After suit has been entered, it should not be neglected indefinitely but marked for trial at an early date. It should not be continued when once on the court docket, unless for very urgent

reasons.

Lawyers should co-operate with the courts to clear the court dockets as speedily as may be, and, in this way, make possible the handling of a greater volume of business, thus relieving the congestion now generally existing.

§ 85. THE DUTY OF PUNCTUALITY.

There is no fault more common among lawyers than tardiness in attendance upon court. It is no uncommon thing to see dozens of cases that are ripe for trial passed over because of the absence of the lawyers concerned.

Tardiness in attendance at court means not only an injustice to one's client and an economic loss to the State through a slowing down of the court's progress, but it means also annoyance and vexation of spirit to the presiding justice. The judge finds enough cause for perturbation during the progress of trials without having the beginning of his day marred by inexcusable tardiness of counsel. The tardy lawyer is usually most insistent that his case be tried speedily when he does at length arrive, and the judge and clerk are pestered and irritated by frequent inquiries and

requests. Such a condition of affairs ought not to exist. Punctuality in attendance at court, therefore, is one of the duties that every lawyer owes to the court.

§ 86. DUTY NOT TO PROLONG TRIAL.

Another fruitful cause of the congestion of court dockets is the tendency of lawyers to prolong trials unduly. It frequently happens that a case that should not, if properly presented, occupy more than an hour of the court's valuable time, is so lengthened by dilatory tactics that an entire day is consumed. The county or State pays the bills, and other claimants wait through tedious hours for a chance to be heard.

In many instances, attorneys seem to be absolutely heedless of their duty to expedite matters. A witness is examined or cross-examined in a haphazard way, and taken over the same ground again and again. The case could really be presented to better effect if the lawyer would continually bear in mind that his duty is to present his case as speedily as is consistently possible.

The author's experience with law students in the School Superior Court of his own institution may serve to illustrate the topic under discussion. Actual cases were being tried; certain of the students were impersonating the witnesses and testifying as nearly as they could recollect the

facts assigned to them. The students who acted as attorneys usually became so earnest in their cross-examination of the witnesses that they did precisely what the ordinary lawyer does in the regular courts, kept the witnesses on the stand very much longer than was wise or proper. The result was that the trials became lengthy and wearisome.

There seemed to be no way of obviating the difficulty. Finally the experiment was tried of requiring each side to present its evidence within a certain given time, the time allotted to include both direct and cross-examination. If, for example, more than half the allotted time were used in the direct examination of one's own witnesses, it left only the balance of the time for crossexamination of the opponent's witnesses.

The experiment proved eminently successful. The cases tried became more entertaining to the other students present. A conciseness and expedition was attained that had never prevailed under the former system. The students were forced to make the very most of their time and to avoid questioning that was immaterial to the issue.

If some such compulsion could be felt by lawyers in court, the machinery of justice would run more swiftly. Every lawyer should consistently endeavor to economize his own time and that of the courts. In examination of witnesses he should

seek brevity and directness. In argument to the court or jury he should aim at conciseness and eschew long speaking and the multiplying of words.

§ 87. DUTY NOT TO OFFER IMPROPER EVIDENCE. The lawyer owes a duty to the court not to attempt to offer improper evidence. When a judge is endeavoring impartially to hear the facts in the case, it is improper for a lawyer to willfully attempt to introduce evidence that, under the established rules of evidence, ought not to be introduced.

If the opposing attorney objects, the judge is called upon suddenly and abruptly to decide a point of law, and his attention is withdrawn from the facts in the case. Such interruptions, coming at frequent intervals, renders the judge's task a very difficult one.

There are some attorneys who apparently consider it a clever and commendable practice to get inadmissible evidence before the jury. Their method of procedure is to start to introduce the evidence with apparent good faith. The opponent cannot block it by objection until he can perceive the nature of the evidence sought, and by the time he can halt the examination the jury have caught the full import of the inquiries. It is idle for a court to tell the jury not to con

sider the evidence thus placed before them. They are but human and cannot eliminate it from their recollection.

It may be that some past misconduct of the witness, conduct that has no bearing whatever upon the present issue, is revealed to the jury. The angry objection of the opposing counsel serves only to heighten the effect; the jury attach greater importance to it than it really deserves. A prejudice against the witness is thus created, and the effect of the prejudice may prove far reaching in its influence upon the verdict in the case.

$88. DUTY NOT TO ARGUE UPON MATTERS NOT IN EVIDENCE.

In the lawyer's plea to the jury he should carefully avoid arguing upon matters not in evidence, or attempting to deduce conclusions that are known to him to be unsound, but which he hopes the jury will accept.

It is not for the lawyer to testify, unless he does so as a witness in the regular course of events. Statements made in the course of argument might be mistaken or utterly false, and there would be no opportunity for the adversary to disprove them. The judge cannot be expected to interrupt a lawyer in the course of his argument, to admonish him to argue from the