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by which a growing evil can be overcome by the law students themselves, with the aid of the active Bar, through the formal and the public teaching of the duties and the obligations of future citizenship? We have our public medical clinics. We have our free dispensaries to furnish definite legal aid to the poor and to the ignorant. In the same concrete way, can we not have our dispensaries where an untutored alien who desires to learn the truth (as against the rabid talk he can not escape), can learn, and where the spirit of destruction may itself be destroyed?

Even within the ranks of our own citizenship, it is a natural. development of a republican form of government that the individual should frequently come to think that there are no other individuals; for the people are the sovereign, and that element of sovereignty which attaches to each individual may at times obscure his vision as to the existence of the others. We resent the governmental interference indicated by the ordinances of certain European cities which prescribe the manner in which the houses upon a certain street shall be constructed, in order to add to the beauty of the street. This, we say, conflicts with the right of a man to build as he pleases, even though in particular cases it may add to the happiness of many other men. But, assuming that we should desire to subordinate the status of the individual in any matter in which we have given him the constitutional right to act in a certain way, it is, of course, no argument to say that if we now think the rule should be changed, it should accordingly be done by the courts, or by violence, or in any other way than the orderly processes of legal change.

Society is nothing but an aggregation of individuals; but there is a growing tendency toward the view that while the law may be a proper instrument for the protection of individuals as between themselves, or as between one individual and society as a whole, it ceases in value if a number of individuals band themselves together for a common purpose. Under these circumstances, the argument is made boldly that, after all, this is but

helping society itself, and that, in this event, the associates are justified not only in attempts to gain control of the courts, but to resist the law itself. The theory seems to be that no one is honest but ourselves; that no one can save the State but our own minority, and that when we speak, the processes of the law shall bow. It is, of course, the ancient story of the three tailors of Tooley Street who headed their petition: "We, the people of England."

With the aid of the same character of logic-or the lack of it-there is a growing assertion of the right of the individual to treat the law as the measure of our action only in so far as it conforms to our individual sense of right. This, the world has looked upon with increasing toleration, until today it beguiles itself with the word "justice"; and the situation is confined to no one country, to no one people and to no one class. We are all in some measure party to it.

Of course, as a profession, we have no concern in the development of any particular theory looking to the adoption of any status which society may determine upon as exhibiting its views of justice in economic or social matters. If it be determined that the present order of things in any respect no longer represents fairplay between men, and, as a result, the order is lawfully changed, the new order becomes for the Bar the evidence of the justice which society then demands. In our personal lives, and in our political allegiance and activities, we may still think and contend that there should be further changes to establish what we believe to be justice, and for those changes we may strive; but, striving, we must not forget that there can be no present justice. and no protection to society at large as against violence and lawlessness save through the enforcement of the law, and of that justice which the law, itself, declares.

Frequently, the besetting sin of argument lies in a lack of definition of terms. It is easy to adopt a high-sounding phrase, or a word of admitted credit, and, without attempting to define

it, use it to cover our own defects in logic, or in the very quality that the word or phrase may itself imply.

Every man of honest mind stands and must stand for justice in everything. It is "the principle of rectitude and proper dealing of men with each other"; but it has become common for the individual or the class that desires the supremacy of its own selfish views to demand a "justice" which it declines to define specifically.

In a state of lawlessness, there is no rule but that of force, and while the victim may refuse to recognize the justice of the conduct of the victor, he has no relief save in renewed appeals to force. But in any free government the situation is otherwise. The organization of society under the forms of law, and obedience to that organization, are a necessity in bringing about the justice which we may think should exist. With the differing opinions among men as to whether a particular law speaks justice, or what changes should be made or what new policies should be adopted, there is nothing to do but to obey the law until we change it to what society demands; and this, in our form of government, constitutes justice, for there is no other stable basis on which men as part of society can deal properly and safely with each other.

It is of no lasting importance that trite phrases be made the oriflammes of contending factions, or that the same banner be flung to the breeze by both or by all litigants. Each of us thinks his conduct "just", and each of us may contend with honesty that the other lacks all justice. But where must the lawyer stand in the maintenance of the law and of justice under the law?

Can he say that in his view the courts have erroneously decided his client's cause, and that therefore he will resist by force, because in his judgment justice has been denied? Can he say that if by constitutional methods the people have resisted his exercise of certain professional functions, justice has been denied his class, and that he will array his associates against the world?

Or must he say that if his ideas of justice are sound they shall be presented to the people for consideration and for adoption into the legal processes of government, and that, until then the law as declared by lawful means is the only measure of justice in his relations to his fellowmen, and in the relation of all men to each other?

Justice and the right to declare it are attributes possessed by no one individual and by no one class. What is proper dealing of men with each other can only be determined by some express or implied agreement, binding, at least for a time, upon society; and in civilized government there can be no governmental justice save as exhibited by the law itself. Our views of public policy may differ among us as individuals, but they must be controlled for practical purposes by some power other than that of each for himself. As between individuals, we may agree from day to day as to what shall be the measure of our fair dealing; but if we do not agree, we have no measure save the law, as society itself has agreed upon it for our protection. When, therefore, we demand the justice that we may rightly demand in the law, let us not forget that the honesty of our demand lies in this test:

"Do we demand justice through the maintenance of the law as it stands, until changed; or do we demand. the present recognition of our present and personal views of justice, notwithstanding the law?"

Justice looks to the future as well as to the present. There can be no justice where there is no defined rule of action on which we can rely, and in this sense all peace implies justice; but it is a perversion of all law and of all government and of all truth to say or to insinuate that the peace of the world shall depend upon my right or upon yours to determine for ourselves what shall constitute the justice that we shall have.

And here lies a prime duty of the lawyer. We, as lawyers, may be able to differentiate in these matters, but how natural it

is that the average man hearing us unite in our demands for justice when we are convinced of the need for change, should conclude that justice is a thing above and apart from all law, that the law may be ignored, and some undefined thing placed in its stead with safety. That conclusion has never lead to anything but to violence and to anarchy.

The law is and must be the handmaid of justice, for the law is no end in itself. One class may contend that it and it alone is the spokesman and the helpmeet of society; and so may every other class. One man may contend that he and he alone is the evangel of truth, and that he must control the powers of government for what he conceives to be the right; and so may every other man. The majority may contend that its interests are assailed by a belligerent and unreasoning minority; and the minority may proclaim itself oppressed by a vicious majority. These are incidents in the progress of the world. They involve matters which are not to be settled by unreasoning denunciation, but calmly. Underlying them all lies the truth that as the world progresses, its governmental justice from time to time can find nothing but a human basis, and that that human basis is the rule of action-the law-upon which society has authorized itself to proceed.

The present seems to be a period when we are vieing with each other as reformers, and most of us desire to make some one else virtuous according to our own ideas of justice. This policy usually leads to bitterness and invective, and at times to violence, to open lawlessness and to unthinking condonation of lawlessness.

As lawyers, we have no monopoly or control of knowledge, but we have an obligation resting upon us to use what knowledge we do possess, in the public and private maintenance of the things we know to be of the foundations of all protection for rich and poor alike. The duty rests upon us not to insist upon the continuance of a law simply because it exists, but to insist upon its observance while it exists, and to stand against all lawlessness.

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