Opinion of the Court. the time at which the freight train of the defendant would approach the place was well known to McCormick and was unknown to the plaintiff. The freight train was overdue at Byers' station at the time the construction train left that station, and McCormick knew the fact of its being so overdue, and knew that the freight train was then coming towards Byers' station from the east; and the plaintiff knew nothing about the freight train. The injury so occasioned to the plaintiff, was probably due and owing to the haste and confusion occasioned by the oaths, violent commands and injunc tions to make haste given by McCormick. The only question to be considered in the case is whether it was proper for the court to instruct the jury to find for the defendant, or whether the case should have been left to the jury. We are of opinion that it was proper to direct a verdict for the defendant. On the facts set forth, the injury to the plaintiff was not caused by any negligence on the part of McCormick. It is alleged that McCormick, knowing of the approach of the regular freight train, moved out his train in the face of it; but that does not show any negligence, for it does not appcar that the approaching freight train was so near as to render it unsafe for McCormick to start the construction train. Whatever the distance away of the freight train, it would properly be called an approaching train; and it is very plain that the work of construction and repair must be done in the intervals between the running of regular trains. This latter fact was known as well to the plaintiff as to McCormick, and the plaintiff, being employed to do construction work with a construction train, must be held to have assumed the risk of doing it at the times at which it had to be done. The fact that all of the rails save three or four had been loaded at the time shows that there was no negligence in undertaking to load the rails upon the construction train at the time they were loaded. The negligence on the part of McCormick, if there was any, could have been only as to the manner of loading the particular rail whose fall injured the plaintiff. It is clearly to be deduced from the evidence that the method Opinion of the Court. described, of lifting the rail, walking with it to the car, halting, dressing, and then, acting in concert, lifting the rail, at the word of command given by McCormick, and throwing it upon the floor of the flat car, was a proper and safe method of loading the rails, and that if, in the course of such action, the injury to the plaintiff had happened, no negligence could have been complained of. The negligence alleged consists in the fact that, after the men had lifted the rail in question and had carried it forward to the car and were there holding it, awaiting the word of command from McCormick to lift it further and throw it on the car, McCormick failed to give the word of command in such a way as to produce concert of action in the men, but, on the contrary, ordered them to get the rail on the car in any way they could. The fact that McCormick hurried the men does not show any negligence on his part, or excuse any negligence on theirs. The necessity of keeping the construction train out of the way of the freight train was one of the risks of the employment. The use of oaths and imprecations by McCormick was not an element of negligence. The fact that McCormick urged the men to hasten, even if, as a consequence, the plaintiff and his fellow-workmen became confused and failed to act in concert, cannot be regarded as a fault or negligence in McCormick. Whatever negligence there was, was the negligence either of the plaintiff himself or of his fellow servants who with him had hold of the rail. These views being conclusive in favor of the defendant, it is unnecessary to consider the broader grounds urged in support of the judgment below. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BREWER concurs in the judgment. Counsel for Plaintiff in Error. QUEBEC STEAMSHIP CO. v. MERCHANT. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORH. No. 30. Argued January 24, 1890.- Decided March 3, 1890. The stewardess of a steam-vessel belonging to a corporation sued it to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her. She came out of the cabin, which was on deck, to throw the contents of a pail over the side of the vessel, at a gangway facing the door of the cabin, and leaned over a railing at the gangway, composed of four horizontal rods, which gave way, because not properly secured, and she fell into the water, probably striking the side of a boat. The rods were movable, to make a gangway, and had been recently opened to take off some baggage of passengers, and not properly replaced. The porter and the carpenter had attempted to replace them, but left the work, knowing that it was unfinished. The persons composing the ship's company were divided into three classes of servants, called three departments- the deck de partment, containing the first and second officers, the purser, the carpenter and the sailors; the engineer's department, containing the engineers, the firemen and the coal-passers; and the steward's depa.cment, containing the steward, the waiters, the cooks, the porter and the stewardess. Every one on board, including the plaintiff, had signed the shipping articles, and she had participated in salvage given to the vessel. The master was in command of the whole vessel; Held, that the porter and the carpenter were fellow-servants with the plaintiff, and that the corporation was not liable to her for any damages. The Circuit Court left it to the jury to determine, if they found there was negligence, whether the injury was occasioned by the careless act of a servant not employed in the same department with the plaintiff; Held, error, and that the court ought to have directed the jury, as requested, to find for the defendant, on the ground that the negligence was that of a fellow-servant, either the porter or the carpenter. The verdict was for $5000, and the judgment was for that amount, and $306 interest for the time between verdict and judgment, and for $60.25 costs; Held, that the matter in dispute exceeded the sum or value of $5000, exclusive of costs, within the act of February 16, 1875, c. 77, § 3, 18 Stat. 316, even though, without the interest included in the judgment, the amount, exclusive of costs, would not be over $5000. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. William Allen Butler (with whom was Mr. Wilhelmus Mynderse on the brief) for the plaintiff in error. Opinion of the Court. Mr. A. J. Dittenhoefer for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. This was an action to recover damages for personal injuries, brought by Barbara Merchant against the Quebec Steamship Company, a Canadian corporation, in the Superior Court of the city of New York, and removed by the plaintiff into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The case was tried by a jury, which found a verdict for the plaintiff for $5000, on which a judgment was entered in her favor for that amount, with $306 interest from the time of rendering the verdict to the time of entering judg ment, and $60.25 costs, in all $5366.25. The plaintiff was the stewardess of the steamship Bermuda, a vessel. belonging to the defendant, and one of a line of vessels plying between the city of New York and the West Indies. She had been employed on the vessel for about eighteen months. It was her duty as stewardess to attend to the ladies' rooms in the cabin, and, in the course of that duty, to empty slops, as to which her orders were to throw them over the side of the vessel. The cabin was on deck. A railing extended around the vessel, and consisted of four horizontal iron rods, which were supported, at intervals of about 4 feet, by stanchions. In this railing there were openings or gangways, for receiving and discharging freight and passengers. Three of the gangways were for passengers. One of them faced one of the doors of the cabin which open on the deck. In order to use these openings or gangways, the four iron rods which formed the railing of the gangway, instead of being fixed immovably to the stanchions, were each of them fastened at one end to a stanchion by a ring or eyelet in which the rod could swing, the other end of each rod being formed into a hook which went into an eye fastened on another stanchion to receive it. This was a proper construction of the railing at the gangway. On the 28th of December, 1883, the vessel was at anchor from a mile-and-a-half to two miles off the shore of the Island Opinion of the Court. of Trinidad, one of the islands at which she stopped in her trips. Some passengers from New York were to land at Trinidad, and their baggage was put off through the gangway on the starboard side aft into a boat from the shore. To do this, the four rods composing the railing in the gangway were raised, and the gangway was opened. After the baggage had been discharged, the carpenter and the porter of the vessel undertook, according to the testimony of a witness for the plaintiff, to replace the rods in their proper position. He says that the porter, one West, "was at one stanchion, pushing forward, while the carpenter stood at the other, where the hook fitted into the eye, trying to force it into the eye. It began raining, and the carpenter and West were beginning to get wet." Thereupon the carpenter left the gangway and the porter left it soon afterwards. The rods were not placed in their proper positions, but remained so far unfastened that the hooks were not secured in the eyes. The porter testified, as a witness for the defendant, that he told the carpenter to put the rods in, and that he replied, "Wait until the rain goes over." While the rods were thus unfastened, the plaintiff came out of the cabin door with a pail of slops, to throw its contents over the side of the vessel. She leaned over the rail ing at the gangway, the rods gave way, and she fell overboard through the opening and was seriously injured. She probably struck the edge of a small boat which was lying there, and thence fell into the water. She had been in the habit of emptying slops at this gangway, but had never noticed the hooks. The ship's company consisted of thirty-two or thirty-three persons, divided into three classes of servants, called three departments, the deck department, the engineer's department, and the steward's department. The captain, the first and second officers, the purser, the carpenter and the sailors were in the deck department. The engineers, the firemen, and the coal-passers were in the engineer's department. The steward, the waiters, the cooks, the porter, and the stewardess were in the steward's department. Every one on board, including the plaintiff, had signed the shipping articles, and she had partici |