without cement; here a bit of black ftone, and there a bit of white; patriots and courtiers; king's friends and republicans; whigs and tories; treacherous friends and open enemies; that it was indeed a very curious fhow, but utterly unfafe to touch, and unfure to ftand on. The colleagues whom he had afforted at the fame boards ftared at each other, and were obliged to afk, " Sir, your name, &c." It fo happened, that perfons had a fingle office divided between them who had never spoken to each other in their lives; until they found themfelves, they knew not how, pigging together, heads and points, in the fame truckle-bed. In confequence of this arrangement having put fo much the larger part of his enemies and oppofers into power, the confufion was fuch that his own principles could not poffibly have any effect or influence in the conduct of affairs. If ever he fell into a fit of the gout, or if any other caufe withdrew him from public cares, principles directly contrary were fure to predominate. When he had executed his plan, he had not an inch of ground to ftand upon when he had accomplished his fcheme of adminiftration, he was no longer a minifter. When his face was hid but for a moment, his whole system was on a wide fea, without chart or compafs. The gentlemen, his particular friends, in various departments of miniftry, with a confidence in him which was juftified, even in its extravagance, by his fuperior abilities, had never in any inftance prefumed on any opinion of their own: deprived of his guiding influence, they were whirled about, the fport of every guft, and easily driven into any port; and as those who joined with them in manning the veffel were the most directly oppofite to his opinions, measures, and character, and far the most artful. and most powerful of the fet, they easily prevailed, fo as to feize upon the most vacant, unoccupied, and derelict minds of his friends, and inftantly they turned the veffel wholly out of the courfe of his policy. As if it were to infult as well as to betray him, even long before the close of the firft feffion of his administration, when every thing was publicly transacted, and with great parade, in his name, they made an act, declaring it highly juft and expedient to raife a revenue in America. For even then, even before the fplendid orb was entirely fet, and while the western horizon was in a blaze with his defcending glory, on the oppofite quarter of the heavens arofe another luminary (Charles Townshend) and for his hour became lord of the afcendant, who was officially the reproducer of the fatal fcheme, the unfortunate act to tax America for a revenue. Edm. Burke. $79. Mr. PULTENEY's Speech on the Motion for reducing the Army. Sir, We have heard a great deal about parliamentary armies, and about an army continued from year to year; I have always been, Sir, and always fhall be, against a ftanding army of any kind. To me it is a terrible thing; whether under that of parliamentary or any other defignation, a ftanding army is ftill a ftanding army, whatever name it be called by: they are a body of men diftinct from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws; and blind obedience, and an entire fubmiffion to the orders of their commanding officer, is their only principle. The nations around us, Sir, are already enflaved, and have been enslaved by thofe very means: by means of their standing armies they have every one loft their liberties: it is indeed impoffible that the liberties of the people can be preferved in any country where a numerous ftanding army is kept up. Shall we then take any of our measures from the examples of our neighbours? No, Sir; on the contrary, from their misfortunes we ought to learn to avoid those rocks upon which they have split. It fignifies nothing to tell me, that our army is commanded by fuch gentlemen as cannot be fuppofed to join in any meafures for enflaving their country. It may be fo; I hope it is fo; I have a very good opinion of many gentlemen now in the army; I believe they would not join in any fuch meafures; but their lives are uncertain, nor can we be fure how long they may be continued in 002 command; command; they may be all difmiffed in a moment, and proper tools of power put in their room. Befides, Sir, we know the paflions of men, we know how dangerous it is to truft the best of men with too much power. Where was there a braver army than that under Julius Cæfar? Where was there ever an army that had ferved their country more faithfully? That army was commanded generally by the best citizens of Rome, by men of great fortune and figure in their country; yet that army enflaved their country. The affections of the foldiers towards their country, the honour and integrity of the under officers, are not to be depended on: by the military law the adminiftration of justice is fo quick, and the punishment fo fevere, that neither officer nor foldier dares of fer to difpute the orders of his fupreme commander; he must not confult his own inclinations: if an officer were commanded to pull his own father out of this house, he must do it; he dares not difobey; immediate death would be the fure confequence of the leaft grumbling. And if an officer were fent into the court of requests, accompanied by a body of mufketeers with fcrewed bayonets, and with orders to tell us what we ought to do, and how we were to vote, I know what would be the duty of this houfe; I know it would be our duty to order the officer to be taken and hanged up at the door of the lobby; but, Sir, I doubt much if fuch a spirit could be found in the houfe, or in any house of Commons that will ever be in England. Sir, I talk not of imaginary things; I talk of what has happened to an English houfe of Commons, and from an English army: not only from an English army, but an army that was raised by that very houfe of Commons, an army that was paid by them, and an army that was commanded by generals appointed by them. Therefore do not let us vainly imagine, that an army raised and main tained by authority of Parliament will always be fubmiffive to them; if any army be fo numerous as to have it in their power to over-awe the Parliament, they will be fubmiffive as long as the Parliament does nothing to difoblige their favourite general; but when that cafe happens, I am afraid that in place of the Parliament's difmiffing the army, the army will difmifs the Parliament, as they have done heretofore. Nor does the legality or illegality of that Parliament, or of that army alter the cafe: for, with refpect to that army, and according to their way of thinking, the Parliament difmiffed by them was a legal Parliament; they were an army raifed and maintained according to law, and at firft they were raised, as they imagined, for the prefervation of thofe liberties which they afterwards deftroyed. It has been urged, Sir, that whoever is for the Proteftant fucceffion, must be for continuing the army: for that very reafon, Sir, I am against continuing the army. I know that neither the Proteftant fucceffion in his majesty's most illuftrious houfe, nor any fucceffion, can ever be fafe, as long as there is a ftanding army in the country. Armies, Sir, have no regard to hereditary fucceffions. The firft two Cæfars at Rome did pretty well, and found means to keep their armies in tolerable fubjection, becaufe the generals and officers were all their own creatures. But how did it fare with their fucceffors? Was not every one of them named by the army without any regard to hereditary right, or to any right? A cobler, a gardener, or any man who happened to raise him. felf in the army, and could gain their affections, was made emperor of the world. Was not every fucceeding emperor raised to the throne, or tumbled headlong into the duft, according to the mere whim or mad frenzy of the foldiers? We are told this army is defired to be continued but for one year longer, or for a limited term of years. How abfurd is this diftin&tion! Is there any army in the world continued for any term of years? Does the most abfolute monarch tell his army, that he is to continue them for any number of years, or any number of months? How long have we already continued our army from year to year? And if it thus continues, wherein will it differ from the ftanding armies of thofe countries which have already already fubmitted their necks to the $80. Sir JOHN ST. AUBIN's Speech The fubject matter of this debate is of fuch importance, that I fhould be afhamed to return to my electors, without endeavouring, in the best manner I am able, to declare publicly the reafons which induced me to give my most ready affent to this question. The people have an unquestionable right to frequent new parliaments by ancient ufage; and this ufage has been confirmed by feveral laws, which have been progreffively made by our anceftors, as often as they found it neceffary to infift on this effential privilege. Parliaments were generally annual, but never continued longer than three years, till the remarkable reign of Henry VIII. He, Sir, was a prince of unruly appetites, and of an arbitrary will; he was impatient of every reftraint; the laws of God and man fell equally a facrifice, as they stood in the way of his avarice, or difappointed his ambition: he therefore introduced long parliaments, because he very well knew that they would become the proper inftruments of both; and what a flavish obe. dience they paid to all his measures is fufficiently known, If we come to the reign of King Charles the Firft, we must acknowledge him to be a prince of a contrary temper; he had certainly an innate love for religion and virtue. But here lay the misfortune; he was led from his natural difpofition by fycophants and flatterers; they advised him to neglect the calling of frequent new parliaments, and therefore, by not taking the conftant fenfe of his people in what he did, he was worked up into so high a notion of prerogative, that the commons, in order to restrain it, obtained that independent fatal power, which at laft unhappily brought him to his most tragical end, and at the fame time fubverted the whole conftitution; and I hope we fhall learn this leffon from it, never to compliment the crown with any new or extravagant powers, nor to deny the people thofe rights which by ancient ufage they are entitled to; but to preferve the juft and equal balance, from which they will both derive mutual fecurity, and which, if duly obferved, will render our conftitution the envy and admiration of all the world. King Charles the Second naturally took a furfeit of parliaments in his father's time, and was therefore extremely defirous to lay them afide: but this was a scheme impracticable. However, in effect, he did fo: for he obtained a parliament which, by its long duration, like an army of veterans, became fo exactly difciplined to his own meafures, that they knew no other command but from that perfon who gave them their pay. This was a fafe and moft ingenious way of enslaving a nation. It was very well known, that arbitrary power, if it was open and avowed, would never prevail here; the people were amused with the fpecious form of their ancient conftitution: it exifted, indeed, in their fancy; but, like a mere phantom, had no fubftance nor reality in it for the power, the authority, the dignity of parliaments were wholly loft. This was that remarkable parliament which fo juftly obtained the opprobrious name of the Penfion Parliament; and was the model from which, I believe, fome later parliaments have been exactly copied. At the time of the Revolution, the 003 people people made a fresh claim of their ancient privileges; and as they had fo lately experienced the misfortune of long and fervile parliaments, it was then declared, that they fhould be held frequently. But, it feems, their full meaning was not understood by this declaration; and, therefore, as in every new fettlement the intention of all parties fhould be fpecifically manifefted, the parliament never ceafed ftruggling with the crown, till the triennial law was obtained: the preamble of it is extremely full and ftrong; and in the body of the bill you will find the word declared before enacted, by which I apprehend, that though this law did not immediately take place at the time of the Revolution, it was certainly intended as declaratory of their first meaning, and therefore ftands a part of that original contract under which the conftitution was then fettled. His majesty's title to the crown is primarily derived from that contract; and if upon a review there fhall appear to be any deviations from it, we ought to treat them as fo many injuries done to that title. And I dare fay, that this houfe, which has gone through fo long a feries of fervices to his majefty, will at last be willing to revert to thofe original flated measures of government, to renew and ftrengthen that title. But, Sir, I think the manner in which the feptennial law was first introduced, is a very ftrong reafon why it fhould be repealed. People, in their fears, have very often recourfe to defperate expedients, which, if not cancelled in feafon, will themselves prove fatal to that conftitution which they were meant to fecure. Such is the nature of the feptennial law; it was intended only as a prefervative against a temporary inconvenience the inconvenience is removed, but the mischievous effects ftill continue; for it not only altered the conftitution of parliaments, but it extended that fame parliament beyond its natural duration; and therefore carries this most unjust implication with it, That you may at any time ufurp the moft indubitable, the moft effential privilege of the people, I mean that of chufing their own reprefentatives: a precedent of fuch a dangerous confequence, of fo fatal a tendency, that I think it would be a reproach to our ftatute-book, if that law was any longer to fubfift, which might record it to pofterity. This is a feafon of virtue and public fpirit; let us take advantage of it to repeal thofe laws which infringe our liberties, and introduce fuch as may reftore the vigour of our ancient conftitution. Human nature is fo very corrupt, that all obligations lofe their force, unless they are frequently renewed: long parliaments become therefore independent of the people, and when they do fo, there always happens a moft dangerous dependence elsewhere. Long parliaments give the minifter an opportunity of getting acquaintance with members, of practifing his feveral arts to win them into his fchemes. This must be the work of time. Corruption is of fo base a nature, that at first fight it is extremely fhocking; hardly any one has fubmitted to it all at once: his difpofition must be previously underflood, the particular bait must be found out with which he is to be allured, and after all, it is not without many ftruggles that he furrenders his virtue. Indeed there are fome who will at once plunge themfelves into any bafe action; but the generality of mankind are of a more cautious nature, and will proceed only by leifurely degrees: one or two perhaps have deferted their colours the first campaign, fome have done it a second; but a great many, who have not that eager difpofition to vice, will wait till a third. For this reafon, fhort parliaments have been lefs corrupt than long ones; they are obferved, like ftreams of water, always to grow more impure the greater diftance they run from the fountain-head. I am aware it may be faid, that frequent new parliaments will produce frequent new expences; but I think quite the contrary: I am really of opinion, that it will be a proper remedy against the evil of bribery at elections, efpecially as you have provided fo whole fome a law to co-operate upon thefe occafions. Bribery at elections, whence did it arife? not from country gentlemen, for they are fure of being chofen without it; it was, Sir, the invention of wicked and corrupt minifters, who have from time to time led weak princes into fuch deftructive meafures, that they did not dare to rely upon the natural reprefentation of the people. Long parliaments, Sir, first introduced bribery, becaufe they were worth purchafing at any rate. Country gentlemen, who have only their private fortunes to rely upon, and have no mercenary ends to ferve, are unable to oppofe it, especially if at any time the public treasure shall be unfaithfully fquandered away to corrupt their boroughs. Country gentlemen, indeed, may make fome weak efforts, but as they generally prove unfuccefsful, and the time of a fresh ftruggle is at fo great a distance, they at lait grow faint in the difpute, give up their country for loft, and retire in defpair; defpair naturally produces indolence, and that is the proper difpofition for flavery. Minifters of itate underftand this very well, and are therefore unwilling to awaken the nation out of its lethargy by frequent elections. They know that the fpirit of liberty, like every other virtue of the mind, is to be kept alive only by conftant action; that it is imposible to enflave this nation, while it is perpetually upon its guard. Let country gen. tlemen then, by having frequent opportunities of exerting themfelves, be kept warm and active in their contention for the public good: this will raife that zeal and fpirit, which will at laft get the better of thofe undue influences by which the officers of the crown, though unknown to the feveral boroughs, have been able to fupplant country gentlemen of great characters and fortune, who live in their neighbourhood.—I do not fay this upon idle fpeculation only I live in a country where it is too well known, and I appeal to many gentlemen in the houfe, to more out of it, (and who are fo for this very reafon) for the truth of my affertion. Sir, it is a fore which has been long eating into the moft vital part of our conftitution, and I hope the time will come when you will probe it to the bottom. For if a minifter fhould ever gain a corrupt familiarity with our boroughs; if he should keep a register of them in his clofet, and, by fending down his treasury-mandates, fhould procure a spurious reprefentation of the people, the offspring of his corruption, who will be at all times ready to reconcile and justify the most contradictory measures of his adminiftration, and even to vote every crude indigested dream of their patron into a law; if the maintenance of his power fhould become the fole object of their attention, and they fhould be guilty of the most violent breach of parliamentary truft, by giving the king a difcretionary liberty of taxing the people without li mitation or controul; the laft fatal compliment they can pay to the crown;→→→→ if this fhould ever be the unhappy condition of this nation, the people indeed may complain; but the doors of that place, where their complaints fhould be heard, will for ever be shut against them. Our difeafe, I fear, is of a complicated nature, and I think that this motion is wifely intended to remove the firft and principal diforder. Give the people their ancient right of frequent new elections; that will reftore the decayed authority of parliaments, and will put our conftitution into a natural condition of working out her own |