 When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a...  Cobbett's Weekly Political Register - Seite 6231810Vollansicht - Über dieses Buch
 | John Dickinson - 1801 - 650 Seiten
...one man need not be afraid of another. When the power of making laws and the power of executing them, are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them... | |
 | William Hazlitt - 1809 - 608 Seiten
...subject. It was so remarkably to the point, that he would quote it. That great man observes, " When the legislative and executive powers are united in...of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them... | |
 | William Cobbett - 1810 - 538 Seiten
...government be so constituted " as that one man be not afraid of another. " But." says Montesquieu, " when the " legislative and executive powers are '• united...of magistrates, there can be ' no Liberty ; because apprehensions ' may arise, lest the same monarch or ' senate should enact tyrannical laws, to ' execute... | |
 | Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay - 1817 - 570 Seiten
...reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim, are & further demonstration of his meaning. " When the legislative " and executive powers are united in the same person or body,'' says he, " there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may " arise lest the same monarch... | |
 | James Madison, John Jay - 1818 - 882 Seiten
...reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim, are a further demonstration of his meaning. " When " the legislative and executive powers are united in the " same person or body," says he, " there can be no " liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same tl monarch... | |
 | Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu - 1823 - 810 Seiten
...liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man needs not be afraid oi another. When the legislative and executive powers are united in...person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can he no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical... | |
 | United States. Continental Congress - 1823 - 644 Seiten
...one man need not be afraid of another. When the power of making laws and the power of executing them, are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate, should enact tyrannical laws, to execute... | |
 | 1826 - 436 Seiten
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 | William Paley - 1835 - 324 Seiten
...principle generally acceded to 1 And the following reasons for it are given by Montesquieu : " When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should... | |
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