Opinion of the Court. execution by her of a new submission. Pick. 269. Bean v. Farnam, 6 The notice given to the arbitrator by Mrs. Pike, through her attorney Harvey, December 24, 1886, for the purpose of revoking the submission, of itself imports or implies the previous existence of a submission intended to be revoked by her. We submit, therefore, in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case, it was not the intention of the receipt given by Stetson as stakeholder that neither party should be able to get possession of the notes, though successful before the arbitrator, unless he could procure the order or direction of the other, authorizing Stetson to give them up. If this were so, then stakeholders could never be required to perform their duty or trust to the party entitled, without the concurrence or consent of both parties; or, in other words, the losing party could always prevent any delivery of the stakes except at the end of a law-suit. Of course we do not claim that the stakeholder should not be free to decline to deliver over the stakes, so long as he has any reasonable doubt as to who is entitled to them. He is always at liberty, in the case of conflicting claims, to bring a bill of interpleader, and in that way get a decision of the court which shall bind all parties. Mr. John G. Stetson, in person, submitted on the opinion of the court below. MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court. The bill having been dismissed by agreement, as respects the defendant Swift, the only questions in the case for our consideration are those relating to the demurrer of the defendant Stetson. That demurrer rests on ten grounds, but the court below considered only one of them, viz., the ninth one, which is as follows: "This bill is defective for want of proper parties, in that it does not make Mary II. Pike, executrix of Frederic A. Pike, Thomas H. Talbot and Francis A. Brooks, or either of them, parties thereto." Opinion of the Court. We are of opinion that the decree of the court below must stand. The rule as to who shall be made parties to a suit in equity is thus stated in Story's Eq. Pl. § 72: "It is a general rule in equity (subject to certain exceptions, which will hereafter be noticed) that all persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject matter of a suit are to be made parties to it, either as plaintiffs or as defendants, however numerous they may be, so that there may be a complete decree, which shall bind them all. By this means, the court is enabled to make a complete decree between the parties, to prevent future litigation by taking away the necessity of a multiplicity of suits, and to make it perfectly certain that no injustice is done, either to the parties before it, or to others, who are interested in the subject matter, by a decree, which might otherwise be grounded upon a partial view only of the real merits. When all the parties are before the court, the whole case may be seen; but it may not, where all the conflicting interests are not brought out upon the pleadings by the original parties thereto." See also 1 Daniell's Chan. Pl. and Prac. 246 et seq. In the case before us we are unable to see how any final decree could be rendered affecting the parties to the contract sued on without making them all parties to the suit. It is an elementary principle that a court cannot adjudicate directly upon a person's right without having him either actually or constructively before it. This principle is fundamental. The allegations of the bill show that the contract sued on was made and entered into subsequently to the termination of the proceedings before the referee. By the terms of that contract the note in dispute between Mrs. Pike and the complainant was to be held by the bailee, Stetson, "subject to the joint order and direction" of their respective attorneys. It seems too plain to require argument that complainant Gregory, Mrs. Pike, Talbot, Brooks and Stetson, all had an interest in the subject matter of the contract—such an interest, too, as brings the case within the rule just announced. The point was made in the court below, and it is also pressed here, that Mrs. Pike being a non-resident and beyond the juris Counsel for Parties. diction of the court, it was impossible to join her as a party defendant to this suit, and that it was, therefore, unnecessary to attempt to do so. The court below ruled against the complainant on this point, and we see no error in that ruling. The general question involved therein has been before this court a number of times, and it is now well settled that, notwithstanding the statute referred to and the 47th equity rule, a Circuit Court can make no decree in a suit in the absence of a party whose rights must necessarily be affected thereby. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 141, 142; Coiron v. Millaudon, 19 How. 113, 115, and cases there cited. But even admitting the complainant's contention as regards the making of Mrs. Pike a party to this suit, it does not follow that Talbot and Brooks should not have been made parties. As we have shown, they had a substantial interest in the subject matter of the contract sued on, and they should have been made parties to the suit. We see no error in the decree of the court below prejudicial to the complainant, and it is therefore Affirmed. LOUISVILLE, NEW ORLEANS AND TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY v. MISSISSIPPI. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. No. 1195. Submitted January 10, 1890. - Decided March 3, 1890. The statute of the State of Mississippi of March 2, 1888, requiring all railroads carrying passengers in that State (other than street railroads) to provide equal, but separate, accommodations for the white and colored races, having been construed by the Supreme Court of the State to apply solely to commerce within the State, does no violation to the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States. The construction of a state statute by the highest court of the State is accepted as conclusive in this court. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. W. P. Harris for plaintiff in error. Opinion of the Court. The defendant in error submitted on the record. MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court. The question presented is as to the validity of an act passed by the legislature of the State of Mississippi on the 2d of March, 1888. That act is as follows: "SEC. 1. Be it enacted, That all railroads carrying passengers in this State (other than street railroads) shall provide equal, but separate, accommodation for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger cars for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger cars by a partition, so as to secure separate accommodations. "SEC. 2. That the conductors of such passenger trains shall have power, and are hereby required, to assign each passenger to the car or the compartment of a car (when it is divided by a partition) used for the race to which said passenger belongs; and that, should any passenger refuse to occupy the car to which he or she is assigned by such conductor, said conductor shall have power to refuse to carry such passenger on his train, and neither he nor the railroad company shall be liable for any damages in any event in this State. "SEC. 3. That all railroad companies that shall refuse or neglect within sixty days after the approval of this act to comply with the requirements of section one of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be fined not more than five hundred dollars; and any conductor that shall neglect to, or refuse to, carry out the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than twenty-five nor more than fifty dollars for each offence. "SEC. 4. That all acts and parts of acts in conflict with this act be, and the same are hereby repealed, and this act to take effect and be in force from and after its passage." Acts of 1888, p. 48. The plaintiff in error was indicted for a violation of that statute. A conviction in the trial court was sustained in the Supreme Court, and from its judgment this case is here on Opinion of the Court. error. The question is whether the act is a regulation of interstate commerce and therefore beyond the power of the State; and the cases of Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, and Wabash, St. Louis &c. Railway v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, are specially relied on by plaintiff in error. It will be observed that this indictment was against the company for the violation of section one, in not providing separate accommodations for the two races; and not against a conductor for a violation of section two, in failing to assign each passenger to his separate compartment. It will also be observed that this is not a civil action brought by an individualto recover damages for being compelled to occupy one particular compartment, or prevented from riding on the train; and hence there is no question of personal insult or alleged violation of personal rights. The question is limited to the power of the State to compel railroad companies to provide, within the State, separate accommodations for the two races. Whether such accommodation is to be a matter of choice or compulsion does not enter into this case. The case of Hall v. De Cuir, supra, was a civil action to recover damages from the owner of a steamboat for refusing to the plaintiff, a person of color, accommodations in the cabin specially set apart for white persons; and the validity of a statute of the State of Louisiana, prohibiting discrimination on account of color, and giving a right of action to the party injured for the violation thereof, was a question for consideration. The steamboat was engaged in interstate commerce, but the plaintiff only sought transportation from one point to another in the State. This court held that statute, so far as applicable to the facts in that case, to be invalid. That decision is invoked here; but there is this marked difference. The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana held that the act applied to interstate carriers, and required them, when they came within the limits of the State, to receive colored passengers into the cabin set apart for white persons. This court, accepting that construction as conclusive, held that the act was a regulation of interstate commerce, and therefore beyond the power of the State. The Chief Justice, speaking for the court, said: "For the purposes of this case |