strictly in favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and rea-
sonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature.
United States v. Stowell, 1.

2. The forfeiture imposed by the act of February 8, 1875, c. 36, § 16, for
carrying on the business of a distiller without having given bond, or
with intent to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits dis-
tilled, includes all personal property owned by other persons, know-
ingly and voluntarily permitted by them to remain on any part of the
premises, and actually used, either in the unlawful business, or in any
other business openly carried on there; but in the lot of land on which
the distillery is situated, only the right, title and interest of the distil-
ler, and of persons who have consented to the carrying on of the busi-
ness of a distiller thereon, is forfeited. And there is a like forfeiture
of personal property under Rev. Stat. § 3258, for setting up an unregis-
tered still; and of personal property and interests in real estate under
§ 3305, for omitting to keep books as required by law. Ib.
3. The forfeiture imposed by the act of February 8, 1875, c. 36, § 16, and
by Rev. Stat. §§ 3258, 3305, takes effect from the time of the commis-
sion of the offence, both as to the right, title and interest in the land,
and as to personal property then upon the land. Ib.

4. When the owner of land, upon which an illicit distillery has been set
up and carried on with his consent, has previously made a mortgage
thereof to one who does not permit or connive at the illicit distilling,
and the mortgagor, upon a subsequent breach of condition of the
mortgage, makes a quitclaim deed to the mortgagee, the forfeiture of
the land, as well as of trade fixtures annexed to it for a lawful pur-
pose before the setting up of the still, is of the equity of redemption
only. Ib.

JUDGMENT.

A decree in equity, cancelling bonds of one railroad corporation and a
mortgage by a second railroad corporation of its property to secure
their payment, upon a bill filed by the latter against the former and
the trustee under the mortgage, binds all the bondholders, unless ob-
tained by fraud. And a bill afterwards filed by bondholders not per-
sonally made parties to that suit against those two corporations and a
third railroad corporation alleged to claim a right in the property, by
purchase or otherwise, prior to the lien of the bondholders, charging
fraud and collusion in obtaining that decree, cannot be maintained
without proof of the charges, if the second and third corporations, by
pleas and answers under oath, fully and explicitly deny them, and
aver that the third corporation had since purchased the property in
good faith and without knowledge or notice of any fraud or irregular-
ity in obtaining the decree. Beals v. Illinois, Missouri & Texas Rail-
road Co., 290.

See EVIDENCE, 1;

PUBLIC LAND.

JURISDICTION.

A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

1. This court has no jurisdiction to review a judgment of the highest
court of a State, unless a Federal question has been, either in express

terms or by necessary effect, decided by that court against the plaintiff
in error. San Francisco v. Itsell, 65.

2. The record from the trial court must be taken in this court as it was
presented to the appellate court below, and an objection to it, not
made there, will not be considered here. Keyser v. Hitz, 138.

3. The decision of a state court that a judge of a Federal Court acted judi-
cially in disbarring an attorney of the court involves no Federal ques-
tion. Manning v. French, 186.

4. A petition for a writ of error forms no part of the record upon which
action is taken here. Ib.

5. The verdict was for $5000, and the judgment was for that amount, and
$306 interest for the time between verdict and judgment, and for
$60.25 costs; Held, that the matter in dispute exceeded the sum or
value of $5000, exclusive of costs, within the act of February 16, 1875,
c. 77, § 3, 18 Stat. 316, even though, without the interest included in
the judgment, the amount, exclusive of costs, would not be over $5000.
Quebec Steamship Co. v. Merchant, 375.

6. Where the Supreme Court of a State decides against the plaintiff in
error on an independent ground, not involving a Federal question, and
broad enough to maintain the judgment, the writ of error will be dis-
missed by this court without considering the Federal question. Hop-
kins. v. McLure, 380.

7. In this case, the Supreme Court of the State held that the law was not
changed by an isolated decision made by it, because such decision was
an erroneous declaration of what was the law; and on that view this
court held that no Federal question was presented by the record, and
the writ of error was dismissed. Ib.

8. No judgment or decree of the highest court of a Territory can be re-
viewed in this court in matter of fact, but only in matter of law.
Sturr v. Beck, 541.

9. Upon appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia in general term, affirming a judgment in special term, dis-
missing a bill in equity founded upon a contract bearing interest, the
sum in dispute at the time of the judgment in general term, including
interest to that time, is the test of the appellate jurisdiction of this
court. Keller v. Ashford, 610.

10. The refusal of a Circuit Court to grant a rehearing is not subject to
review here. Boesch v. Graff, 694.

11. To a master's report upon the damages to be awarded in an equity
suit for the infringement of letters patent the bill of exceptions raised
the points: (1), that the infringement was not wilful; (2), that the
reduction in price of the article manufactured by the plaintiff was not

solely due to the infringement; Held, that this was sufficient to bring
before the court the whole subject of the computation of damages. Ib.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE United

STATES, (1);

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 3;

CONSUL, 5;

EQUITY, 3;
RECEIVER, 3.

B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. Under the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, as amended by the
act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, c. 866, a Circuit Court of the
United States has not jurisdiction on the ground of diverse citizen-
ship, if there are two plaintiffs to the action, who are citizens of and
residents in different States, and the defendant is a citizen of and
resident in a third State, and the action is brought in the State in
which one of the plaintiffs resides. Smith v. Lyon, 315.
2. Under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, the restriction of the original
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States in suits by an
assignee whose assignor could not have sued in that court does not
apply to a suit removed from a state court. Delaware Co. Commission-
ers v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 473.

3. It is no objection to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Circuit Court of
the United States over a suit brought by an assignee of a contract,
that the assignor is a citizen of the same State as the defendant, if the
assignor was not a party to the suit at the time of its removal from
the state court, and, being since made a party, disclaims all interest in
the suit, and no further proceedings are had against him, and the
complaint alleges that the defendant consented to the assignment. Ib.
4. A Circuit Court can make no decree in a suit in the absence of a party
whose rights must necessarily be affected thereby. Gregory v. Stetson,
579.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 9;
EQUITY, 10.

C. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.

See BANKRUPT.

LIEN.

A liquidated claim against a railroad company, not converted into judg-
ment, which another railroad company, purchasing its road and prop-
erty, agrees with the selling company to assume and pay as part of the
consideration, does not thereby become a lien upon the property so as
to take priority over the lien of a mortgage made by the purchasing
company to secure an issue of bonds. Fogg v. Blair, 534.

LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.

When, after default by a municipal corporation in the payment of interest
upon its bonds the legislature provides for the creation of a special

VOL. CXXXIII-47

fund by the debtor, out of which the creditor is to be paid, the debtor
cannot set up the statute of limitations to an action on the bonds and
coupons, without showing that the fund has been provided. Lincoln
County v. Luning, 529.

California.

District of Columbia.

Illinois.

Kansas.

Louisiana.

Massachusetts.
New York.
Utah.

Virginia.

See MORTGAGE, (9).

LOCAL LAW.

See WILL, 2.

See MORTGAGE, (6).

See EQUITY PLEADING, 4.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2, 4, 5, 6.

See INSOLVENCY.

See WILL, 2.

See TAX AND TAXATION.

See PUBLIC LAND, 5;

WILL.

See ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT

of Creditors, 1, 8.

MARRIED WOMEN.

See NATIONAL BANK, 6, 7.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. In this case, which was an action against a railroad company, by one
of its employés, to recover damages for a personal injury, it was Held,
that it was proper for the Circuit Court to direct the jury to find a
verdict for the defendant. Coyne v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 370.

2. The plaintiff was a laborer or construction hand, under a construction
boss or foreman of the defendant. He was injured by the fall of a
steel rail, which he and other laborers were trying to load from the
ground upon a flat car, and which struck the side of the car and fell
back. The negligence alleged was, that the foreman moved out the
construction train to which the flat car belonged, in the face of an
approaching regular freight train, to avoid which the laborers were
hurrying to load the rails; and that he failed to give the customary
word of command to lift the rail in concert, but, with the approaching
freight train in sight, and with oaths and imprecations, ordered the
men to get the rail on in any way they could, and they lifted it with-
out concert; Held, that whatever negligence there was, was that of
either the plaintiff himself or of his fellow-servants who with him had
hold of the rail. Ib.

3. The stewardess of a steam-vessel belonging to a corporation sued it to
recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her. She came
out of the cabin, which was on deck, to throw the contents of a pail
over the side of the vessel, at a gangway facing the door of the cabin,
and leaned over a railing at the gangway, composed of four horizon-

tal rods, which gave way, because not properly secured, and she fell
into the water, probably striking the side of a boat. The rods were
movable, to make a gangway, and had been recently opened to take
off some baggage of passengers, and not properly replaced. The por-
ter and the carpenter had attempted to replace them, but left the
work, knowing that it was unfinished. The persons composing the
ship's company were divided into three classes of servants, called three
departments - the deck department, containing the first and second
officers, the purser, the carpenter and the sailors; the engineer's de-
partment, containing the engineers, the firemen and the coal-passers;
and the steward's department, containing the steward, the waiters,
the cooks, the porter and the stewardess. Every one on board, in-
cluding the plaintiff, had signed the shipping articles, and she had
participated in salvage given to the vessel. The master was in
command of the whole vessel; Held, that the porter and the car-
penter were fellow-servants with the plaintiff, and that the corpora-
tion was not liable to her for any damages. Quebec Steamship Co.
v. Merchant, 375.

4. The Circuit Court left it to the jury to determine, if they found
there was negligence, whether the injury was occasioned by the care-
less act of a servant not employed in the same department with the
plaintiff; Held, error, and that the court ought to have directed the
jury, as requested, to find for the defendant, on the ground that the
negligence was that of a fellow-servant, either the porter or the car-
penter. Ib.

MORTGAGE.

S. gave two deeds of trust of a lot of land in the District of Columbia to
secure loans made by P. Afterwards he gave a deed of trust of the
same lot to secure a loan made by C., that deed covering also a lot in
the rear of the first lot, and fronting on a side street. At the time all
the deeds were given, there was a dwelling-house on the premises, the
main part of which was on the first lot, but some of which was on
the rear lot. P., on an allegation that B., a trustee in each of the first
two deeds, had refused to sell the property covered by them, filed a
bill asking the appointment of a trustee in place of those appointed by
the first two deeds. The suit resulted in a decree appointing a new
trustee in place of B., "in the deed of trust," but not identifying
which one.
The new trustee and the remaining old one then sold the
land at auction to P., under the first trust deed. S. then filed a bill to
set aside the sale, and P. filed a cross bill to confirm it. The bill was
dismissed. P. then filed this bill against S. and C., and all necessary
parties, to have a trustee appointed to sell the land covered by the
three trust deeds, and the improvements on it, to have a receiver of
the rents appointed, and to have the rents and the proceeds of sale
applied first to pay P. A receiver was appointed, and a decree made