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Opinion of the Court.

mation, and had caused an examination to be made of the premises, and that therefrom he found that a survey made in strict accordance with the boundary calls of the decree of confirmation would include something like a league more of land than the present survey, and that the owners of the grant were satisfied with the present survey, and therefore suggested the propriety of accepting it. This report was returned to the Secretary of the Interior, by him approved, and, on June 22, 1872, the patent was issued. This bill was filed on May 29, 1885. The bill charged that the surveyor, Henry Hancock, who made the survey was the real owner of a large interest in the grant, although the title was nominally in another party; that concealing his interest he secured his appointment as deputy surveyor, and in making the survey fraudulently included within its limits about twenty-six thousand acres more of land than justly belonged therein; that without any knowledge of the fraudulent acts of Hancock in the premises the surveyor general thereafter published the required notice. of the survey in a newspaper published in the city of Los Angeles, a city of another county and over fifty miles from the land; whereas, at the time, there was a newspaper published within the county and within two miles of the land. It also charged that after the survey had been disapproved by the Secretary of the Interior, Hancock fraudulently represented to the surveyor general that a correct survey would include about one league in addition to what was embraced within the present survey, but that the owners were content to take the survey as it stood; and that, induced by and relying upon these fraudulent representations, the surveyor general made the report and recommendation heretofore mentioned. The Circuit Court, on final hearing, dismissed the bill, and the United States appealed to this court.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury, for appellant.

Mr. A. T. Britton and Mr. A. B. Browne, for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

Opinion of the Court.

It is obvious that the confirmation was of a tract with specified boundaries, and as such covered all the land within those boundaries, irrespective of quantity, and this, notwithstanding there appeared in the prior proceedings statements that the tract contained a certain amount, "a little more or less," which amount was very much less than that included within the boundaries. "When a decree gives the boundaries of the tract to which the claim is confirmed, with precision, and has become final by stipulation of the United States and the withdrawal of their appeal therefrom, it is conclusive, not only on the question of title, but also as to the boundaries which it specifies." United States v. Halleck, 1 Wall. 439; United States v. Billing, 2 Wall. 444; Higueras v. United States, 5 Wall. 827. And the act of Congress of July 1, 1864, 13 Stat. 334, § 7, requires the surveyor general, "in making surveys of the private land claims finally confirmed, to follow the decree of confirmation as closely as practicable whenever such decree designates the specific boundaries of the claim."

The charge of fraudulent misconduct on the part of the surveyor, Hancock, is not substantiated. Mr. Hancock was not appointed surveyor with reference to this survey. He was the regular deputy surveyor for this district, having been appointed more than ten years prior thereto. While at one time he had owned an interest in the grant, he had more than eight years before the survey sold and conveyed it for a full consideration to his brother, and from that time forward, during all these proceedings, was without any interest in the premises. It is true that during these years Mr. Hancock acted as the general agent of his brother, and that is all the ground there is to suspect wrong on his part. There is not a syllable of testimony that, after the Secretary had ordered the new survey, Mr. Hancock had anything to do with the matter, either in suggestion, recommendation or otherwise, so that the report of the surveyor general was not made by virtue of anything that Hancock had said or done. The examination referred to by the surveyor general in his report was made by one R. C. Hopkins, under the direction of the surveyor general, a person who was at the time, so far as the testimony discloses, entirely disinterested.

Opinion of the Court.

It is true there is testimony furnished by Mr. Hopkins himself that some time after the patent had been issued he accepted a deed of a portion of this grant as a present from the owners a tract which he subsequently sold for $1500. Whatever criticism may be placed upon the acceptance of this gifta gift made long after his relations to the survey had ceased-it certainly does not establish dereliction in his discharge of prior official duty.

These matters, together with the failure to publish notice in the nearest paper, are all the evidences of fraud in the transaction. Not only are they not "the clear, convincing and unambiguous" proofs of fraud required to set aside a patent, as declared by this court in the case of Colorado Coal Company v. United States, 123 U. S. 307, 317, but they, all combined, create nothing more than a suspicion. They may leave a doubt, but they do not bring the assurance of certain wrong.

Some question is made as to the correctness of the survey, and that turns as a question of fact upon what is meant by the expression "Agua Caliente" in the various descriptions. If it means a stream known as Agua Caliente, then the government has no cause to challenge the survey, for it includes less than was really confirmed, but if it means a district of country known by that name in the northwestern portion of the San Bernardino rancho, a neighboring tract, then the survey was excessive. If it were necessary for us to determine this question, we think the evidence in the case indicates that the stream and not the district was intended, but it is not the province of this court to correct a mere matter of survey like that. If made in good faith and unchallenged as this has been for over fifteen years, whatever doubts may exist as to its correctness must be resolved in favor of the title as patented. We see no error in the decree, and it is

MR. JUSTICE FIELD takes no part in this decision.

Affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

COMANCHE COUNTY v. LEWIS.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.

No. 1022. Submitted January 7, 1890.— Decided January 27, 1890.

Full control over the matter of the organization of new counties in the State of Kansas is, by its constitution, article 9, § 1, given to the legislature of the State, which has power, not only to organize a county in any manner it sees fit, but also to validate by recognition any organization already existing, no matter how fraudulent the proceedings therefor were. When a legislature has full power to create corporations, its act recognizing as valid a de facto corporation, whether private or municipal, operates to cure all defects in steps leading up to an organization, and makes a de jure out of what was before only a de facto corporation. When both the executive and legislative departments of the State have given notice to the world that a county within the territorial limits of the State of Kansas has been duly organized, and exists, with full power of contracting, it is not open to the county to dispute those facts in an action brought against it by a holder of its bonds, who bought them in good faith in open market.

The debts of a county, contracted during a valid organization, remain the obligations of the county, although, for a time, the organization be abandoned, and there are no officers to be reached by the process of the court.

A recital in the bond of a municipal corporation in Kansas that it was issued in accordance with authority conferred by the act of March 2, 1872, Kansas Laws of 1872, 110, c. 68, and in accordance with a vote of a majority of the qualified voters, is sufficient to validate the bonds in the hands of a bona fide holder; and the certificate of the auditor of the State thereon that the bond was regularly issued, that the signatures were genuine, and that the bond had been duly registered, is conclusive upon the municipality.

A recital in a bond issued by a county in Kansas for the purpose of building a bridge, need not necessarily refer to the particular bridge for the construction of which it was issued.

In Kansas a county has power to borrow money for the erection of county buildings, and to issue its bonds therefor.

Ат LAW, to recover on coupons of bonds issued by a municipal corporation in Kansas. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.

Opinion of the Court.
'Court.

Mr. G. C. Clemens and Mr. A. H. Smith for plaintiff in

error.

Mr. W. H. Rossington for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action on coupons. There were three classes of bonds, namely, court-house, bridge and current expense bonds. The Circuit Court held the latter void, the others valid, and judgment was rendered accordingly. Lewis v. Comanche County, 35 Fed. Rep. 343. The county alleges error. Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to the bridge and court-house bonds.

The first and principal contention of the plaintiff in error is that at the time of the issue of these bonds there was no valid county organization, no corporate entity capable of contracting, that the pretended organization in 1873 was fraudulent and void, and shortly thereafter abandoned, the county remaining unorganized until 1885, when, upon memorial presented and census taken, it was organized anew as in the case of an unorganized county.

In order to fully understand the question here presented, a brief retrospect of the condition, the legislation and judicial decisions of the State is necessary.

At the time of its admission into the Union, in 1861, the settlements were confined to the eastern portion of the State, the west being wholly unoccupied. The territory of the State was divided into counties, those in the eastern portion being organized, and those in the western unorganized, the legislation as to the latter being limited to the matter of names and boundaries. Of course there were no courts in these unorganized counties, for the machinery was wanting; there were no county buildings, county officers or jurors. So they were by statute attached to the organized counties for judicial purposes. It was foreseen that they would, in course of time, become occupied, and that provision must be made for their organization as political subdivisions of the State. So, by the constitu

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