that might be, the old law seemed to be worn out; its teeth could not be fixed upon the evil; it was the object of the present bill to remedy this defect, and to render the law efficacious.

General Gascoyne moved that the bill be read this day three months. The house divided. For the amendment 64; against it 5.

DECEMBER 8.

: ARMY ESTIMATES-WAR WITH FRANCE.

Mr. SHERIDAN rose, and spoke to the following effect:-"Sir, being in the situation alluded to by the right honorable gentleman who had just sat down, of not being able to agree precisely with any of those who have preceded me, yet of being, at the same time, unwilling to give a silent vote on the present occasion, I rise with some sentiments of reluctance. There is one thing, however, in which we all coincide; it is, that the crisis in which we are placed, is so big with tremendous importance, so pregnant with mighty difficulties, so full of apprehensions and dangers, that the house and the country have a right to know what are the intentions and the views of those by whose exertions we may expect to be extricated from the complication of embarrassments, and snatched from the very brink of destruction. Sir, one of the circumstances I most regret in this debate is, the references that have been made to the characters and abilities of persons supposed to be fit to fill particular offices. I feel this as a subject of regret, and feeling so, I am sorry that my honorable friend near me made any allusion even to one man, whom of all men upon earth I most love and respect, because I do view the crisis to be one of such moment and peril, and because, if ever there was a time in which we should prove to the people of England that we are above all party feelings, that we are above all party distinctions, that we are superior to any petty scramble for places and power, that

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time is the present.-Sir, in speaking upon these topics, I do find a disposition in some gentlemen to rebuke any man who shall deliver any opinion with respect to the First Consul of France. One honorable gentleman, who rebuked an honorable general that spoke before him, declared that he would not give his opinion with respect to the conduct of France to Switzerland; and what does his rebuke amount to? He confesses that upon that subject there can be but one opinion. Why then, Sir, he either adopts the opinion of the honorable general or not. If he does adopt it, he gives as strong an opinion against the conduct of France as can possibly be given. If he does not adopt it, why then all we can say is, that there are two opinions. But what, he asks, has Switzerland to do with the question? It has this to do with it. The honorable general introduced the subject in this way; he contends that a power which is capable of such unprovoked aggression and such perfidy, is the power that ought to be watched. But the honorable gentleman goes on to assert, that we have nothing to do with the case of Switzerland, nothing to do with France, nothing but with her power:-Nothing but her power!-as if that were little. He asks too where is the great difference between France under the Bourbons and under her present ruler? Why, Sir, the honorable general inferred, from the conduct of France, that with her growing power she had a growing disposition to mischief. But is that power, demands the honorable gentleman, greater now than it was last June? Perhaps it is not, Sir. But her mischievous disposition is greater; and if I am asked to bring a proof of the truth of my assertion, I must bring the case of Switzerland. Sir, if I see a purposed contempt of the independence of a nation; if I see a perfidious disregard of the faith of treaties; if I see a power withdraw her assistance, only to return and entrap a country of freemen with greater certainty; why then I say there has been a

change, and a great change too, and that such a power we have a right to watch. But, says the honorable gentleman, we have no right to make use of invectives against the First Consul of France. I will abstain if I can; I say if I can, because I feel that even a simple narrative may be construed into invective. With regard to the general question of a disposition to peace or war, I for one declare, that I am as strongly and as sincerely for the preservation of peace as any man, and that I do not consider war as any remedy for the evils complained of. If a war spirit be springing up in this country, if a chivalrous disposition be observable, if a sentiment of indignation be rising upon the subject of the treatment of Switzerland, I for one shall contend that the treatment of Switzerland is no cause of war. I would therefore say, preserve peace if possible: peace if possible, because the effects of war, always calamitous, may be calamitous indeed, buckling, as we should be forced to do, all our sinews and strength to that power in a contest with her upon such grounds. I repeat, therefore, peace if possible; but I add, resistance, prompt, resolute, determined resistance to the first aggression, be the consequences what they may. Influenced by these sentiments, I shall vote cordially and cheerfully for this large peace establishment; and it is because I shall vote for it that I think myself bound to state my reasons. Sir, some gentlemen seem to consider what they advance as so many axioms too clear to need explanation or to require defence. But when I vote so large an establishment, I think myself not at liberty to bind such a burthen upon my constituents, without stating the grounds upon which I act, and the principles by which I am prompted. Sir, I have listened with all the attention I am master of to the different arguments that have been advanced in the present debate. One honorable gentleman who spoke second, appears to be a decided enemy to a great establish

ment, and the reasons he gave for his opposition, I confess, perfectly astonished me. Luckily he has no rapid flippancy in his manner; his sentiments are delivered too soberly and sedately to be mistaken. I am sure I mean nothing disrespectful to that gentleman, who amply repays the attention that is paid to him. But he says, if ministers had only said to him that danger existed, he would for one have voted for the force proposed. Does he doubt the danger? He complains that His Majesty's ministers do not state it precisely. But does he pretend that he does not see and feel it? Can any one look at the map of Europe and be blind to it? Can any one have a heart to resist apprehended injury, and say that we ought not to be prepared? But he asks, why raise only eleven hundred thousand men? You can never equal the military power of France, and as you cannot, why stop at eleven hundred thousand? Why not raise one hundred and twenty, one hundred and thirty, or one hundred and forty thousand? If this argument be worth any thing, it applies equally to our raising only one thousand. Why, if we can never be equal to France, raise a man? Another gentleman, who spoke last, has alluded to alliances, and I agree perfectly with him in what he advanced against making any pledges. He has alluded to the fate of the pledges made in the war of the succession, in the war of 1741; but if he meant to be impartial, he need not have gone back so far; he need not have travelled beyond the last war; he might have mentioned the pledges then given; he might have recollected the pledge of never giving up the Netherlands; he might have recalled to our minds the pledge of obtaining indemnity for the past, and security for the future; he might have dwelt upon the pledge of exhausting the last drop of our blood in the contest for religion, order, and civilized society, the toto certatum corpore regni; he might have reminded us of all these

pledges made, and of all of them having been abandoned. He confesses his warmth of friendship for the late minister, and he certainly never shewed it more than in stopping so short with his historical narrative of pledges. The next excellent reasoning of the honorable gentleman who spoke second against the proposed vote is, that the first year of war there will be an immense army drawn upon the opposite coast, and therefore, now it is not necessary to be prepared. When the army is upon your shores, when the trumpet of the enemy sounds at your gates, then it is time to be prepared. Appearance of se curity, he contends, gives, often, the effect of se curity. If we have large armies, France will think we raise them through fear; if we do not have them, she will think that we feel ourselves perfectly secure. I have heard instances, Sir, where mounting wooden guns upon a fort has produced the same security as if there had been real ones. But unluckily in this instance for us, by our constitutional form of proceeding, our whole force must be known: we cannot pass upon an enemy wooden guns, and an army at Brentford. If we vote no force, an enemy will know we have none. But have no arms, throw away your guns, is the advice of the honorable gentleman. Sir, when every house in my neighbourhood has been attacked and robbed by a gang of ruffians, how my having no arms is to save me from a visit from them, I must leave the honorable gentleman to explain. His next argument is, that it is unreasonable in us to believe that Buonaparte wishes to be at war with us; for he thinks the French have nothing to gain by invasion. Nothing to gain? What else have they to lose but that of which it has been said they have so much to spare, and what have they not to gain? Sir, I cannot but think this as unbecoming a sentiment as ever was uttered. But it is unreasonable to think that the French wish to meddle with us. Why, I protest I cannot explain. If, as has been said, they have felt our arms, they who have been every where else