131, and the case of Pearce v. Foote, 113 Illinois, 228, do not apply to
the present case. Ib.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
The property of a subject of the Emperor of the French in Louisiana was
occupied by the army of the United States during the war of the rebel-
lion. A claim for the injury caused thereby was adjusted by the com-
manding general, but payment was refused in consequence of the
passage of the act of February 21, 1867, 14 Stat. 397, c. 57. After the
organization of the commission under the Claims Convention of 1880
with France, 21 Stat. 673, his executor (he having meantime died in
Paris leaving a will distributing his estate) presented this claim against
the United States to the commissioners, and an allowance was made
which was paid to the executor. In settling the executor's accounts in
the courts of Louisiana two of the legatees, who were citizens of France,
laid claim to the whole of the award. The other legatees, who were
citizens of the United States, claimed the right to participate in the
division of this sum. The award of the commission being silent on
the subject, the briefs of counsel on both sides before the commission
together with letters from the claimants' counsel, and a letter from
one of the commissioners, were offered to show that only the claims
on the part of the French legatees were considered by the commission,
and the evidence was admitted. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
ordered the award to be distributed among all the legatees, French
and American; Held, (1) That this court had jurisdiction to review
the judgment of the state court; (2) That the French legatees only
were entitled to be represented before the commission, and they only
were entitled to participate in the distribution; (3) That the briefs
of counsel were properly admitted in evidence; (4) That the letters
of counsel and of the commissioner should have been rejected; but,
(5) That it was immaterial whether the evidence was or was not re-
ceived, as the decision of the question depended upon considerations
which such evidence could in no way affect. Burthe v. Denis, 514.
COMPTROLLER IN TREASURY DEPARTMENT.
A comptroller in the Treasury Department has no power to review, revise
or alter items in accounts expressly allowed by statute, or items of
expenditures or allowances made upon the judgment or discretion of
officers charged by law with the duty of expending the money or
making the allowances. United States v. Waters, 208.
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY.
See NATIONAL Bank, 3.
CONDITION SUBSEQUENT.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 6.
A condemnation under the confiscation act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589,
of real estate owned in fee by a person who had participated in the
rebellion, and a sale under the decree, left the remainder, after the
expiration of the confiscated life-estate, so vested in him that he could
dispose of it after receiving a full pardon from the President.
Central Railroad Co. v. Bosworth, 92.
1. The Constitution of the United States, in proper cases, permits equity
courts of one State to control persons within their jurisdiction from
prosecuting suits in another State. Cole v. Cunningham, 107.
2. It is no violation of that provision of the Constitution of the United
States which requires that full faith and credit shall be given in each
State to the judicial proceedings of every other State, if a court in
one State, (in which proceedings have been begun, under a general
insolvent law of the State, to distribute the estate of an insolvent
debtor among his creditors,) enjoins a creditor of the insolvent, (who
is a citizen of the same State, and subject to the jurisdiction of the
court,) from proceeding to judgment and execution in a suit against
the insolvent in another State, begun by an attachment of his prop-
erty there, after knowledge of his embarrassment and actual insolvency,
which property the insolvent law of the State of the debtor's residence
requires him to convey to his assignee in insolvency, for distribution
with his other assets there being nothing in the law or policy of the
State in which the attachment is made, opposed to those of the State
of the creditor and of the insolvent debtor. Ib.
3. In an action brought in a state court against the judges of the Court of
Commissioners of the Alabama Claims, by one who had been an
attorney of that court, to recover damages caused by an order of the
court disbarring him, the plaintiff averred and contended that the
court had not been legally organized, and that it did not act judicially
in making the order complained of; Held, that a decision by the state
court that the Court of Alabama Claims was legally organized and did
act judicially in that matter, denied to the plaintiff no title, right,
privilege or immunity claimed by him under the Constitution, or
under a treaty or statute of the United States, or under a commission
held or authority exercised under the United States. Manning v.
French, 186.
4. The provision in § 501, Rev. Stat. Idaho, that "no person who is a
bigamist or polygamist, or who teaches, advises, counsels or encourages
any person or persons to become bigamists or polygamists, or to com-
mit any other crime defined by law, or to enter into what is known as
plural or celestial marriage, or who is a member of any order, organi-
zation or association which teaches, advises, counsels or encourages its
members or devotees or any other persons to commit the crime of
bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime defined by law either as a rite
or ceremony of such order, organization or association, or otherwise, is
permitted to vote at any election, or to hold any position or office of
honor, trust or profit within this Territory" is an exercise of the legis-
lative power conferred upon Territories by Rev. Stat. §§ 1851, 1859,
and is not open to any constitutional or legal objection. Davis v.
Beason, 333.
5. The cases in which the legislation of Congress will supersede the legis
lation of a State or Territory, without specific provisions to that effect,
are those in which the same matter is the subject of legislation by
both.
6. It was never intended that the first article of amendment to the Con-
stitution, that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," should be a
protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to
the peace, good order and morals of society. Ib.
7. No State has power to tax the property of the United States within its
limits. Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Price, 496.
8. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution does not operate to pre-
vent counties in a State from being sued in a Federal Court.
County v. Luning, 529.
9. No state statute exempting a county in the State from liability to suit
except in the courts of the county can defeat the jurisdiction of suits
given by the Constitution to the Federal courts. Ib.
10. The statute of the State of Mississippi of March 2, 1888, requiring all
railroads carrying passengers in that State (other than street railroads)
to provide equal, but separate, accommodations for the white and col-
ored races, having been construed by the Supreme Court of the State to
apply solely to commerce within the State, does no violation to the
commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States. Louisville,
New Orleans &c. Railway v. Mississippi, 587.
See BETTERMENTS, 2;
EQUITY 9;
TAX AND TAXation, 1, 2;
TREATY, 1.
This court follows the Supreme Court of Nevada in holding that the statute
under which the bonds in controversy were issued was not in conflict
with the Constitution of that State. Lincoln County v. Luning, 529.
CONSUL.
1. The question considered, as to what are "Official services" performed
by consuls, under the consular regulations of 1874 and 1881, prescribed
by the President by virtue of the provisions of § 1745 of the Revised
Statutes. United States v. Mosby, 273.
2. Fees collected by a consul for the examination of Chinese emigrants
going to the United States on foreign vessels; and fees for certificates
of shipment of merchandise in transit through the United States to
other countries; and fees for recording instruments which are not
official documents recorded in the record books required to be kept by
the consul, but relate to private transactions for individuals not re-
quiring the use of the consul's title or seal of office; and fees for
cattle-disease certificates; and fees for acknowledgments and authen-
tications of instruments certifying the official character and signature
of notaries public; and fees for settling private estates; and fees for
shipping and discharging seamen on foreign-built vessels sailing or
the China coast under the United States flag; are not moneys which
he is required to account for to the United States. Ib.
3. Fees collected by him for certifying extra copies of quadruplicate
invoices of goods shipped to the United States; and money received
for interest on public moneys deposited in bank; and fees collected
for certificates of shipments or extra invoices; and fees for certifying
invoices for free goods imported into the United States; are moneys
which he is required to account for to the United States. 1b.
4. The practice of consuls to do acts which are not official is recognized
by the statutes and the consular regulations. Ib.
5. The claimant had a judgment in the Court of Claims against the
United States for $13,839.21. Both parties appealed. The items of
the disallowance of which the claimant complained did not amount to
more than $3000. But it was held that he could avail himself of
anything in the case which properly showed that the judgment was
not for too large a sum; and this court, disallowing one of the items
allowed to him, allowed one of the items disallowed, and rendered a
judgment in his favor for a less amount than that rendered below. Ib.
1. The city of Galesburg, Illinois, by an ordinance, granted to one Shelton,
and his assigns, in May, 1883, a franchise for thirty years, to construct
and maintain water works for supplying the city and its inhabitants
with water for public and private uses, the city to pay a specified rent
for fire hydrants, and a tariff being fixed for charges for water to con-
sumers. In December, 1883, the water works were completed by a
water company to which Shelton had assigned the franchise, and
a test required by the ordinance was satisfactorily made, and the city,
by a resolution, accepted the works. The water furnished by the
company for nine months was unfit for domestic purposes. After
November, 1884, the supply of water was inadequate for the protection
of the city from fire, and its quality was no better than before.
During eighteen months after December, 1883, the company had ample
time to comply with the contract. The city, by a resolution passed
June 1, 1885, repealed the ordinance, and then gave notice to the
company that it claimed title to certain old water mains which it had
conditionally agreed to sell to Shelton, and of which the company
had taken possession. The city then took possession of the old mains,
and, in June, 1885, filed a bill in equity against the water company to
set aside the contract contained in the ordinance and the agreement
for the sale of the old mains. In August, 1883, the company executed
a mortgage to a trustee on the franchise and works, to secure sundry
bonds, which were sold to various purchasers in 1884 and 1885. The
interest on them being in default, the trustee foreclosed the mortgage
by a suit brought in November, 1885, and the property was bought by
a committee of the bondholders, in November, 1886. In February,
1886, the trustee had been made a party to the suit of the city. After
their purchase, the members of the committee were also made parties
and they filed a cross-bill, praying for a decree for the amount due by
the city for water rents, and for the restoration to them of the old
mains, and for an injunction against the city from interfering with the
operation of the works. After issue, proofs were taken; Held, (1)
The supply of water was not in compliance with the contract, in
quantity or quality; (2) The taking possession by the city of the old
mains was necessary for the protection of the city from fire; (3) The
contract of the city for the sale of the old mains was conditional and
was not executed; (4) The city was not estopped, as against the
bondholders, from refusing to pay the rent for the hydrants, which,
by the mortgage, was to be applied to pay the interest on the bonds,
or from having the contract cancelled; (5) The obligation of Shelton
and his assigns was a continuing one, and their right to the continued
enjoyment of the consideration for it was dependent on their con-
tinuing to perform it; (6) The bondholders were bound to take
notice of the contents of the ordinance before purchasing their bonds,
and purchased and held them subject to the continuing compliance
of the company with the terms of the ordinance; (7) In regard to the
old mains, the lien of the mortgage was subject to the conditions of
the agreement for the sale of them by the city to Shelton; (8) A suit
by the city for a specific performance of the contract, or one to recover
damages for its non-performance would be a wholly inadequate remedy
in the case; (9) A decree was proper annulling the ordinance and the
agreement; dismissing the cross-bill; directing the city to pay into
court, for the use of the cross-plaintiffs, $3000, as the value of the use
of the water by the city from December, 1883, to June, 1885; and
dividing the costs of the suit equally between the city and the cross-
plaintiffs. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Galesburg, 156.
2. Where the subject matter of a contract relates to the construction of a
railroad in Massachusetts, and the defendant resides there, and the
contract was made there, and a suit on the contract is brought there,
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