pline of the beft European troops to the teft. Finding this failure in the first part of his defign, and not placing the lofs of men in any competition with the attainment of his object, he thought to fupply the defect by the number and courage of his cavalry, who he expected could not fail of break. ing in at fome point or other of the attack, and of then foon cutting or trampling down the whole party. He accordingly made reiterated attempts to lead on his cavalry to the charge; but though they advanced with the greateft impetuofity and fury, they were conftantly received with fuch inceffant fhowers of grape and mufquet fhot, and fuch havock made amongst them in the approach, that they were as conftantly broken on the way, and obliged to fly in the utmoft diforder; whilst at the very inftant of their breaking, the party of cavalry fallied full gallop from the centre of the fquare, and purfuing them furiously with heavy and unrefifted execution to a proper diftance, again returned to their former ftation.

Such was the nature of the repeated attacks which they fuftained, and fuch the hard and defperate fervice, which this hand. ful of brave men underwent through fo long a courfe of time. But in this courfe their numbers were continually thinned, while the brave furvivors, worn down with wounds and fatigue, were ftill more fubdued by the evident fruitleffness of their exertions. At length, on the third day, Monf. Lally feeing the total failure of the cavalry, and that fo far from fulfilling Tippoo Saib's fanguine hopes of riding over at once and

trampling upon the British infantry, no poffible means could bring them to the refolution of ever making one charge up to the lines, he propofed a new difpofition and more effectual mode of attack.

M. Lally marched himself at the head of his 400 Europeans, with fixed bayonets, to the attack of that fide of the fquare, which was the most expofed or feemed the weakest; he being accompanied and fupported by feveral battalions of the enemy's beft infantry, and flanked by cavalry. Whilft he was advancing to this attack, the whole fire of their artillery was poured in upon the other three faces, which were at the fame time menaced and harraffed by great bodies of cavalry, who were ready to rush in upon them, at the inftant that they ventured upon any change in their pofition; fo that the attacked front could not receive the fmalleft fupport whatever from the others. The poor wearied fepoys in that front, were little able to withstand the vigorous bayonet attack of fuch a body of Europeans coming fresh into action, confident, as they were, of fuccefs, and fupported by fuch a weight of native troops. They were foon broken, and the cavalry inftantly rushing in, a dreadful carnage enfued.

This moment of horror and deftruction afforded an opportu nity to M. Lally of difplaying the nobleft humanity, and of tranfmitting his name with favour and honour to pofterity. He not only iffued immediate orders for putting a stop to the carnage, which were readily obeyed by the in

fantry,

fantry, but he haftened perfonally, and with apparent hazard, to chaftize and restrain the blind and cruel fury of the cavalry; five of whom are faid to have fallen by his own hand in that generous exertion. The flaughter was, however, great in the firft inftance; but as foon as it was effectually reftrained, Lally, as if it were entirely to perfect what he had fo happily begun, prevailed upon Tippoo Saib to commit the prifoners to his own charge; and the kindness and tendernefs which they continued to experience from him, particularly the officers and wounded, fully equalled his generofity and humanity in the field, Many gallant British officers fell in this unfortunate affair; and of the whole number who were in the field, only one efcaped being wounded. They loft every thing but their honour; and were fill doomed to fuffer the miseries of a long and cruel imprisonment at Seringapatam, Hyder's capital in the Myfore kingdom.

This unfortunate ftroke on the Coleroon, could not but totally difconcert Sir Eyre Coote's plan for the conduct of the campaign. All the countries to the fouthward were now laid entirely open to the defigns of the enemy; whilft Hyder, with his grand army, clofely watched the motions, and was powerfully prepared to obstruct the defigns of the English general, on the northern fide, who was already moft unfortunately cramped in his operations through thofe circumftances which we have before stated. In this state of imbecility or constraint on the one fide, and of active power on the other, the French forces and ar

tillery from the iflands, under the immediate conduct of M. Duchemin, (being the first division of that great force, under the Marquis de Buffy, which was intended for the fubverfion of the English power in India) were, in the courfe of the month of March, difembarked by Suffrein at Pondicherry. These being received or joined by a body of Hyder's forces, the combined enemy marched in full confidence and fecurity to befiege Cuddalore; a place of fufficient ftrength and of great importance; but not expecting a fiege, and being, through that, and the unfavourable circumftances of the times, unprovided for any length of defence, Captain Hughes, the commandant, was obliged to furrender it by capitulation on the 8th of April. Thus affured by fuccefs, and encouraged by having no enemy to oppose them in the field, as well as by the weak and unprovided ftate of the garrifons, they advanced to the northward, where they befieged and took Permacoil; and then, in concert with Hyder ̧ were directing their views to a joint attack upon Vandiwah.

Thefe unexpected loffes, and this new danger, were not neceffary to quicken Sir Eyre Coote in his endeavours to put the army in motion. Vandiwafh was indeed of fuch great importance, that a lefs active and vigilant commander, could have left no means unfought, nor refource untried for its prefervation. He accordingly advanced with the army towards that place, in full confidence that Hyder, being now ftrengthened by fo powerful an aid of Europeans, would be no

way's

ways averfe to a general action, or indeed that he would rather be pleafed with fo early an opportu nity of trying, and of benefiting by their energy: at all events, he concluded that he would fooner fight, than to relinquish an object, which he had fo much at heart, and which was of fo much real confequence as the taking of Vandiwafh. He found himself, however, mistaken in all his conclufions, well founded, as they certainly were; and it foon appeared, that the prefence even of his European allies, was not fufficient to restore Hyder's confidence in the iffue of a field battle with the English.

The protection of Vandiwash was not, however, fufficient to fatisfy the British general; and as his pofition there was too advantageous to encourage Hyder's approach, he determined to feek him upon his own ground; till concluding, that the difgrace of retiring from fo inferior a force under the eyes of ftrangers, who were themselves his allies, eminent for their own military abilities, and already prepoffeffed, through the greatnefs of his name, in an opinion of his fuperior prowefs in war, together with a fenfe of the impreflion which fo fhameful a retreat would make upon all the other ftates of India, and even upon his own fubjects and forces, would inevitably induce Hyder to ftand the hazard of a battle; and that even though the measure should be contrary to his own opinion, he would notwithstanding be forced to give way to the united operation, of fo many powerful concurrent motives. In this opinion,

he pushed on two days march directly to Hyder's camp. But that wary prince was not to be overruled or guided in his conduct, by any regard to appearances, or to the opinions of others. He fubmitted without hefitation to the fuppofed difgrace, and took care to fall back in good time, without at all waiting for fo near an approach of the British army as could by any means enable them to disturb his retreat; and directing his courfe to the Red Hills, he there took a pofition of fuch ftrength, as he well knew would deter an able and experienced general, from all attempt upon an army of fuch magnitude as he commanded.

It is perhaps among the diftinguishing features of great talents, and is undoubtedly highly neceffary in military affairs, not to truft fo much to them, as to venture upon meafures of great importance, and capable of much danger in their confequences, without full confultation and advice. This was at leaft a leading part of Sir Eyre Coote's character. He held a council of war, and having communicated all the intelligence he poffeffed to his of ficers, he then laid before them his own ideas, and the plan he had thereupon framed, in order to draw the enemy from his prefent ftrong poft, and thereby to obtain an opportunity of bringing him to action. Hyder's great magazines were depofited in the ftrong fortrefs of Arnee, and the general fuggefted, that a movement towards that place, would not only be a means of effectually checking his fupplies, but would alarm him fo much for its fafety.

that

that on both accounts, he probably would be led to defcend from his prefent pofition on the hills.

The general's propofal being unanimously approved of in the council of war, he directed his course towards Arnee, and encamped within five miles of that place. This judicious movement, immediately produced the intended effect, by drawing Hyder down from the hills, who marched with the utmost expedition to the rescue of a place which contained the means of carrying on the war. This movement, however, continued unknown to the general, until a little before day, at the very moment that the army was commencing its five mile march to Arnee; and this intelligence rendered it then a matter of deliberation, whether he fhould ftill proceed to that place, or advance to meet Hyder, and fight him on the way? He determined on the former, as the most certain means of bringing the enemy to action; for if Hyder found that he could fave the place, by drawing the English army away from its pofition, he then would have been under no neceffity of rifquing a battle, which was a decifion that he evidently had no difpofition to appeal to, while it could be avoided without fome fignal lofs.

It was not the leaft of the many great difficulties which the British general had to encounter in this war, that the vaft crowds of Hyder's cavalry, which conftantly attended and watched all the fmalleft movements of the army, covering as it were the whole face of the adjoining country, ren

dered it almoft impoffible to obtain any precife information of the motions or fituation of his main body; nor could the evolutions or approach of the former, which they were endlefs in the repetition of, be confidered as the Imalleft indication either of his distance or defigns. The van of the army had already reached Arnee, and were marking out a camp in fight of the place, when a diftant cannonade on the rear, announced to the general Hyder's fudden approach, who was till then fuppofed to be at feveral miles diftance.

This furprize, however, produced no manner of diforder, although their arrival at that critical juncture afforded great advantages to the enemy in their attack; for the army was in a low fituation furrounded by commanding grounds, which Hyder's forces inftantly took poffeffion of ; fo that their manoeuvres were performed under every poffible difadvantage in that refpect, and they were expofed to a heavy though diftant cannonade during the time they were forming. Thefe difficulties and difadvantages by no means difconcerted the general, who ufed the utmost difpatch, and difplayed all his ufual ability, in making fuch difpofitions, and adopting fuch meafures, as would the moft fpeedily remove or remedy them, and might, in their effect, tend to bring the enemy to clofe and decifive action.

that was accomplished, the British troops advanced upon them with fuch refiftlefs impetuofity, that Hyder's army gave way on every fide. A total rout enfued, and the enemy were purfued till late in the evening.

The want of cavalry on the British fide, and the fuperabundance of it on the other, prevented victory from producing any of its grand effects in this war, whether with refpect to the deftruction of men, the taking of prifoners and artillery, or the total、 difperfion and ruin of the enemy's army. It is however a matter peculiarly worthy of obfervation, that although Hyder's tried and veteran fepoys and gre. nadiers, who once would not have dreaded the encounter of any enemy whatever, had long fince been worn out and confumed in this war, yet that fuch were the effects of his own great military talents, and of the remains of that admirable order and difcipline which he had been fo many years eftablishing, that even the fort of troops which he now commanded, though incapable of long ftanding the brunt of close and fevere action with the English fepoys, yet they were, in all circumftances, ftill obedient to command, and foon recovered their order; never once being guilty of that fhameful dereliction of their commanders, and irretrievable difperfion, which, before his time, had been the conftant concomitants of defeat in Indian armies. When Hyder's army was beat, whatever the lofs, or however great the defeat, it was ftill beaten like an European army; and, like that, was eafily recalled to order

and fervice, and speedily fit for fresh action. It is not lefs remarkable, nor worthy of obfervation, that, although before Hyder's time, the furprize of Indian camps at night by Europeans, and the ever confequent deftruction of their armies, were among the common incidents of warfare; yet, that fo wonderful was the change which he introduced in the government of armies, and fo admirable the measures with refpect to guards and the establishment of pofts, that in all the courfe of his wars with the English, though oppofed by fome of the most enterprizing officers in the world, and by commanders of first-rate abilities, no camp of his was ever furprized by night or by day. Nor will this appear the lefs extraordinary when we recollect, that fome of the greatest generals and beft armies, even in Europe, have not at all times been exempt from fuch misfortunes.

On the day after the battle, Sir Eyre Coote having obtained intelligence, that Hyder was encamped upon fuch strong ground, as might encourage him to ftand another action, and feemed to be chofen for that purpose, he again advanced upon him. But, upon his coming up, he found the enemy retreating with great precipitation, although the approaches to his encampment were fo difficult that they might be difputed with much advantage. The purfuit was continued on the following day, until it was found that the enemy had quitted the road, and croffed the country towards Arnee. But however Hyder might be defeated, and obliged to fly, he still remained unconquere

and