Opinion of the Court.

parties, în respect of subject matter and in respect of the relief prayed for, the two bills brought by Pepper are different; and none of the questions involved in the pleadings in the present suit were involved in or adjudicated in the first suit brought by Pepper. Still further, the uncertainty and inoperative character of the decree of May 12, 1879, make the whole suit fruitless and of no more effect than if it had never been commenced.

For the same reason, Pepper cannot be regarded as having made any election, in the first suit brought by him, to enforce a sale of the property described in the first two deeds of trust aside from a sale with it of sub-lot A, so as to be estopped from now asserting a lien upon sub-lot A. When the first bill was filed by Pepper, he knew that Shepherd had merely a tax title to sub-lot A; and Shepherd, in his answer to that bill, averred that the title to sub-lot A never belonged to him, and that he theretofore purchased what is called a tax title to sublot A, but it turned out to be void and of no effect. Therefore, Pepper could not at that time have attempted to reform the first two deeds of trust so as to include sub-lot A, because Shepherd then had no title to that sub-lot. But the fact that both Pepper and Shepherd agree that it was intended by them that the first two deeds of trust should include sub-lot A, gave Pepper a right to assert an equitable mortgage against that sub-lot; so that afterwards, when Shepherd bought in the proprietary title to it, as the evidence shows he did, Pepper was for the first time in a position to assert a lien against it.

It is, we think, very plain that Pepper acquired no title by the deed to him under the sale by the trustees, and that the decree dismissing the bill filed by Shepherd had no effect to establish any legal title in Pepper to the real estate in question. Even if resort may not be had to the opinion of Mr. Justice James, still it is manifest that the propositions stated in that opinion are sound, namely, that if the decree of May 12, 1879, was uncertain on its face, in the respects and to the extent before mentioned, the alleged title of Pepper, through the deed from the trustees to him, was not a cloud upon the title of Shepherd, and therefore the court could not grant

Opinion of the Court.

Shepherd the relief he prayed for in the bill filed by him, and that bill was properly dismissed.

This view of the case is taken by Pepper, in his bill in the present suit, because he says therein, in regard to the decree of May 12, 1879, and the opinion of Mr. Justice James, "that, as it appears by the said opinion of the court that the said decree did not give to the said Johnston any power to sell, said decree was in effect, an adjudication upon and favorable to the averments in said Shepherd's bill of complaint in said court that said sale was made without authority and the deed of said Philip and Johnston was null and void, and, as the said Shepherd has always averred and insisted that said decree was void and said sale a nullity, and to the end that said lot 3 of said Shepherd's subdivision may be sold as a whole, the complainant files this bill in order that an undisputed title to the whole property may be obtained by means of foreclosure proceedings under the order and decree of this court." Then the bill prays accordingly, "that a trustee or trustees may be appointed by this court to sell the whole. of lot 3, in A. R. Shepherd's subdivision of square numbered 164, with the improvements thereon." Therefore, it is not true that Pepper is still asserting a legal title in himself.

We think that Pepper is entitled to have the whole of lot 3 sold. It was omitted at least by accident from the first two trust deeds, when both parties supposed they covered it. Lot 3 embraces not only sub-lot A, but the property covered by the first two deeds of trust. Shepherd, in his answer to the first bill filed by Pepper, said, "that, in his opinion, it would be impossible to make a sale and division of the said property under the said deed of trust without irreparable injury to, if not total destruction of, a large portion of the dwelling-house which is erected upon the said lot; . that the said

dwelling-house would be entirely incomplete without the addition of that portion called the 'picture-gallery;' that the servants' apartments and the laundry and drying-room, etc., etc., are underneath the said portion of said dwelling-house, as well as the heating apparatus for a large portion of the house; and that, if the said lot A, which is not included in the deed of

Opinion of the Court.

trust of the said complainant, shall be separated from that portion which is included in the said deed of trust to the complainant, a dividing line would not only take off the said 'picture-gallery,' but would take off and destroy a portion of the back part of the main dwelling-house.'

In regard to Mrs. Gray, the letter to her, written by Mr. Brown, of the firm of Fitch, Fox & Brown, who were negotiating for her the loan to Shepherd, the letter being dated April 18, 1876, speaks of the loan as one "to be secured by a second mortgage, the prior mortgage being for $45,000.” Besides this, the first two deeds of trust were recorded respectively June 3, 1874, and March 24, 1875, and they conveyed, to secure Pepper, the premises described in them, “together with all the improvements, ways, easements, rights, privileges, and appurtenances to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining, and all the estate, right, title, interest and claim, whatsoever, whether at law or in equity, of the said parties of the first part, of, in, to, or out of the said piece or parcel of land and premises." The improvements and easements in question were visibly necessary for the dwelling-house as then constructed, and were visibly upon, or required the use of, sublot A, as stated by Shepherd, as before recited.

Mrs. Gray is only a mortgagee, and not the owner in fee, of sub-lot A; and her interest in the property is subject to the prior and subsequent interests of other parties, as those interests are usually ascertained and administered by a court of equity for the benefit of all concerned. It is not equitable that she should be allowed to use her mortgage on sub-lot A to prevent a sale of the entire lot 3. Her only right can be to have the proceeds of sub-lot A applied first to the payment of her debt; and that right is secured by the decree appealed from.

The present bill is one to obtain a decree for the sale of encumbered premises and the application of the proceeds of sale to discharge the encumbrances according to priority. The debts to Pepper and to Mrs. Gray are overdue; and under such circumstances a court of equity, on the application of a junior encumbrancer, will provide for the sale of the entire

Opinion of the Court.

encumbered property, if the circumstances of the case show that the interests of the mortgagor and of the encumbrancers require the sale. Finley v. Bank of the United States, 11 Wheat. 304, 306; Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. 29, 37, 38; Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734, 735, 736, 740; Hill v. National Bank, 97 U. S. 450, 453, 454; Woodworth v. Blair, 112 U. S. 8; Hefner v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 124 U. S. 747, 754; Vanderkemp v. Shelton, 11 Paige, 28. This authority is properly exercised in the case of deeds of trust, where all the encumbrances are due and where the plaintiff has a first lien on some of the property sought to be sold, and where all the encumbrancers are parties to the suit. Here, Pepper has a first lien on' the bulk of the property sought to be sold, and a second lien, as decreed, on the small remaining portion; and the debts secured by the first two deeds of trust were all overdue when the bill in this case was filed, as well as the debt due to Mrs. Gray. Under such circumstances, the mere non-assent of Mrs. Gray ought not to prevent the court from doing what is equitablein regard to the claims of Pepper, as well as those of herself.

There was no error in the dismissal of the two petitions of Shepherd, filed in March, 1885, nor in entering a personal decree against him for any deficiency which should remain after exhausting the property covered by the deeds of trust.

The fact of the bringing of the suit at law upon the notes, by Pepper against Shepherd, in April, 1880, was set up in the answer of Bradley to the bill in the present suit, and was therefore in issue; but it was not shown in defence that Shepherd had ever been served with process in any such suit at law, or had appeared in it, voluntarily or otherwise. Moreover, the principal notes given to Pepper were not barred by limitation when the bill in this case was filed. As to the interest notes or coupons, although some of the unpaid ones for each of such two principal notes had been overdue more than three years when the bill was filed, yet it makes a claim to recover all the interest, and Shepherd does not, in his answer, set up the statute of limitation as a bar to any part of the principal or interest claimed.

The bill in this suit prays for general relief, and a decree

Opinion of the Court.

for a deficiency is a necessary incident of a foreclosure suit in equity. It is provided as follows by section 808 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia: "The proceeding to enforce any lien shall be by bill or petition in equity, and the. decree, besides subjecting the thing upon which the lien has attached to the satisfaction of the plaintiff's demand against the defendant, shall adjudge that the plaintiff recover his demand against the defendant, and that he may have execution thereof as at law." This provision was interpreted by this court in the case of Dodge v. Freedman's Savings and Trust Co., 106 U. S. 445, where it was held that it authorized a decree in personam against the debtor for the balance remaining due after the proceeds of the sale of lands covered by a mortgage or a deed of trust in the nature thereof had been applied to the satisfaction of the debt. The present cause is of the same character of foreclosure proceeding as that involved in the case cited. It was proper for the court, under the bill as it stands and the statute on the subject, to make a personal decree against Shepherd for a deficiency; and the matter of granting the prayers of his petitions filed in March, 1885, was a question of discretion in the court below, and not reviewable.

As to the question of the disposition of the rents in the hands of the receiver we think the action of the court below was proper. The pecuniary condition of Shepherd, his failure to pay taxes, premiums of insurance, or interest, the inadequacy of the property to pay the claims of Pepper and Mrs. Gray, and the diversion of the income from rents, from making such payments, to the use of Shepherd, up to the time of the appointment of the receiver, were adequate grounds for the appointment of the receiver. Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U. S. 378, 395; Grant v. Insurance Co., 121 U. S. 105. The court, through its receiver, took possession of the rents in order to preserve them for that party to the suit who should ultimately be found to be equitably entitled to them. Hitz v. Jenks, 123 U. S. 297, 306. The various reports of the receiver contained in the record, as to his payment of taxes, premiums of insurance and the expenses of repairs on the