him. holy, for I am holy," is our Crea H tor's explicit command; and to be like our Father who is in heaven," is, by our blessed Saviour, proposed as the high consideration, by which our conduct should be directed and governed. Now, it is the character of God, an essential attribute of his nature, "that he cannot and will not lie." Neither is there any one thing which is represented in holy scripture as more hateful to God, more the object of his abhorrence, or more certainly subjecting the offender to his severe displeasure, than every species of falsehood and deceit. He declares that "all liars shall have their part in the Jake which burneth with fire and brimstone; this is the second death." He requires "truth and uprightness in the inner man." And it was the emphatic commendation of Nathaniel by our Redeemer" Behold an Israelite in deed, in whom there is no guile." You will find indeed in the sacred scriptures, several examples of good men who, under the force of temptation, or through the remainders of depravity, violated truth; and their guilt in this respect is not always explicitly stated, in the places where their sin is recorded. But in every instance their guilt is implied, and never extenuated; and in some cases, as in those of Abraham and Jacob, the punishment which followed their crime, is narrated at length. Abraham was put to shame before Pharaoh and Abimelech, and received reproof from both; and Jacob was long an exile, was deceived and imposed on by Laban, and lived for many years in constant dread of his brother Esau -all as the consequence of his own and his mother's falsehood and deception. Having made these general remarks on the nature, foundation, and obligation of truth, I shall give you some quotations from an author whose views entirely accord with my own and I do it for the twofold reason of availing myself of his authority, and of expressing my thoughts at once compendiously and with entire perspicuity. You will be careful to notice, that there are other signs of thought beside words, and that whatever be the sign, the obligation of truth is the same. "Instituted signs are those that have, no other connexion with the thing signified, than what has been made by agreement; as if two persons shall agree between themselves, that if the one wants to signify to the other at a distance, that he wishes him to come to his assistance, he will kindle a fire upon a certain hill, or hang out a flag upon a certain pinnacle of his house, or some part of his ship. Words and writing are properly instituted signs, for they have no relation to the thing signified, but what original agreement and long custom has given them. "Customary signs are no other than instituted signs which have long prevailed, and whose institution has either been accidental or has been forgotten. It is also usual to apply the word customary, to such signs as depend upon the mode and fashion of particular countries. There are some signs and postures, which though they may seem perfectly arbitrary, have obtained very generally, perhaps universally, as bending down the body, or prostration, as a sign of respect and reverence; kneeling, and lifting up the hands, as a sign of submission and supplication.Perhaps both these are natural, as they put the person into the situation least capable of resistance. "Sometimes there is a mixture of natural and instituted signs, as if a man sends a pair of wings, or the figure of them, to a friend, to intimate his danger, and the necessity of flying. "In the use of signs, the great rule of sincerity is, that wherever we are bound, and wherever we profess to communicate our inten tion, we ought to use the signs in the least ambiguous manner possible. When we have no intention, and are under no obligation to communicate any thing to others, it is of small moment what appearances are; it is their business not to make any unnecessary or uncertain inferences. A light in a house, in the middle of the night, will perhaps suggest most probably, to a traveller accidentally passing, that there is somebody sick in that house; yet perhaps it is extraordinary study or business, that keeps some person awake. Nay, when there is no obligation to give, nor any reason for the party to expect true information, it is held generally no crime at all, to use such signs as we have reason to suppose will be mistaken; as when one who does not desire to be dis-. turbed keeps his chamber close shut, that people may conclude he is not there. When a general of an army puts a fire in his camp, to conceal his march or retreat. And probably none would think it faulty, when there was an apprehension of thieves, to keep a light burning in a chamber, to lead them to suppose the whole family is not at rest. "There are some who place in the same rank, evasive phrases, when there is an apparent intention to speak our mind, but no right in the other to obtain it. Such expressions may be strictly true, and yet there is all probability that the hearer will misunderstand them. As if one should ask if a person was in any house, and should receive for answer, he went away yesterday morning, when perhaps he returned the same evening. I look upon these evasions, however, as very doubtful, and indeed rather not to be chosen, because they seem to contain a profession of telling our real mind." "Some mention ironical speech as an exception to the obligation to sincerity. But it is properly no ob 9 jection at all, because there is no deception. Truth lies not in the words themselves, but in the use of them as signs. Therefore, if a man speak his words in such a tone and manner, as that the hearer immediately conceives they are to be taken in an opposite sense, and does really take them in the sense the speaker means them, there is no falsehood at all. some "Mr. Hutchinson, and others, allow a voluntary intended departure from truth, on occasion of some great necessity, for a good end. This I apprehend is wrong; for we cannot but consider deception as in itself base and unworthy, and therefore a good end cannot justify it. Besides, to suppose it were in men's power on a sufficient occasion to violate truth, would greatly destroy its force in general, and its use in the social life. "There are two sorts of falsehood, which, because no doubt they are less aggravated than malicious interested lies, many admit of, but I think without sufficient reason. "1. Jocular lies, when there is a real deception intended, but not in any thing material, nor intended to continue long. However harmless these may seem, I reckon they are to be blamed, because it is using too much freedom with so sacred a thing as truth. And very often such persons, as a righteous punishment in Providence, are left to proceed further, and either to carry their folly to such excess, as to become contemptible, or to go beyond folly into malice. "2. Officious lies, telling falsehoods to children, or sick persons, for their good. These very seldom answer the end that is proposed. They lessen the reverence for truth; and, particularly with regard to children, are exceedingly pernicious; for as they must soon be discovered, they lose their force, and teach them to deceive. Truth and authority are methods infinitely preferable, in dealing with children, as well as with persons of riper years." "A question is often moved in morals, how far it is lawful to deceive an enemy? especially if we hold the general and universal obligation of truth. To this it may be answered, in the first place, that we may certainly, with great justice, conceal our own designs from an enemy-as indeed we may generally from friends, by silence, and guarding against every circumstance that may betray them. Neither do I think there is any thing at all blame-worthy in a general of an army using ambiguous signs, as feigned marches of a part or the whole, putting up lights or such things, because after a declaration of war, he does not pretend to give information to his enemy of his motions; nay, it is expected on both, sides that they will do the best they can to overreach one another in point of prudence. Yet I can scarce think it right to employ people to go to the enemy, and professing to be sincere, tell direct falsehoods, and deceive them by that false intelligence." * "All proposals tending to peace ought to be made with the greatest sincerity. Of all deceits in war, the most infamous is that of making a treaty, or asking a conference, only to take the advantage of one party to destroy him by assassination; or by breaking a truce to fight with advantage."* Thus it appears, that "in maintaining and promoting truth between man and man," whether it be in common conversation, or in our promises, oaths, bargains or contracts, and whether the method of expressing our thoughts be by words, or by other signs or tokens, we are to observe a strict veracity; and that even toward an enemy, we are not to make use of falsehood, although we may lawfully con • Witherspoon's Moral Philosophy. ceal the truth, either in whole or in part, when he has no right to expect that we should make it known. It remains to consider how we are to maintain and promote our own and our neighbour's good name, especially in witness bearing. 1. We ought, in our own case, justly to estimate the value of a good name; and consider what we may do, and what we may not do, in order to preserve it. "A good name, says Solomon, is better than precious ointment;" and he elsewhere declares that "it is rather to be chosen than great riches." Without a measure of the confidence of those among whom we dwell, we can neither do them good nor be happy ourselves. Whatever is said or done by a man whom we distrust, stands for nothing in our estimation; and it does not belong to human nature to have inward satisfaction, when this distrust becomes universal. A reputation for integrity, therefore, is of inestimable value to every man, and he ought to regard it as above all price. But beside integrity, a character for benevolence, and for activity in lawful business, and in doing good to others as we have opportunity, increases our own happiness, and greatly enlarges our sphere of usefulness. Your first concern, therefore, my young friends, should be to deserve the esteem and affection of others, and your second, to preserve it when acquired. I would be far from directing you to aim at popular applause, or what the world calls fame. This often proves a most dangerous snare, and is contrary to the very spirit of the gospel. Your primary object should be to please God: and if you do this, you will not fail to secure the approbation and friendship of the good and virtuous, and ultimately to obtain more of the confidence, and even the applause, of the world at large, than by any other course. When a man is believed to be thoroughly conscientious in all he does, bad men as well as good, will choose to commit their dearest in terests to his management, rather than to any one of a different character. It has been well said by the author already so largely quoted, that "it is not a contradiction, but perfectly consistent to say, a man should be tender and even jealous of his character, and yet not greedy of praise. There is an amiableness and dignity in the first, but a meanness and littleness in the last." But with every real Christian, the strongest of all motives to preserve his character from stain, will be a desire not to bring a reproach on his professionnot to do injury to the cause of his dear and adored Saviour. This he will dread more than death itself. It should be remembered, however, that it is not possible for a Christian altogether to escape the reproach of an ungodly world; and that temptations to endeavour to escape it, by unlawful compliances, will ever be among the most insidious and powerful, with which the disciple of Christ will have to contend. Our Redeemer has given us fair warning on this subject-"If ye were of the world, the world would love his own; but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you. Remember the word that I said unto you, The servant is not greater than his Lord. If they have persecuted me, they will also persecute you: if they have kept my sayings they will keep yours also." In every age of the world, the trial of "cruel mockings," has been one which the stedfast, consistent and zealous Christian, has had to endure and he could not endure it, were he not sustained by the testimony of a good conscience, the known approbation of his God, the sympathy and prayers of his fellow believers, and the prospect of the acquittal and honour which he anticipates in the day of final retribution. A defence of our good name, when it is assailed by slander or false accusation, and when defence may probably be effectual, is not only lawful but an incumbent duty. "There may be cases," says Dr. Witherspoon, "where vindications may be necessary and effectual, but they are not many. And I think I have seen in the course of life, reason to make the following distinction. If the accusation or slander be special, and relate to a particular fact, fixed by time, place, and other circumstances, and if it be either wholly false, or essentially mistaken in its nature and tendency, the matter may be explained, and justice may be done. But if it be a general character, that happens to be imputed to a man, he ought to attempt no refutation of it, but by conduct: the more he complains of it, the more he speaks of it, the more he denies it, it will be the more believed. For example, if it be affirmed that a man spoke profanely in a certain company, at a certain place and time, when he was not present at all, it may be easily and completely refuted; but if he is accused of being proud, contentious, covetous, or deceitful, although these accusations are pretended to be supported by a train of facts, it is better to let them wholly alone, and suffer his conduct to speak for itself. There are instances in history, of accusations brought with much plausibility, and urged with great vehemence, which yet have been either from the beginning disbelieved, or by time confuted; which occasioned the Latin proverb, Magna est veritas et prævalebit." Great is the truth and it will prevail. In defending ourselves against attacks on our character, we may lawfully refer to commendable actions performed by ourselves, and |
