tem of creation, whofe very effence confifts in a chain of fubordination, defcending from infinite perfection to abfolute nothing. To this likewife one objection, only has been made; which is, that no fuch chain of fubordinate beings, reaching from infinite perfection to abfolute nothing, can, in fact, exift, for this notable reason; because no being can approach next to infinite perfection nor any be contiguous to nothing. But this argument being no more than a quibble on metaphysical terms, to which no precife ideas are affixed, neither deserves, nor is capable of an answer.

The third letter treats of natural evils; and attempts to fhew, that most of these, which we complain of, are derived likewise from the fame fource; that is, from the imperfection of our natures, and our station in the universal system: to this are added three conjectures; firft, that many of our miseries may be owing to fome fecret, but invincible difpofition, in the nature of things, that renders it impracticable to produce pleasure exclufive of pain; a certain degree of which B 4

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muft therefore be endured by individuals, for the happiness and well-being of the whole: fecondly, that many other of our miferies may be inflicted on us by the agency of fuperior beings, to whofe benefit they may poffibly be as conducive as the deaths and fufferings of inferior animals are to ours; and lastly, that by the ancient doctrine of tranfmigration, the miferies, which for the fake of general utility we are obliged to fuffer in one life, may be recompenfed in another, and fo the divine goodness be fufficiently juftified from the admiffion of them all. To every one of these fome objections have been made: against the first, it has been alledged, that this impracticability to produce pleasure without pain, whence arifes this utility of the fufferings of individuals for the good of the whole, is merely a production of the author's own daring imagination, founded on no reason, and supported by no proof. To which he answers, that he proposes it as a conjecture only; but cannot think it ill-founded, fince it is con

firmed by the appearance of every thing around us, and fince it is reasonable to believe, that a benevolent Creator would not have permitted his creatures to have fuffered on any other terms. In ridicule of the fecond conjecture, it has been asked, with an air of humour, whether we can think it credible that fuperior beings fhould ride, or hunt, or roast, or eat us, as we make use of inferior animals? Which question is most properly to be answered by another: whether, in the unbounded fyftem of creation, there may not be numberlefs methods, by which beings of different orders may be fubfervient to each others uses, totally above the reach of our comprehenfions? To doubt of which would be like the incredulity of the ignorant peasant, who can scarce be perfuaded to believe that there is any thing in the world, fome fpecimen of which he has not beheld within the narrow limits of his own parish. To the last it is objected, that the doctrine of tranfmigration being only the fanciful and exploded opinion of fome ancient philofo

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phers, in the times of darkness, ought not, by the author, to have been here advanced in direct contradiction to the faith and tenets of the Chriftian religion: to which he replies, that he neither proposes this doctrine as an article of his own belief, or imposes it on others; but mentions it only as the most rational conjecture of the human mind, uninformed by fupernatural affiftance, concerning a future ftate; that it is confirmed by Revelation he does not pretend, but that it directly contradicts it, by no means appears. So filent are the fcriptures concerning the ftate of the foul between death and the refurrection, that the most learned divines still widely differ on that fubject; fome maintaining that it enters immediately into a state of retribution; others, of fleep; and others, of purgation from past offences: why therefore is it more repugnant to the sense of these writings to fuppofe, that it may poffibly animate other bodies during that period, and, at the laft day, receive fuch punishments or rewards as is due on the whole account of

its paft behaviour? Thus the probability of every one of these conjectures seems to be sufficiently established, and they appear perfectly confiftent with reason, and not at all contradictory to revelation.

The fourth letter endeavours to account for moral evil: the most arduous part of the whole undertaking; to which end it attempts to fhew, that the common opinion, which derives it folely from the abuse of free-will in man, is ineffectual for that purpose; and that therefore, though its very effence confifts in the production of natural evil, yet it could never have been admitted into the works of a juft and beneficent Creator, if it had not fome remote and collateral tendency to univerfal good, by answering fome ends beneficial to the immenfe and incomprehenfible whole; one of which may poffibly be the converfion of unpreventable miferies into just punishments by the production of guilt, without which they must have been inflicted on perfect innocence. To this account of the origin of moral evil, not only many

weighty