E. C. Stimson: I think it is much more important to get this thing right than to do it hurriedly. I think on the next ballot that the same 60 per cent. provision should apply. There are eight candidates. Out of those candidates those whose aggregate vote reaches 60 per cent., being the highest on the list, should be counted as the candidates to go on the fifth ballot, or some such idea as that. After the fifth ballot then I would drop down to two. In other words, I would substitute the plan on the fourth ballot as applying to the fifth ballot. I would make the fifth ballot the same as the fourth, so far as percentage is concerned, if it were left to me to decide. Harry E. Kelly: With the consent of the Association, I wish to withdraw my motion in order to leave the way clear for Judge Stimson to make one to cover that point, as he just explained it now. E. C. Stimson: I think the committee has done plenty. President Dubbs: As the chair understands Judge Stimson's suggestion, it is that the plan be modified in this respect, that after the fourth ballot be taken there then be selected from the candidates appearing on the fourth ballot those names representing 60 per cent. of the vote, that a fifth ballot be then taken with those names upon that ballot, and that after the return of the fifth ballot the sixth ballot be then taken confined to the two men receiving the largest vote. Is that correct? Harry E. Kelly: I move that the plan be modified as just stated by the chair. E. C. Stimson: May I read some extracts from a letter which I received this morning from one member of the committee who was unable to be present, bearing directly on this matter now under consideration? "I regret deeply that I can not attend the annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association in person, and that I have been unable to take up your request for the making of further suggestions for our committee until now. "In the light of our present primary election experience, a few thoughts naturally arise. "First, in my judgment, the process of elimination applied to the second and third ballots ought to continue by the systematic dropping on each successive ballot of those candidates not contributing to the 60 per cent. aggregate of the high votes.” That is, he means of all the votes. "There should be no arbitrary elimination of the candidates actually polling a large majority of the votes, as is possible under our rule for the elimination of candidates after the third ballot. Otherwise, two candidates jointly polling the votes of a comparatively small minority might be segregated as the final candidates, when, as a matter of fact, a large majority might prefer to have neither. The necessarily haphazard arrangement of the scattered votes on the third ballot makes deliberate selection by the majority improbable if not impossible on the fourth ballot. Expression of another unrestricted choice from among those jointly polling 60 per cent. of the votes on the fourth ballot might unite a majority upon one of the candidates who received a smaller vote. Under our rules, such a process is out of the question as to the fourth ballot. I admit, of course, that the fourth ballot may show the highest two candidates to have received more than 60 per cent. of the total votes. "On the second ballot the highest candidate had a little over 8 per cent. of the entire vote, the next highest candidate a little over 7 per cent., and both together 15.7 per cent. of the total vote cast. If the votes which will be received on the fourth ballot by those who become the highest two candidates should prove to be proportionately double the respective votes of the highest two on the second ballot, the joint vote would represent less than 31.5 per cent. of the total vote, yet the other 68.5 per cent. would be bound to choose one or the other of the two. The majority representing 68.5 per cent. (or even 84.3 per cent., if we retain the ratio obtained from the actual figures on the second ballot instead of assuming the two leading candidates on the fourth ballot to have twice as large a vote as the corresponding candidates on the second) might prefer a candidate who is very little behind the second highest, yet it can not enforce its preference. "To sum up, I think the candidates left in the field on any one ballot should always represent the affirmative preferences of at least a majority (perhaps 60 per cent.) of all the votes. The elimination should be only of those weaker candidates, who represent an actual minority. "Since dictating the above figures, I have seen the article in the Rocky Mountain News giving the vote on the highest eight candidates on the third ballot, constituting more than 60 per cent. of the total vote. I do not think the result is such as to obviate entirely the objections which I have made. Certainly in future primary elections, if not in the present one, the procedure ought to be modified as suggested." This is signed by Assistant Attorney-General Francis E. Bonck. Lawrence Lewis: It is interesting that a number of us apparently have reached practically the same conclusion about this system, that possibly we have proceeded a little too slowly in this elimination first, and it is at least worthy of very serious consideration as to whether or not we are not proceeding too rapidly in the elimination in the later ballots. In the form of fourth ballot which you will all find in your offices when you return, we have reprinted the seventh and eighth subdivisions of this mode of procedure, the eighth being the one which Judge Stimson has just read to you. Coming down here on the train this morning I had worked out the specific form of the result which was so well given in Mr. Bouck's letter. Assuming, for example, that there are on this fourth ballot 800 votes cast for the eight candidates, whom we shall designate as A to H. I hope there will be nearer a thousand votes on this fourth ballot, but assume that there is a total of 800 cast. Let us assume further (which is not a wild conjecture) that the highest man on this ballot will not receive over 150 votes. We will designate him as A. Assume that B will receive 115 votes. Unless the mode of procedure is modified that will mean that the two men who are retained out of the total of 800 votes will receive 265 votes. Let us assume further that the third man, C, receives 110 votes, D 105 votes and E 95. The aggregate vote cast for C, D. and E will thus be 310. It at least well might happen that out of these 310 lawyers who voted for C, D, and E, each one of them might prefer any one of C, D, or E to either A or B, but under the present plan of elimination there would be an arbitrary rejection of all but A and B. Assume further that F received 85 and G 75 and H 65, making a total in that third group of 225, and the same assumption might be true of all those men, yet the men who voted for F, G, and I would prefer any of the candidates C, D, E, F, G, or H to either A or B. It might be then that 265-a solidified minority you might say—would control this situation and might obtain a result which would be satisfactory to none of us. Although I do not even dignify this as a suggestion I wish to present it here for your serious consideration. I think all who have had anything to do with these ballots feel that on further examination of this plan it might be well to adopt the 60 per cent. rule as to the fourth ballot instead of this arbitrary elimination of the six out of the eight, the line dividing the second from the third man being perhaps one or two votes under the rule. W. N. Searcy: I would like to ask whether it is intended that the 60 per cent. rule should apply all the way through. I can not see at present why it would not be fair for the 60 per cent. rule to apply to every vote down to the last two, until all are eliminated but two. I do not understand whether that is the way of it or not. President Dubbs: As the chair understands the motion, it is to the effect that instead of cutting the list of candidates down to two after the taking of the fourth ballot that the 60 per cent. rule be applied to the result of the fourth ballot, and that after the fifth ballot comes in then the list of candidates shall be cut down to two. That is the chair's understanding. Thomas J. O'Donnell: Will the chair state the motion? President Dubbs: It was a motion to the effect, as the chair just stated. That is the chair's understanding of Judge Stimson's recommendation as to change of plan. Thomas J. O'Donnell: I did not hear his recommendation. President Dubbs: His recommendation was to the effect that instead of cutting the list of candidates down to two after taking the fourth ballot, a fifth ballot be taken on the same theory on which the fourth ballot |