command, but three hundred of his men marched off in one body. General Schuyler wrote to Washington Nov. 22, 1775, that these men reached him too feeble to do military duty until he gave them their discharge, when they "instantly acquired health, and . . . undertook a march from here of two hundred miles with the greatest alacrity." He commented: 10 "Nothing can surpass the impatience of the troops from the New England colonies to get to their firesides.” Montgomery joined Arnold before Quebec and the combined army of less than a thousand men challenged Carleton to come out and fight. He wisely preferred to let the winter fight the scarecrows for him. So the two wild generals resolved to storm the city, and chose a bitter night of blizzard for the surprise. Montgomery was killed and Arnold had his leg shattered. Morgan got lost in the crooked streets and was captured, weeping with rage. Four hundred and twenty-six men surrendered. Fate was saving Arnold for another immortality, but as he lay blazing with fever and pain in his icy tent and thought of the cowardice of the home-seeking heroes there must have begun in his soul a festering contempt for the poltroons who would not follow him to battle but afterward followed him with investigations. General Carleton suffered the wreck of the two American armies to lie out and freeze and plead for reinforcements while he kept his own uncertain troops warm for more important days, and thereby saved Canada to the Empire. The anxious Washington received the news through General Schuyler: "I wish I had no occasion to send my dear General this melancholy account. My amiable friend, the gallant Montgomery, is no more; the brave Arnold is wounded; and we have met with a severe check in an unsuccessful attempt on Quebec. May Heaven be graciously pleased that the misfortune may terminate here! I tremble for our people in Canada; and nothing, my dear Sir, seems left to prevent the most fatal consequences, but an immediate reenforcement that is nowhere to be had but from you.' >> 11 From Arnold came a description of the defeat and the disgraceful conduct even of some of the men who had been brave enough to attempt the assault: "Our loss and repulse struck an amazing panic into both officers and men, and, had the enemy improved their advantage, our affairs here must have been entirely ruined. It was not in my power to prevail on the officers to attempt saving our mortars, which had been placed in St. Roque's. Of course they fell into the hands of the enemy. Upwards of one hundred officers and soldiers instantly set off for Montreal, and it was with the greatest difficulty I could persuade the rest to make a stand.. "Our finances are very low. However, I hope we shall be able to rub along. . . . I wait with great anxiety the arrival of a reenforcement from below. I have wrote the Honorable Congress my opinion, that five thousand men will be necessary to insure us Quebec, . had not the General been basely deserted by his troops, we should doubtless have carried the town. • . "I hope soon to have the pleasure of seeing General Lee, or some experienced officer, here. I heartily wish you the protection and blessing of the Almighty.' >> 12 The irony of being asked for a whole army when he could not fill his own gaps, did not deter Washington from raising three regiments from Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Hampshire and sending them north in the stubborn hope of taking Quebec after all. He apologized to Congress for presuming to arrange this reinforcement without consultation, humbly asking that his orders be countermanded if they did not please, and adding, "do me the justice to believe that my intentions were good, if my judgment has erred." 18 So modest a man, and so truly a servant of the people, it is perhaps small wonder that they piled such heavy loads on a giant both willing and meek. XXVI HE CREATES AN ARMY AND CAPTURES BOSTON "T HE finger of Providence is in it, to blind the eyes of our enemies," wrote Washington to Reed in the cold January of 1776.1 But wherever else that interfering finger of Providence may have been, it was certainly not in the eyes of Sir William Howe, and there is really no mystery at all in his failure to attack Washington's thinly held trenches and redoubts. What good would it have done? It would have been, at best, a repetition of Bunker Hill, with a far more devastating loss, since Washington, in spite of his shortage of powder, had a great superiority in numbers and could be endlessly reinforced, while the British could not hope for any replacement at all of men killed or wounded, and would move farther and farther from their base, where their own supplies were dwindling rapidly. If Howe defeated Washington easily and drove the Yankees off in wild panic, what then? He could do nothing to make good his victory, for he had no horses to pull his supply train or his guns. He had not forgotten that Braddock had met with ruinous delays, and Forbes' expedition had been all but stopped short for lack of horses of any quality. If he had his horses, where would he get forage for them? The inability to secure horses and forage was Howe's explanation of his indolence in pursuit, and a large element in the failure of the British throughout the war, preventing mobility in attack and often rendering pursuit impossible." Washington always had trouble enough securing horses and forage, but he had other advantages the British could not share. So Howe wisely refused to smash his small army on Washington's breastworks. He kept up a pretence of cannonade and preparation for attack to fool the Americans and his own men, while he awaited orders from home and the opportunity to leave Boston as soon as he could secure sea-carriage. He had to wait transports, not only for his men, but for the loyalists, whom he had not the heart to leave behind him. As Burgoyne had put it (in his memorandum to Gage in August), leaving Boston included the evacuation of "All the inhabitants who may claim the protection of Government, many of whom are gentlemen's families with a numerous train of women, children, and servants, together with all the merchandise, computed at the value of three hundred thousand pounds, and which it is conceived ought on no account be left to the enemy. "All these persons and articles combined would make the fleet immense not an armament but a colony afloat-and that too at an advanced season of the year (for so it must be before the preparations could be made, and still later if an answer to the plan must be awaited for from England), and not a single friendly port to take shelter in case of tempestuous weather; a return to Boston would be impracticable.' It is so easy to ridicule the British officers from a distance across the horizon of their final defeat, that few American historians have done anything else. It is the duty and the wisdom of the historian as of a general to put himself in his enemy's place. It takes very little investigation to realize the why of Gage's and Howe's failure to attack Washington, and the wherefore of their activities and inactivities. These were only a masquerade to kill time and disguise the expedition to New York. In his desperation over the Canadian débâcle, Washington once more sought for release of his pent-up emotions through an attack on Boston. But again his council of war voted him down, and he would not overrule it-fortunately. The powder situation had improved, and a privateer commanded by Captain Manly captured the big "Nancy" with 2,000 muskets, 30,000 round shot, and 100,000 flints-and fresh flints were most important. The British suffered much in their marksmanship from worn-out flints. The "Nancy" also yielded a 13-inch brass mortar weighing 2,700 pounds, and it was welcomed with "universal joy." General Putnam, "Old Put," straddled it, "with a bottle of rum in his hand, standing parson to christen, while Godfather Mifflin gave it the name of Congress." Putnam also called it the "sow." It exploded at the first fire. Far better was the gift of Colonel Henry Knox. He had come to Washington, with a request for permission to fetch all the military stores captured at Ticonderoga and Crown Point and since impounded for return to England when the reconciliation was effected. Washington had granted him the authority. Now he plowed through the snows and returned with a magnificent caravan of ox-teams dragging over frozen lakes and through snowdrifts forty-two sledges laden with 14 mortars, 2 howitzers, and 39 cannon. He had found more ice than he wanted, but to Washington, praying for it so that he might cross to Boston, none was vouchsafed. Washington sent to Howe a letter of protest against the cruelty of Colonel Ethan Allen's subjection to "all the hardships inflicted upon common felons," and threatened a retaliation on the British General Prescott, who had fallen into American hands, and whom he blamed for inspiring Allen's ill treatment. Washington expressed for Howe "the highest regard and reverence for your great personal qualities and attainments," but could not refrain from a dig at "the wicked ministry.” 5 |