the expedition was meant as a diversion, Holland, of all other places, was the worst for a diversion; since by the nature of the country, a very inferior body of troops could sucessfully resist a greatly superior force. He would He would agree that it was a fair thing to call a descent diversion, where, landing on an enemie's shore, you drew great bodies of men from other quarters, and kept them in play; but it was quite another thing, when, having landed with the professed object of replacing an exiled authority, and having failed, you came home and called it a diversion. You had no right to call it by such a name. But it was to be repeated! What, after the trial which has been made? and never was a trial so completely made of the dispositions of any people could insanity itself think of repeating the experiment? After having entered the country not merely with a superior force, but with a force, so greatly superior, that if the people were in their hearts at all disposed to come over to the British, they had every temptation-if not a man was found disposed to trust us, could it be believed, that after the experience they had had, they would now come, if the experiment were to be repeated? Mr. Sheridan concluded, by expressing his surprise at the conduct of ministers upon this occasion. He did expect that they would endeavor to have made the inquiry nugatory; but that they would have colored their indisposition to enter into the investigation with some plausible pretext. He was disappointed. The house had seen the ground they had taken, and the country would see their motives. He lamented, for the sake of the brave army, and for the honor of the nation, that they thought it consistent with common decency to get rid of the subject by such means.

The house divided; ayes 45; noes 216.

FEBRUARY 17.

GRANT TO THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY, &c.

FOR THE LOAN TO FOREIGN POWERS.

Mr. Pitt moved for a sum not exceeding 500,000l. to enable His Majesty to make such advances as might be necessary for the purpose of insuring, at an early period, a vigorous co-operation of the Emperor of Germany, the Elector of Bavaria, &c. in the ensuing campaign against the common enemy.

Mr. SHERIDAN-" The honorable gentleman (Mr. Wilberforce) who has just sat down, and said he rose only to save himself from misinterpretation, has declared, that he has no objection to peace. Now I should expect a warmer declaration from that honorable gentleman, when I recollect his conduct on a former occasion. I recollect a time, when he came to rebuke the violence of the minister. [Mr. Sheridan read a motion made by Mr. Wilberforce, for an address to His Majesty, praying, that the government of France might not be made an obstacle to peace, when an opportunity should arrive.] Now, as the honorable gentleman is anxious to escape from the charge of inconsistency, I should expect he would state the reason for this difference in his conduct now. Then the government was a provisional government; a government from its nature not intended to stand; a government of furious jacobins; and yet the honorable gentleman implored to supplicate His Majesty, that it might not be suffered to stand in the way of peace; but now, when it is of a less objectionable description, he justifies his friend from an arrogant, violent, inconsiderate, and I hope he will not find an unfortunate note, refusing to accept peace from such a government. An honorable gentleman who has spoken in the debate put a very just question, whether the country will endure to be governed by words, and not by facts? I admit it right that it should not be so governed, but I unfortunately have the authority of the present government that it is. The honor

able gentleman spoke with great eloquence, I may say irritation; but never did I see eloquence so misapplied. He has shewn his dexterity in driving the subject from its proper basis; he guides, urges, and inflames the passions of his hearers on jacobinical principles; but he does not shew how they bear on the present question. He has not dared to say, that so far as respects the restoration of the house of Bourbon, we have suffered by the defection of Russia. What that power may still do with regard to La Vendee, or reconciling the people of Ireland to the Union, I do not inquire; but with regard to the great object, the restoration of monarchy in France, we are minus the Emperor of Russia; that power may be considered as extinct. Is it then to be endured, that the minister shall come down and ask for a subsidy under such circumstances? Is it to be eudured, that we shall be told we are at war for the restoration of monarchy in France, that Russia is pledged to the accomplishment of that purpose, that Russia is the rock on which we stand, that the magnanimous Emperor of Russia, the gallantry of whose troops, and the skill of whose great generals, place them above all the troops and generals in Europe, is all we have to rest on? Is it to be endured, I say, that this rock should prove as brittle as sand, and that those who held this language should come down in a week after, and say, give us two millions and a half to subsidize Germany, and then we shall have a better army than we had with Russia? After such unqualified praise upon Russia, and after her defection, is not such language, I ask, inconsistent, absurd, and preposterous? If Germany possessed these wonderful forces before, why were they not called into action; and if not, why are we to subsidize the posse comitatus, the rabble of Germany? But who is the person that applies for this subsidy ? As to the Elector of Bavaria, I leave him out of the question. It is the Emperor of Germany. Is there any thing in his

conduct and character to incline us to listen to him. I think not; and for these two reasons: first, he applied once on a false pretence; and, secondly, he failed in performing his stipulated engagement. What was his false pretence? He said he could not open the campaign without the pecuniary assistance of this country; and yet he did do so, and displayed more vigor, energy, and resources than ever. Now, if to this we add experience, and the evidence of facts, when he dared, though bound to this country, to break faith with her, and make a separate peace, does it not furnish a reasonable cause for declining to grant a subsidy to such a power? The honorable gentleman is offended at our connecting the situation of the country, and the present scarcity with the question of war. I do not know to what extent this principle is to be carried. I see no more objection to state the pressure in this particular from the continuance of the war, than there would be to advance the increase of the public debt, the situation of the finances or any other of those reasons so often repeated without its having been ever objected that they were of an improper kind, Sir, I say, there is no more impropriety in urging this argument, than in urging ministers not to press the people too far, but to apportion the burden to their strength to bear it. What has my honorable friend said? We see an opulent commercial prosperity; but look over the country, and we behold barracks and broth-houses, the cause and the effect, the poverty and distress of the country; for surely it will not be contended, but that among the calamities of war are to be reckoned families left without support, and thrown upon charity for subsistence. That the war is unnecessary, as being useless, is self-evident, and nobody can deny it. But, say they, Bonaparte has taken us at an unguarded moment: we do not object to peace, but we have a fear and jealousy of concluding one, except with the house of Bourbon: in a

peace concluded with it we should have confidence, but we can have none in the present government of France. I say, were that event arrived, and the house of Bourbon seated on the throne, the minister should be impeached who would disband a single soldier; and that it would be equally criminal to make peace under a new king as under a republican government, unless her heart and mind were friendly to it. France, as a republic, may be a bad neighbour; but than monarchical France a more foul and treacherous neighbour never was. Is it, then, sufficient to say, let monarchy be restored, and let peace be given to all Europe? I come now, Sir, to the object of the war as expressed in the note. It is there stated, that the restoration of monarchy is the sine qua non of present negociation; and then it proceeds to say, that it is possible we may hereafter treat with some other form of government, after it shall be tried by experience and the evidence of facts. What length of time this trial may require, is impossible to ascertain; yet we have, I acknowledge, something of experience here by which we may form a kind of conjecture.

"At the time of the negociation at Lisle, the then republican government had stood two years and a half. Previous to that time, it had been declared improper to enter into negociation with it; but, from experience and the evidence of facts, ministers discovered that it was then become good and proper to treat with; and yet so it happened, that, immediately after this judgment in its favor, it crumbled to pieces. Here then we have a tolerable rule to judge by, and may presume, on the authority of this case, that something more than two years and a half must expire before any new government will be pronounced stable. The note, Sir, then proceeds to pay an handsome compliment to the line of princes who maintained peace at home, and to round the period handsomely, it should have added, tranquillity abroad; but instead of this are substituted respect