Opinion of the Court.

and take rank against the assets in the hands of the administrator according to the nature of the instrument evidencing the debt, and the statute relating thereto. Exceptions were filed to the decree and the case was heard on appeal by the Supreme Court of the State, which, in April, 1886, affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court. 24 So. Car. 559.

The point was taken by the appellants in the Supreme Court of South Carolina that the case of Piester v. Piester could not be applied to their cases, for the reason that so to apply it would impair the obligation of contracts or divest vested rights, because, at the time of the making of the contract of Hopkins, Dwight & Co., the law, as then declared by the case of Edwards v. Sanders, required that the balances due on the two debts should be ranked as mortgages, and as such be entitled to priority over specialty debts; and that the decision in Piester v. Piester could not divest rights which became vested at the time the intestate died, under the law as it was then declared to be.

But the Supreme Court said that the construction placed on the provisions of the act of 1789 by the decision in Piester v. Piester, was the same as that laid down in Tunno v. Happoldt and Kinard v. Young; that the law stood unquestioned down to the time of the decision in Edwards v. Sanders; that that decision did not seem to have been followed in a single instance; that from what was said in Piester v. Piester it would seem never to have been satisfactory to the profession; that at the first opportunity it was overruled; and that, in the meantime, the legislature, by the act of 1878, had shown its dissatisfaction with the construction adopted in the case of Edwards v. Sanders. On the question whether the decision in Piester v. Piester effected such a change in the law as would forbid its application to the case under consideration, because it would impair the obligation of a contract or divest rights vested under the law as declared in Edwards v. Sanders, the Supreme Court said, that, as the proper construction of the statute had been settled for a long series of years by decisions of both of the courts of final resort in the State, in accordance with the view declared in Piester v. Piester, it would be going very far

VOL. CXXXIII-25

Opinion of the Court.

to say that a single isolated decision, never recognized or followed in any subsequent case, and never recommending itself to the approval of the profession, should be regarded as having the effect of changing the law. "On the contrary," says the court, "whatever may be the opinions of individuals as to its correctness, it must be regarded as an erroneous declaration of what was the law, and as only the law of the particular case in which it was made."

The members of the firm of Hopkins, Dwight & Co., as successors of the former members of that firm, and the trustee of that firm and of Mrs. Melton and her infant children, have brought a writ of error to review the decree of the Supreme Court affirming that of the Circuit Court; and the defendants in error now move to dismiss the writ of error, on the ground of a want of jurisdiction in this court.

It is contended on the part of the plaintiffs in error that the decision of the court below was based upon the application of the act of 1878 as a valid act, affecting the contract of the plaintiffs in error and impairing its obligation. But the validity of that statute was not drawn in question, and the Supreme Court did not pass upon it. The decree of that court does not rest upon that statute, but upon independent grounds. The decision rests upon a ground broad enough to cover the entire case, without considering the statute. It rests upon the ground that the law of South Carolina, under the act of 1789, was such as it had always been held to be, in Tunno v. Hap poldt, Kinard v. Young and Piester v. Piester, and that the law as so declared had always been the law, and was not varied or changed by anything decided in Edwards v. Sanders. That being so, we must hold that no Federal question is presented by the record.

This view is in accordance with the decisions of this court in Kreiger v. Shelby Railroad Co., 125 U. S. 39, Desauşsure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216, and Hale v. Akers, 132 U. S. 554, the ruling in which cases is, that where the Supreme Court of a State decides a Federal question, in rendering a judgment, and also decides against the plaintiff in error on an independent ground, not involving a Federal question, and broad enough

Syllabus.

to maintain the judgment, the writ of error will be dismissed without considering the Federal question.

The writ of error is

Dismissed.

CALIFORNIA INSURANCE COMPANY v. UNION COMPRESS COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.

No. 1051. Submitted October 30, 1889.- Decided March 3, 1890.

The defendant, a fire insurance company, issued a policy of insurance to the plaintiff, a cotton compress company, on "cotton in bales, held by them in trust or on commission," and situated in specified places. The cotton was destroyed by fire in those places. The plaintiff received cotton for compression, and issued receipts to the depositors, which said "not responsible for any loss by fire." The holders of the receipts exchanged them with one or the other of two railroad companies for bills of lading of the cotton, which exempted the carrier from liability for loss or damage by fire. On issuing the bills of lading the railroad companies notified the plaintiff of their issue, and ordered it to compress the cotton. It was burned while in the hands of the plaintiff for compres sion, after the bills of lading were issued. In a suit to recover on the policy; Held,

(1) It was competent for the plaintiff to prove, at the trial, that it took out the policy for the benefit of the railroad companies, and in pursuance of an agreement between it and those companies that it should do so; also, that by like agreement, it collected from the railroad companies a specified sum for all cotton compressed by it, as covering the compression, the loading, and the cost of insuring the cotton; also, that such customs of business were known to the defendant when the policy was issued, and that an officer of the plaintiff had stated to the agents of the defendant, when the policy was applied for, that it was intended to cover the interests of the plaintiff and of the railroad companies; also, what claims had been made on the railroad companies, by owners of cotton burned, to recover its value;

(2) The railroad companies were beneficiaries under the policy, because they had an insurable interest in the cotton, and to that extent were its owners, and it was held in trust for them by the plaintiff'; (3) It was lawful for the plaintiff to insure in its own name goods held in trust by it, and it can recover for their entire value, holding

Statement of the Case.

the excess over its own interest in them for the benefit of those who entrusted the goods to it;

(4) The issuing of the bills of lading for the cotton did not effect such a change in the possession of the cotton as to avoid the policy,

under a provision in it making it void, "if any change take place in the possession of the subject of insurance;"

(5) The plaintiff can recover for losses caused by the negligence of the railroad companies in improperly exposing the cotton to danger from fire.

(6) The exception "not responsible for any loss by fire" in the receipts given by the plaintiff, and the clause in the bills of lading exempting the railroad companies from liability for loss or damage by fire, did not free the latter from responsibility for damages occasioned by their own negligence or that of their employés ; (7) The ruling, that a common carrier may insure himself against loss proceeding from the negligence of his own servants, made in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312, 324, affirmed.

(8) The words in the policy, "direct loss or damage by fire," explained; (9) The mere fact of the dwelling by the court below, with emphasis, in its charge to the jury, on facts which seemed to it of controlling importance, and expressing its opinion as to the bearing of those facts on the question of negligence, is immaterial, if it left the issue to the jury;

(10) Under a clause in the policy, that it shall not apply to or cover any cotton which may at the time of loss be covered in whole or part by a marine policy," such clause is not operative unless it amounts to double insurance, which can exist only in the case of risks on the same interest in property and in favor of the same person; (11) The right of action of the plaintiff accrued on the occurring of the loss, and did not require that the railroad companies should have actually paid damages for the loss of the cotton.

THIS was an action at law, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, by the Union Compress Company, an Arkansas corporation, against the California Insurance Company, of San Francisco, a California corporation, to recover on a policy of insurance against fire, issued by the latter company to the former company on the 2d of November, 1887.

By the policy the California company insured the Compress Company, for the term of thirty days from November 2, 1887, at noon, to December 2, 1887, at noon, "against all direct

Statement of the Case.

loss or damage by fire, except as hereinafter provided, to an amount not exceeding ten thousand dollars, to the followingdescribed property while located and contained as described herein, and not elsewhere, to wit: Form of cotton policy. $10,000 on cotton, in bales, their own or held by them in trust or on commission, while contained in the frame shed 112 to 122, inclusive, and in back shed and yard 115 to 123, inclusive, North Main Street, and on platforms adjoining and in street immediately between the sheds, Sanborn's map of Little Rock, Arkansas; and it is agreed and understood to be a condition of this insurance that this policy shall not apply to or cover any cotton which may at the time of loss be covered in whole or part by a marine policy; and it is further agreed to be a condition of this policy that only actual payment by bank check or otherwise for cotton purchased shall constitute a delivery of cotton from the seller to the buyer; and it is further agreed that this company shall be liable for only such proportion of the whole loss as the sum hereby insured bears to the cash value of the whole property hereby insured at the time of fire; and it is further agreed that tickets, checks, or receipts delivered to bearer shall not be considered as evidence of ownership. Other insurance permitted without notice until required. In case of loss or damage to the property insured, it shall be optional with the company, in lieu of paying such loss or damage, to replace the articles lost or damaged with others of the same kind and quality. ̧. This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement endorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void . . if any change take place in the

ance.

possession of the subject of insurIn case of any other insurance upon the property hereby insured, whether to the same party or upon the same interests therein or otherwise, whether valid or not, and whether prior or subsequent to the date of this policy, the insured shall be entitled to recover from this company no greater proportion of the loss sustained than the sum hereby insured bears to the whole amount insured thereon, whether such other insurance be by specific or by general or floating policies, or by policies covering only in excess of specified loss; and it is