Scriptures to be fairly proved-and this hypothesis is common to all the theories of which we have been speaking-we are bound by every law of reason and religion to hold fast to it, until it can be shown to have been abrogated, not by an ingenious array of probabilities and plausible analogies, but by direct conclusive evidence, as clear and strong as that which demonstrates the original inspiration of the Hebrew Bible. But how immeasurably far short of such evidence does that fall, which consists in showing that a Greek Old Testament was greatly needed, and that Christ and his Apostles used it as a storehouse of religious phraseology and a source of illustrative quotation. All this might have been done with an inspired and faultless version; but it might also have been done with a human and imperfect one; and therefore the bare fact that it was done can prove nothing, either one way or the other.

From the publication of this volume we should be happy to anticipate two benefits. The first is, the confirmed belief of the true doctrine, which it labours among others to demolish. The second is, a general return to the enlightened, rational, and diligent study of the Septuagint version, not apart from the Hebrew text and in a kind of opposition to it, which can only lead to such results as those developed in the book before us; but in such connection with it and subordination to it, as will furnish the best safeguards against both extremes, that of ignorant or prejudiced depreciation, as well as that of overweening admiration and idolatrous attachment.

ART. IV.-Remarks on the Princeton Review, Vol. XXII. No. IV. Art. VII. By EDWARDS A. PARK, Abbot Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Bibliotheca Sacra, January 1851. Art. IX.

WE are really sorry to find that Professor Park has been so much pained by our review of his Convention Sermon. His reply evinces a great deal of wounded feeling. The transparent veil which he has thrown over his acerbities, only renders them the more noticeable. A homely face may pass in a crowd without attracting much attention; but if its unfortunate owner attempt to conceal it by a gauze mask, every eye will be turned upon him. He had better put the mask in his pocket, and let his face pass for what it is. Some allowance must be made for our author. When a man delivers a discourse with great eclat, it must, we presume, be very painful to find that the

reading public does not confirm the verdict of the admiring audience. This is a very common occurrence. Instead, however, of being satisfied with the obvious solution of this familiar fact, the author, if a politician, is very apt to attribute such unfavourable judgment to party spirit, and if a preacher, to theological bigotry. We are the more disposed to be charitable in the present case, because, in our small way, we have had a somewhat similar experience. We wrote a review which we intended to make a sort of model of candour and courtesy. To avoid the danger of misrepresentation, we determined, instead of giving disconnected extracts of the discourse reviewed, to present a full analysis of it, as far as possible in the author's own words; and to guard against discourtesy, we resolved to abstain from all personal remarks, and to confine ourselves to the theory under discussion. We flattered ourselves that we had been tolerably successful as to both these points. Partial friends confirm us in our self-complacency. Even opponents, though dissenting from our opinion of the sermon, acknowledged the courtesy of the review. Judge, then, of our chagrin to learn that it is a tissue of misrepresentations, filled with arguments ad captandum vulgus and ad invidiam, unblushing in its misstatements,* violating not only the rules of logic, but the canons of fair criticism, and even the laws of morals, the offspring of theological bigotry and sectional jealousy, &c., &c. All this may be accounted for in various ways, except so far as the imputation of unworthy motives is concerned. That we are at a loss how to explain. Does not Professor Park know in his heart that it would be a matter of devout thanksgiving to all Old-school men to be assured that their doctrines were taught at Andover? Does he suppose there is a man among them capable, from motives conceivable or inconceivable, of wishing that error should be there inculcated? If he can cherish such suspicions, he is of all Christian men the most to be pitied.

Having failed so entirely to understand the Sermon, we shall not be presumptuous enough to pretend to understand the Reply. It is not our purpose, therefore, to review it in detail. We must let it pass and produce its legitimate effect, whatever that may be. We take a deep interest, however, in the main point at issue, which is nothing more nor less than this: Is that system of doctrine embodied in the creeds of the Lutheran and Reformed churches, in its substantial and distinctive features, true as to its form as well as to its substance? Are the propositions therein contained true as doctrines; or are they merely intense expressions, true, not in the mode in which they are there presented, but only in a vague, loose sense, which

* Professor Park says repeatedly his reviewer does not blush to say this, and does not blush to say that.

the intellect would express in a very different form? Are these creeds to be understood as they mean, and do they mean what they say; or is allowance to be made for their freedom, abatement of their force; are their terms to be considered antiquated, and their spirit only as still in force? For example, when these creeds speak of the imputation of Adam's sin, is that to be considered as only an intense form of expressing "the definite idea, that we are exposed to evil in consequence of his sin?"* This is surely a question of great importance.

From an early period in the history of the Church, there have been two great systems of doctrine in perpetual conflict. The one begins with God, the other with man. The one has for its object the vindication of the Divine supremacy and sovereignty in the salvation of men; the other has for its characteristic aim the assertion of the rights of human nature. It is specially solicitous that nothing should be held to be true, which cannot be philosophically reconciled with the liberty and ability of man. It starts with a theory of free agency and of the nature of sin, to which all the anthropological doctrines of the Bible must be made to conform. Its great principles are, first, that "all sin consists in sinning;" that there can be no moral character but in moral acts; secondly, that * Sermon, p. 535. In the following article, the references to Professor Park's sermon are to the edition of it contained in the Bib. Sacra for July 1850; and those to his remarks on the Princeton Review are the Bib. Sacra for January 1851. That the point at issue is what is stated in the text, will be made more apparent in the sequel; for the present it may be sufficient to refer to the following passages. In giving his reasons for the title of the sermon, Professor Park says: Secondly, The title was selected as a deferential and charitable one. The representations which are classified under the theology of feeling are often sanctioned as the true theology,' by the men who delight most in employing them. What the sermon would characterize as images, illustrations, and intense expressions, these men call doctrines." "We call one system of theology 'rational' or 'liberal,' simply because it is so called by its advocates; much more then may we designate by the phrase 'emotive theology,' those representations which are so tenaciously defended by multitudes as truth fitted both for the feeling and the judgment."-(Remarks, p. 140.)

66

"A creed, if true to its original end, should be in sober prose, should be understood as it means, and mean what it says, should be drawn out with a discriminating, balancing judgment, so as to need no allowance for its freedom, no abatement of its force, and should not be expressed in antiquated terms, lest men regard its spirit as likewise obsolete. It belongs to the province of the analyzing, comparing, reasoning intellect; and if it leave this province for the sake of intermingling the phrases of an impassioned heart, it confuses the soul, it awakens the fancy and the feelings to disturb the judg ment, it sets a believer at variance with himself by perplexing his reason with metaphors and his imagination with logic; it raises feuds in the church by crossing the temperaments of men, and taxing one party to demonstrate similes, another to feel inspired by abstractions. Hence the logomachy which has always characterized the defence of such creeds. The intellect, no less than the heart, being out of its element, wanders through dry places, seeking rest and finding none. Men are thus made uneasy with themselves, and therefore acrimonious against each other; the imaginative zealot does not understand the philosophical explanation, and the philosopher does not sympathize with the imaginative style of the symbol; and as they misunderstand each other, they feel their weakness, and to be weak is to be miserable,' and misery not only loves but also makes company, and thus they sink their controversy into a contention and their dispute into a quarrel; nor will they ever find peace until they confine their intellect to its rightful sphere and understand it according to what it says, and their feeling to its province and interpret its language according to what it means, rendering unto poetry the things that are designed for poetry, and unto prose what belongs to prose."-(Sermon, p. 554.)

the power to the contrary is essential to free agency; that a free agent may always act contrary to any influence, not destructive of his freedom, which can be brought to bear upon him; thirdly, that ability limits responsibility; that men are responsible only so far as they have adequate power to do what is required of them, or that they are responsible for nothing not under the control of the will.* From these princi

*We give from authoritative symbols and writings a few extracts confirming the account given in the text of the two systems referred to.

Our Relation to Adam.

Apology of the Confession of the Remonstrants, p. 84-" Fatentur Remonstrantes, peccatum Adami a Deo imputatum dici posse posteris ejus, quatenus Deus posteros Adami eidem malo, cui Adamus per peccatum obnoxium se reddidit, obnoxios nasci voluit, sive quatenus Deus malum, quod in poenam Adamo inflictum fuerat, in posteros ejus dimanare et transire permisit. At nihil cogit eos dicere, peccatum Adami posteris ejus sic fuisse a Deo imputatum, quasi Deus posteros Adami revera censuisset ejusdem cum Adamo peccati et culpæ, quam Adamus commiserat, reos."

Limborch, Theol. Christ. 3. 3. 8-" Quod itaque imputationem peccati Adami attinet, qua statuitur, Deum primum Adami et Evae peccatum omnibus ipsorum posteris ita imputasse, ut omnium peccatum sit, omnesque in Adamo peccaverint, et propterea mortis ac condemnationis æternæ rei facti sint, eam impugnamus."

Ibid., 3. 3. 19—“ Dicimus, Deum innoxios posteros non punire ob peccatum Adami." Original Sin.

Apol. Conf. Remonstr. p. 84-" Peccatum originale nec habent (Remonstrantes) pro peccato proprie dicto, quod posteros Adami odio Dei dignos faciat, nec pro malo, quod per modum proprie dictæ poenæ ab Adamo in posteros dimanet, sed pro malo, infirmitate, vitio aut quocunque tandem alio nomine vocetur. Peccatum au

tem originis non esse malum culpæ proprie dictæ, quod vocant, ratio manifesta arguit; malum culpæ non est, quia nasci plane involuntarium est, ergo et nasci cum hac aut illa labe, infirmitate, vitio vel malo. . . . . . Multo minus itaque fieri potest, ut sit culpa simul et poena."

Limborch, Theol. Christ. 3. 4. 4-" Nullam scriptura in infantibus corruptionem esse docet, quae vere ac proprie sit peccatum. 4. 5. Absurdum est statuere, Deum homines punivisse corruptione tali, quæ vere ac proprie dictum est peccatum, et ex qua omnia actualia peccata, tanquam ex fonte, necessario scaturiunt, et deinde propter illam corruptionem homines denuo punire poena inferni."

Ibid., 4. 7-" Nullum peccatum poena dignum est involuntarium, quia nihil magis debet esse voluntarium, quam quod hominem poenæ et quidem gravissimæ, aeternæ nempe, et summorum cruciatuum, reum facit. Atqui corruptio originaria est involuntaria."

Ibid., 3. 4. 1-" Inclinatio illa (ad peccandum) proprie dictum peccatum non est aut peccati habitus ab Adamo in ipsos propagatus, sed naturalis tantum inclinatio habendi id quod carni gratum est."

Pelagius apud August. de Peccato Orig. 14-"Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur: capaces enim utriusque rei: non pleni nascimur: et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur; atque ante actionem propriæ voluntatis, id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit." Epist. ad Demetr. c. 3-Volens namque Deus rationabilem voluntarii boni munere et liberi arbitrii potestate donare, utriusque partis possibilitatem homini inserendo proprium ejus fecit, esse quod velit: ut boni ac mali capax, naturaliter utrumque posset, et ad alterutrum voluntatem deflecteret." A. def. 2-" Iterum quærendum est, peccatum voluntatis an necessitatis est ? Si necessitatis est, peccatum non est; si voluntatis, vitari potest. 5. Iterum quærendum est, utrumne debeat homo sine peccato esse. Procul dubio debet. Si debet, potest: si non potest, ergo non debet. Et si non debet homo esse sine peccato, debet ergo cum peccato esse; et jam peccatum non erit, si illud deberi constiterit."

The maxim, Si debet, potest, has become immortal. It is the groundwork of the whole system to which it belongs, and is constantly repeated by its advocates, whether philosophers or theologians. In reference to Kant's Ich Soll, also kann ich, Müller pithily answers: Ich Sollte freilich können, aber Ich kann nicht.”—(Müller's Lehre von der Sünde. Band. ii. s. 116.) "The

Dr Beecher, in the Spirit of the Pilgrims, 1828, held the following language: Reformers with one accord taught that the sin of Adam was imputed to all his posterity, and that a corrupt nature descends from him to every one of his posterity, in consequence of which infants are unholy, unfit for heaven, and justly exposed to fu

ples it follows that there can be no such thing as original righteousness," that is, a righteousness in which man was originally created. Whatever moral character he had, must have been the result of his own acts. Neither can there be any "original sin," i. e. an innate, hereditary, sinful corruption of nature. Whatever effect Adam's apostasy may have had upon himself or on his posterity; whether it left his nature uninjured, and merely changed unfavourably his circumstances; or whether our nature was thereby deteriorated so as to be prone to sin, it was not itself rendered morally corrupt or sinful. Adam was in no such sense the head and representative of his race, that his sin is the ground of our condemnation. Every man, according to this system, stands his probation for himself, and is not under condemnation until he voluntarily trangresses some known law, for it is only such transgression that falls under the category of sin. In regeneration, according to the principles above stated, there cannot be the production of a new moral nature, principle, or disposition, as the source of holy exercises. That change must consist in some act of the soul, something which lies within the sphere of his own power, some act of the will, or some change subject to the will. The influence by which regeneration is effected must be something which ture punishment."-" Our puritan fathers adhered to the doctrine of original sin as consisting in the imputation of Adam's sin, and in a hereditary depravity; and this continued to be the received doctrine of the churches of New England, until after the time of Edwards. He adopted the views of the Reformers on the subject of original sin and a depraved nature transmitted by descent. But after him this mode of stating the subject was gradually changed, until long since, the prevailing doctrine in New England (?) has been, that men are not guilty of Adam's sin, and that depravity is not of the substance of the soul, nor an inherent physical quality, but is wholly voluntary, and consists in a transgression of the law in such circumstances as constitute responsibility and desert of punishment."

Work of Christ and Justification.

The objections of Socinians against the Church doctrine of satisfaction, says Bretschneider, led Grotius to refer the satisfaction of Christ to the justitia Dei rectoria. According to this theory he says, "The satisfaction consists in this, that Christ properly endured no punishment, but, innocent in himself, voluntarily submitted to suffering and death, in order that men might not be punished, and that God was satisfied with this atonement made to his law or government."-(Systemat. Entwickelung, p. 628.)

Limborch, Apol. thes. 3. 21-"Satisfactio Christi dicitur, qua pro nobis poenas omnes luit peccatis nostris debitas, easque perferendo et exhauriendo, divinæ justitiæ satisfecit. Verum illa sententia nullum habet in Scriptura fundamentum. Mors Christi vocatur sacrificium pro peccato; atqui sacrificia non sunt solutiones debitorum, neque plenariae pro peccatis satisfactiones; sed, illis peractis, conceditur gratuita peccati remissio."

Curcelleus, Rel. Christ. Instit. 5. 19. 16-" Non ergo, ut putant, satisfecit Christus patiendo omnes poenas, quas peccatis nostris merueramus: nam primo istud ad sacrificii rationem non pertinet; sacrificia enim non sunt solutiones debitorum: secundo Christus non est passus mortem æternam, quae erat poena peccato debita, nam paucis tantum horis in cruce pependit et tertia die resurrexit. Imo etiamsi mortem æternam pertulisset, non videtur satisfacere potuisse pro omnibus totius mundi peccatis. Quarto ista sententia non potest consistere cum illa remissione gratuita omnium peccatorum, quam Deum nobis in Christo ex immensa sua misericordia concedere, sacræ literæ passim docent."

Ibid., 7. 9. 6-"Nullibi docet scriptura, justitiam Christi nobis imputari. Et id absurdum est. Nemo enim in se injustus, aliena justitia potest esse formaliter justus; non magis, quam aliena albedine Aethiops esse albus."