ity are opposites. Plato, as St. Thomas notes, rightly conceived the soul to be immaterial and its knowledge to be likewise immaterial, but his explanation of this truth was not satisfactory. He introduced unnecessary elements to account for this doctrine; he did not give the intellect the power to render a material object immaterial, but held there were immaterial ideas independent of the object, and that it was these ideas or forms the mind knew. This theory is unlike that of St. Thomas, who says, "everything intelligible is immune from matter in se, or is abstracted from matter by the operation of the intellect,' yet it is the actual recognition of immateriality as a requisite for knowableness.

The knowledge the soul has of itself emphasizes further this requisite of immateriality. St. Thomas holds that we have a two-fold knowledge of the soul-an actual and habitual one. We can simply know of its existence, and we can also know of its nature-two distinct points, "for many know they have a soul who do not know what the soul is,"" do not know its nature. The soul becomes aware of itself through its acts-"one perceives that he has a soul, and lives, and is, because he perceives

28 De Veri., q. 13, a. 3.

29 Ibid., q. 10, a. 9.

himself to feel and understand and to exercise the other functions of a life of this nature." This reveals its existence; "what the nature of the mind itself is, the mind can only perceive from a consideration of its object." From a knowledge of its object, the soul comes to know its own nature. "Our mind can not so understand itself that it can immediately apprehend itself, but from apprehending other things it comes to a knowledge of itself. . . From the fact that the human soul knows the universal natures of things, it perceives that the species by which we understand is immaterial; otherwise it would be individualized and thus never lead to a knowledge of the universal." The soul

32

30 Aliquis percipit se animam habere et vivere et esse, quod percipit se sentire et intelligere et alia hujusmodi vitae opera exercere. De Veri., q. 10, a. 8.

31 Ibid., q. 10, a. 8, ad 1.

St. Thomas appreciated the difficulty of arriving at a knowledge of the nature of the soul. "Each one experiences in himself that he has a soul and that the acts of the soul take place within him, but to know the nature of the soul is most difficult." De Veri., q. 10, a. 8 ad 8. The same applies to our knowledge of the nature of God.

32 Unde mens nostra non potest se ipsam intelligere, ita quod se ipsam immediate apprehendat; sed ex hoc quod apprehendit alia, devenit in suam cognitionem. . . Ex hoc enim quod species qua intelligimus est immaterialis; alias esset individuata, et sic non duceret in cognitionem universalis. De Veri., q. 10, a. 8.

knows the universal, the proper object of the intellect is the essence of material things, this essence is immaterial, and the soul perceiving this immaterial essence recognizes its own immaterial nature, for operation follows being, the act is in accord with its source.

The idea running through these principles is --knowledge is a vital act, an assimilation of subject and object. The degree of activity regulates the degree of knowledge, of perfection; this goes on without a break until we reach the most perfect knowledge in God. Before we consider the knowableness of God, we must outline the factors involved in the activity of intellectual knowledge in man. "There is, therefore, a perfect and supreme grade of life, that of the intellect, for the intellect reflects upon itself and knows itself." The human intellect though it can know itself, begins its knowledge with external things; it is inferior to the Angelic and Divine Intellects, but leads to a knowledge of them.

33 Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae, qui est secundum intellectum; nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, et seipsum intelligere potest. C. G., 1. 4, c. 11.

SECTION II.—THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL

KNOWLEDGE.

There are two kinds of knowledge in man arising from two sets of cognitive activity-the sensory and the intellectual.' The latter is of especial importance in arriving at a knowledge of God, so we shall present the stages of intellectual knowledge as found in St. Thomas.

The human intellect is primarily and directly concerned with being in its widest acceptation. More specificially, it is busied with the essence of material things, the universal. This essence as it exists in material things is not in an immediate condition to be known, so there is a power, an intellectual activity, required to make it actually knowable or intelligible. This power is the active intellect, which by its abstractive power immaterializes the corporeal object and brings to light the intelligible species. This species is the likeness of the object in its specific nature; it makes the object actually intelligible and determines the intellect proper to know. This summary statement can now be viewed in its parts.

1

'What is primarily and per se known by a

1 Homo cognoscit diversis viribus cognoscitivis omnia rerum genera, intellectu quidem universalia et immaterialia, sensu singularia et corporalia. Sum. Theol., I, q. 57, a. 2.

cognitive power is its proper object." "But being is primarily in the conception of the intellect, for everything is knowable in so far as it is actual... Whence being is the proper object of the intellect, and thus it is the first intelligible as sound is the first audible." Being is here taken for actual and possible existence, "it comprehends all the differences and possible species of being, for whatever can exist can be understood." As we are now constituted we are not concerned with all being directly, but with being as found in material things. "The first object of our intellect in our present existence is not being and true of any sort, but being and true viewed in material things, through which we come to a knowledge of all other things. This passage contains the

2 Id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute cognoscitiva est proprium ejus objectum. Sum. Theol., I, q. 85, a. 7.

3 Primo autem in conceptione intellectus est ens: quia secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, in quantum est actu... Unde ens est proprium objectum intellectus; et sic est primum intelligibile sicut sonus est primum audibile. Sum. Theol., I, q. 5, a. 2.

* Est enim proprium objectum intellectus ens intelligibile, quod quidem comprehendit omnes differentias et species entis possibililis; quidquid esse potest intelligi potest. C. G., 1, 2. c. 98.

5 Nec primum objectum intellectus nostri secundum praesentem statum est quodlibet ens et verum, sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit. Sum. Theol., I, q. 87, a. 3 ad 1.