Opinion of the Court. edge of the plaintiff, ordered the drawee not to pay the draft; and the drawee, in refusing to pay it, was acting in accordance with such instructions. On the 27th of June, 1887, the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States, acting under the statute, appointed the defendant receiver of the Fidelity Bank. On the 12th of July, 1887, a decree was rendered by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio, in a proceeding instituted by such Comptroller against the Fidelity Bank, adjudging that its franchises had been forfeited and declaring it to be dissolved. In September, 1887, the claim of the plaintiff was presented to the receiver in due form, but he rejected it. The prayer of the bill is for a decree that such claim for $100,000, with interest from June 17, 1887, to June 27, 1887, is a valid claim against the estate in the hands of the defendant as receiver, and that he be directed to satisfy it by paying dividends upon it from the assets of the Fidelity Bank; and for general relief. The defendant answered the petition, and, after the bill was filed, it was ordered that such answer stand for an answer to the bill, and that the replication which had been filed to it stand also. The defence set up in the answer is that the plaintiff is not the owner of the draft; that it was signed by Hopkins, and came into the possession of the plaintiff, without any consideration paid for it by the plaintiff to the Fidelity Bank; and that that bank never received any consideration from any person for it, and is not indebted to the plaintiff on account of it. It was admitted of record that the draft was presented to the drawee within the reasonable time allowed by law, that payment was refused, that it was protested for non-payment and that notice of demand, refusal, and protest was given in due time to the Fidelity Bank; and also that the defendant, on October 31, 1887, declared, and has paid, a dividend of 25 per cent on all claims against the Fidelity Bank and the receiver, approved or adjudicated as valid claims. Opinion of the Court. Besides cases Nos. 1110 and 1111, a third suit was brought, and testimony was taken in all three of them at the same time. It was stipulated of record that all depositions taken or to be taken in any one of the three cases might be read by either party in all of them. After a hearing on pleadings and proofs, a decree was entered on the 3d of December, 1888, in No. 1110, setting forth that, on the 15th of June, 1887, the plaintiff became and had ever since been the owner of the draft in question; that it was duly presented to the drawee and payment refused, and the Fidelity Bank had due notice; that the claim was duly presented to the receiver and rejected; that it is a just and valid claim, and should have been allowed by him; that the plaintiff is a bona fide holder of the draft for a valuable consideration before maturity, without notice of any want of consideration, free from all equities or defences whatsoever; and directing the defendant to allow the claim as one for the full amount of $100,000 against the assets in his hands as receiver, to satisfy it by paying such dividends as had been made theretofore and as should be made thereafter from the assets of the Fidelity Bank in due course of administration, and to pay the dividend of 25 per cent already declared October 31, 1887, with interest from that date until the date of payment, and also the costs of the suit. From that decree the defendant has appealed. No. 1111 was commenced by a petition filed on the 5th of November, 1887, which was demurred to and the demurrer was overruled. The defendant then answered the petition, a replication was filed to the answer, and then leave was granted to the plaintiff to file a bill in equity instead of the petition. That bill sets forth as follows, in addition to the same formal matters set forth in the bill in No. 1110: On the 14th of June, 1887, the Fidelity Bank issued a certificate of deposit, or letter of advice, addressed to the plaintiff, of which the following is a copy: Opinion of the Court. "Briggs Swift, president; E. L. Harper, vice-president; Ammi Baldwin, cashier; Benj. E. Hopkins, ass't cashier. "U. S. depository. The Fidelity National Bank. Capital, $2,000,000.00; surplus, $400,000.00. "CINCINNATI, June 14th, 1887. "The American Exchange National Bank, Chicago, Illinois. "Gentlemen: Messrs. Wilshire, Eckert & Co. have deposited two hundred thousand ($200,000.00) dollars to your credit for the use of C. J. Kershaw & Co. At the time this certificate of deposit was issued, Benjamin E. Hopkins was the assistant cashier of the Fidelity Bank, and his signature, "Benj. E. Hopkins, As. Cas.," was used as the signature of that bank. The certificate was delivered by it to the plaintiff on the 15th of June, 1887, and the plaintiff has owned it ever since. On the faith thereof, the plaintiff, at the request of said C. J. Kershaw & Co., on said 15th of June, paid to said C. J. Kershaw & Co., and upon their orders, the full amount of $200,000, and by means thereof became entitled to recover from the Fidelity Bank the full amount of the certificate. On June 18, 1887, the plaintiff presented the certificate to the Fidelity Bank, at its banking office in Cincinnati, and demanded payment thereof, which was refused. The plaintiff became indebted to the Fidelity Bank in the sum of $1302.77, for a balance on general account. After deducting such balance, there was due from the latter to the plaintiff, at the time of such demand, $198,697.23, which amount is still due, with interest from June 18, 1887. In September, 1887, that claim was presented to the defendant for allowance, but he rejected it. The prayer of the bill is for a decree that the claim, amounting to $198,697.23, with interest from June 18, 1887, to June 27, 1887, is a valid claim against the assets in the hands of the defendant as receiver, and that he be directed to satisfy it by paying dividends upon it from the assets of the Fidelity Bank in due course of administration. Opinion of the Court. The answer to the petition and the replication thereto were ordered to stand in respect to the bill, and like stipulations were made as in case No. 1110. The defence set up in the answer is as follows: One Joseph Wilshire was a member of the firm of Wilshire, Eckert & Co. E. L. Harper, Benjamin E. Hopkins (the assistant cashier of the Fidelity Bank) and Wilshire conspired to defraud the Fidelity Bank. Harper, Hopkins and Wilshire, with other persons, were, at and before the 14th of June, 1887, engaged in what is called "a deal" in wheat, which is speculating in wheat, in Chicago, by buying very large amounts of wheat on paying a margin or percentage of the purchase price, and entering into contracts for future delivery to them of wheat in large quantities, upon which contracts they were advancing and paying a margin or part of the price of the wheat. The object of the speculation and purchase under the contracts was to enable said parties to own and control all the wheat then in Chicago or to arrive within the time of the performance of the contracts, and thereby to create what is called a "corner" in the market; that is to say, by contracting for the purchase and delivery of more wheat than exists and can by any possibility be delivered, to create a fictitious value or price therefor, effect an advance in the market price of wheat in Chicago, and realize a profit thereon to Harper, Hopkins and Wilshire, and such other persons as might be engaged with them in the speculation. Harper, Hopkins and Wilshire conspired together unlawfully to abstract from the Fidelity Bank its money and to embezzle its funds in the possession or control of Harper and Hopkins as its officers, and, by drawing bills of exchange and other evidences of indebtedness in the name of the bank, to use its credit and resources for their own benefit, not in the prose cution of its legitimate business, but in the purchase of wheat in Chicago and contracts for the future delivery of wheat, in the prosecution of said unlawful speculation. The letter of' advice addressed to the plaintiff, set forth in the bill, was signed by Hopkins and delivered by Harper to Wilshire, in the execution of the scheme to abstract the funds of the bank and unlawfully use its credit in the speculation in wheat, and for no Opinion of the Court. other purpose. Wilshire, Eckert & Co. did not deposit any part of the $200,000 mentioned in the letter of advice, in the Fidelity Bank, to the credit of the plaintiff, for the use therein expressed. The letter was unlawfully and fraudulently addressed to the plaintiff, when in fact no money had been deposited by any person to the credit of the plaintiff with the Fidelity Bank, and in the execution of said scheme. At the time of the alleged delivery of the letter of advice to the plaintiff, it had notice that Harper, Hopkins and Wilshire were engaged in said speculation, and were using the credit and funds of the Fidelity Bank unlawfully for such purpose, and that the letter of advice was written and signed for such purpose, and delivered to Wilshire and by him to the plaintiff, to be used by and through the plaintiff, and by C. J. Kershaw & Co., who were, and to the plaintiff were well known to be, brokers, in the purchase of wheat for the account of Wilshire and his confederates, and had full knowledge that the purchases were in the execution of an unlawful combination to control the market for wheat and thereby enhance the value thereof in Chicago. The terms of the agreement between Wilshire, representing the firm of Wilshire, Eckert & Co., and his confederates, and the circumstances connected therewith, were such that the plaintiff was put upon inquiry, and could not and did not bona fide make advances to C. J. Kershaw & Co., nor become entitled to receive from the Fidelity Bank any part of the amount of such advances, and, if made by the plaintiff, they were not made in the regular course of business, but in bad faith and with such notice. The Fidelity Bank did not become indebted to the plaintiff in any amount, and the claim is not a valid one and ought not to be allowed. On the 3d of December, 1888, after a hearing on pleadings and proofs, a decree was made setting forth that, on the 15th of June, 1887, the plaintiff became the owner of the certificate of deposit or letter of advice set out in the bill; that, on the faith thereof, and without notice of the matters set forth in the answer, the plaintiff, on the 15th of June, 1887, advanced to C. J. Kershaw & Co. the full amount of $200,000, and by reason thereof then became entitled to recover from the Fidel |