Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

CHAPTER 2.

THE Confederation having given place to the American Union, under the Constitution of the United States, it was considered unnecessary to insert, in the first and second editions of this book, the Articles of Confederation, which were agreed to by the Delegates of the thirteen Original States, in Congress assembled, on the 15th November, 1777; ratified by eight States, on the 9th July, 1778; and finally ratified by all the States, on the 1st March, 1781; but on further consideration, those articles have been inserted at page 471, merely as matter of history, as it were out of place to mingle that inefficient form of government with the present approved and successful system, which has stood the test of more than half a century, and which is destined, under Divine Providence, not only to perpetuate the happiness and safety of the people of the United States, but to be the Great Exemplar of Nations, when governments shall, by the natural and just power of man, be brought to their legitimate purposes and uses—to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to the people.

The matter contained in this chapter exhibits the deplorable condition of the finances and credit of the government under the old form, and the incompetency of the Congress of the Confederation to raise a revenue, support the public credit, regulate trade or commerce, or to provide for the wants and safety of the country; and it is intended thereby to show the immediate and prominent causes that led to the abandonment of that inefficient form, and the adoption of the present system of government; and, also, to show the official proceedings by which the change was effected and the present Constitution established.

These facts and proceedings may prove a warning against the treasonable suggestions of the evil spirit, whose insidious and alluring temptations are, not unfrequently, directed towards the

most ardent and honest citizens, whose zeal in the defence of the supposed interests of a part of the Union might induce them even to go so far as to calculate the value of the Union itself, and of the Constitution. By exhibiting the impotency of the measures adopted by the Old Confederation to provide for the wants and to secure the independence and safety of the people, the perusal of these proceedings will induce a due appreciation of the value of our inestimable Union, so firmly bound together by the conservative and protective principles of our noble Constitution, and will banish from the mind the least idea of a disorganizing tendency, or of relapsing into the enfeebled condition of the General Government before the adoption of the Constitution. The danger of extracting from the edifice one particle of the material which serves to support its magnificent superstructure, is here practically made manifest, and every true-hearted American citizen will firmly resolve, with heart and hand, and sleepless vigilance, to guard the Union, fortified by the Constitution, as the citadel of our liberties-the object of our greatest care, and the consummation of our earthly hope.

OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE ADOPTION AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

It was early discovered by the patriots and statesmen of the Revolu tion, that a bond of union, to connect the powers and means of the colonies for the common defence, was a measure of absolute necessity; and nence the assemblage of a number of delegates, chosen and appointed by the several colonies and provinces in North America, to meet and hold a Congress in Philadelphia, at the Carpenter's Hall, on Monday, the 5th September, 1774. This Congress continued to act under the powers separately conferred upon the delegates by the respective colonies, until the time arrived when, from their patriotic ardor, the delicacy of their position, and the force of circumstances, a total separation from the mother country became necessary, and they were obliged to assume a noble stand among the nations of the earth. Simultaneously with and consequent upon the Declaration of Independence, a provision for an

adequate national government became so manifestly indispensable, that, on the 11th June, 1776, it was resolved that a committee be appointed to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into between the colonies. After due deliberation, the Articles of Confederation were agreed to, in Congress, on 15th November, 1777, subject to the ratification of the several States. The ratification by eight States was announced on the 9th July, 1778; but many objections were urged to these articles, and so reluctantly did some of the States part with a portion of their powers, that it was not until the 1st March, 1781, that these articles were fully ratified; and no sooner were they ratified than (indeed before their final ratification) it was found that the powers conferred by them upon Congress were totally inadequate to the indispensable purposes of a national government. The defects first became apparent in the want of the necessary means of raising a revenue, and next in the absence of power to regulate or control the foreign trade and commerce of the country; and on the 3d February, 1781, a member from New Jersey moved a recommendation to the States that Congress be vested with additional powers to provide means for paying the public debt, and prosecuting the existing war, by laying duties on imports and prize goods. One of the States having refused to comply with this recominendation, the subject was referred to a committee, by whom the following report was made:

1. IN THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1782.

The committee, consisting of Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Fitzsimmons, to whom was referred the letter of 30th November, from the honorable William Bradford, speaker of the lower house of Assembly of the State of Rhode Island, containing, under three heads, the reasons of that State for refusing their compliance with the recommenda tion of Congress for a duty on imports and prize goods; report,

That they flatter themselves the State, on a reconsideration of the objections they have offered, with a candid attention to the arguments which stand in opposition to them, will be induced to retract their dissent, convinced that the measure is supported on the most solid grounds of equal justice, policy, and general utility. The following observations, contrasted with each head of the objections, successively, will furnish a satisfactory answer to the whole.

First objection. That the proposed duty would be unequal in s operation, bearing hardest upon the most commercial States, and so

would press peculiarly hard upon that State which draws its chief sup port from commerce."

The most common experience, joined to the concurrent opinions of the ablest commercial and political observers, have established beyond controversy this general principle, "that every duty on imports is incorporated with the price of the commodity, and ultimately paid by the consumer, with a profit on the duty itself, as a compensation to the merchant for the advance of his money."

The merchant considers the duty demanded by the State on the imported article, in the same light with freight, or any similar charge, and, adding it to the original cost, calculates his profit on the aggregate sum. It may happen that at particular conjunctures, where the markets are overstocked, and there is a competition among the sellers, this may not be practicable; but in the general course of trade the demand for consumption preponderates, and the merchant can with ease indemnify himself, and even obtain a profit on the advance. As a consumer, he pays his share of the duty; but it is no further a burden upon him. The consequence of the principle laid down is, that every class of the community bears its share of the duty in proportion to its consumption, which last is regulated by the comparative wealth of the respective classes, in conjunction with their habits of expense or frugality. The rich and luxurious pay in proportion to their riches and luxury; the poor and parsimonious, in proportion to their poverty and parsimony. A chief excellence of this mode of revenue is, that it preserves a just measure to the abilities of individuals, promotes frugality, and taxes extravagance. The same reasoning in our situation applies to the intercourse between two States; if one imports and the other does not, the latter must be supplied by the former. The duty, being transferred to the price of the commodity, is no more a charge on the importing State for what is consumed in the other, than it is a charge on the merchant for what is consumed by the farmer or artificer. Either State will only feel the burden in a ratio to its consumption, and this will be in a ratio to its population and wealth. What happens between the different classes of the same community, internally, happens between the two States; and as the merchant, in the first case, so far from losing the duty himself, has a profit on the money he advances for that purpose, so the importing State, which, in the second case, is the merchant with respect to the other, is not only reimbursed by the non-importing State, but has a like benefit on the duty advanced. It is, therefore, the reverse of a just position, that the duty proposed will bear hardest on the most commercial States: it will, if any thing, have a contrary effect, though not in a suf.

ficient degree to justify an objection on the part of the non-importing States; for it is as reasonable they should allow an advance on the duty paid as on the first cost, freight, or any incidental charge. They have also other advantages in the measure fully equivalent to this disadvantage. Over-nice and minute calculations in matters of this nature are inconsistent with national measures, and, in the imperfect state of human affairs, would stagnate all the operations of government. Absolute equality is not to be obtained: to aim at it, is pursuing a shadow at the expense of the substance, and, in the event, we should find ourselves wider of the mark than if, in the first instance, we were content to approach it with moderation.

Second objection. "That the recommendation proposes to introduce into that and the other States officers unknown and unaccountable to them, and so is against the constitution of the State."

It is not to be presumed that the constitution of any State could mean to define and fix the precise numbers and descriptions of all officers to be permitted in the State, excluding the creation of any new ones, whatever might be the necessity derived from that variety of circumstances incident to all political institutions. The legislature must always have a discretionary power of appointing officers not expressly known to the constitution, and this power will include that of authorizing the federal government to make the appointments, in cases where the general welfare may require it. The denial of this would prove too much; to wit, that the power given by the Confederation to Congress to appoint all officers in the post-office was illegal and unconstitutional.

The doctrine advanced by Rhode Island would perhaps prove, also, that the Federal Government ought to have the appointment of no internal officers whatever-a position that would defeat all the provisions of the Confederation, and all the purposes of the Union. The truth is, that no federal constitution can exist without powers that in their exercise affect the internal police of the component members. It is equally true, that no government can exist without a right to appoint officers for those purposes which proceed from and concentre in itself; and therefore the Confederation has expressly declared that Congress shall have authority to appoint all such "civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction." All that can be required is, that the Federal Government confine its appointments to such as it is empowered to make by the original act of union, or by the subsequent consent of the parties; unless there should be express words of exclusion in the constitution of a

« ZurückWeiter »