proprietors the full value, or else to increase the number of Representatives, so as to leave a sufficiency to distribute among the close Boroughs. When classed as in Scotland, were five Boroughs thrown together, the number of the Representatives would be 17, making the gross amount of the Representation 115. Should the plan of classing the Boroughs and the election take place as in Scotland, the influence attached to each is of so awkward a description that it will be held in little estimation by the proprietors, and their idea of compensation will vary little from what they would expect if the right of voting for Representatives was entirely withdrawn.

An election by rotation within the class, preserving all the corporations for municipal purposes, would not be liable to this objection in its full extent; though the turn of choosing the member would occur only every fifth Parliament, the advantage being ascertained and free from uncertainty, and the cabal to which the election by commissioners is liable, the privilege would be considered as of value in an inverse proportion to the number of Boroughs classed together.

Were there no objection on constitutional grounds to the principle of entire disfranchisement, it would simplify this arrangement, and, perhaps, on the whole, prove the most satisfactory to the parties interested. This principle may be the less to be apprehended in the present instance, from the fact of nearly all the close Boroughs in Ireland having been erected for a special purpose in the reign of James I., namely, for the security of the Protestant Establishment, which special purpose being much more effectually secured by the incorporation of the Protestant Government of Ireland with the Protestant Government of Great Britain, the necessity for their continuance has so far ceased: it may, therefore, very fairly be argued, without furnishing an admission prejudicial to any description of Charter, that, the extinction of a certain number. of Boroughs being indispensable to the arrangement, these Boroughs have been selected, because, with few exceptions, they

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had been the most recently erected upon a ground of policy which would no longer exist, and because, in point of fact, they admitted of that species of compensation which individuals might reasonably expect where they were called upon to make a sacrifice for the public advantage.

If disfranchisement on the application of the corporators of Boroughs was thought less objectionable than compulsory disfranchisement, there could be no doubt many would prefer extinction and entire compensation to any mode of combination that could be adopted. Surrenders thus obtained might reduce the number to be classed so as to make the influence preserved of a more convenient nature: two Boroughs united, giving an alternate choice, would be held in estimation; classed beyond this number, they would retain little value. Were the number to be distributed among the 86 Boroughs to be ascertained, and it was thought advisable not to connect more than two Boroughs together, if a sufficient number of Boroughs did not apply for disfranchisement, the number requisite might be drawn by lot. If too many applied, the preference might be decided in like manner, unless agreed among the parties; but as this last suggestion proceeds upon a supposition of the number of Representatives being suffered to exceed 100, and as the voluntary surrender of the number required can alone render the principle consistent with itself, it seems rather to increase than to obviate the difficulty.

The arrangement in the above statement has been considered more in a personal than in a constitutional point of view. The operation of the measure upon individual interests being less obvious and more of a local nature, it has been thought right to trace it, in order that it may be considered how far it is expedient to accommodate general principles (with a view to the success of the measure) to the ideas the proprietors have of their own private interests.

As compensation is to be made, it may be worth considering how a proceeding somewhat embarrassing in its principle can

be best executed.

The less the detail is canvassed in Parliament the better. The general principle alone ought to be stated there, namely, that an injury is to be done to individual interests for the public good, which, in point of justice, but still more strongly in point of policy, requires compensation.

The maximum of compensation that any Borough shall be entitled to ought to be settled, and, with this restriction, it may be referred to a board of Commissioners, acting on their oaths as a question of equity, to apply the amount so as to provide for each particular case.

Were it possible to devise any means, in Boroughs where the influence is general, to apply the value to local purposes, so as equally to provide for the interests of the parties concerned, it would be a great point gained, inasmuch as it would enable you to class open with close Boroughs, without doing what would be considered as an injury, and which must of course impede the measure; but this appears almost impossible. It would be more practicable, as far as the voters are concerned than with respect to the persons in whom the influence is; but, upon the whole, the transaction must, from its nature, be extremely complicated, and, of course, likely to produce much clamour and dissatisfaction.

These ideas are thrown out loosely, merely as materials for forming a decision upon. The question is, in itself, of the last importance, highly so in a constitutional point of view; but still more so, perhaps, as involving the fate of the question itself. The Union must be exposed to very great hazard, of private dissatisfaction, if the arrangement of the Representation shall be suffered to co-operate with the general opposition to

the measure.

It is indispensable that a plan for the Representation should be digested without delay, and it seems obviously desirable, when the attainment of the object cannot be placed in competition with a rigid adherence to economy, that the compensation to be given should be felt by the parties interested to be

liberal, and that the general system should trench as little as possible on that portion of the Representation to which pecuniary compensation is not applicable.

SUGGESTIONS OF THE LORD-LIEUTENANT RELATIVE TO THE REPRESENTATION.

The Duke of Portland, in his despatch of the 25th,1 calls upon the Lord-Lieutenant for his suggestions upon the future constitution of the Representation for this kingdom returnable to the Parliament of the Union, making it a preliminary condition that the number of Commoners shall not exceed 100, and that the present franchises in the several Counties, Cities, and Boroughs, shall not be impeached or extinguished.

The Lord-Lieutenant, impressed with the wisdom of avoiding any infringement of chartered rights, considers it not incompatible with this principle, and for various reasons highly expedient in the management proposed, to follow the Scotch precedent, and to give a preference to the County Representation, as also that of the great commercial towns over that of the close Boroughs.

As no place can aspire to return more than one member, his Excellency considers that much real embarrassment would arise to the commercial interests of the trading towns, and well founded objections be stated on the part of the Counties, were they exposed to be left without a Representative in the Legislature, specially charged with an attention to their local concerns. His Excellency, therefore, proposes that every place now returning two members should hereafter return but one.

That each County should return one member absolutely to the United Parliament.

That the Cities of Dublin, Drogheda, Newry, Londonderry, Galway, Limerick, Cork, Waterford, and should

return one member absolutely.

That the University should return one member absolutely,

1 of November, 1798, ii., 19.

making in all 42 members. That from the remaining 108 places now returning members, 54 should be chosen, making the gross number of Representatives 96; and in order to avoid the cabal of delegating from amongst themselves, as in the case of the Scotch Peers, or of the uncertainty of selection by lot, which would be peculiarly inconvenient to official men, or of incorporation, which would be altogether impracticable in a representation so constituted as ours, that the Boroughs should alternately choose a member to the United Parliament, classing them so that the different parts of the kingdom might be proportionably represented in each Parliament.

This would, in a certain degree, affect the value of Borough property, and, it is to be presumed, might proportionably disincline their patrons to a Union. The Lord-Lieutenant is of opinion that means might be found, without resorting to the embarrassing principle of avowed compensation, so as to satisfy the private interests of at least a sufficient number of the individuals affected to secure the measure against any risk arising from this consideration. At all events, he considers the reasons before stated for giving a preference to the Representation of Counties and Cities to be so weighty as to counterbalance any additional difficulty in reconciling the individuals to the arrangement.

REMARKS ON THE PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTIONS RESPECTING

THE UNION.

The resolutions state :

1. That each country is to remain separately chargeable with their past debts, and with any future debts which it may contract according to the proviso contained in the 9th resolution.

2. All joint debt hereafter contracted, together with the general expenses of the United Kingom, to be defrayed proportionably by the respective countries.

3. The United Parliaments are to have a discretion to sub