and their loss would be a blow at the liberty of citizenship, and tend to the ultimate destruction of republican institutions. Nevertheless, by reason of the impulsive utterances of class leaders, and the criticism of others who act without serious consideration, this decision has not only been misunderstood but misconstrued to be a blow at the wage earners of our commonwealth. Already murmurs of discontent are heard, threats are made against the judges who thus learnedly expounded and fearlessly protected constitutional rights, and this discontent and these threats have crystallized into political activity.

To the thoughtful lawyer, as well as to the conservative and patriotic layman, these facts are evidence of a serious and threatening condition. That condition calls for a remedy. The question for solution is what shall the remedy be? How shall the dignity, integrity and independence of the bench be preserved?

In my judgment, the answer to this question is involved in a determination of the method of selecting the judges, their term and tenure of office. This vital question is commanding the espe cial attention of the bar and receiving the earnest consideration of many thoughtful laymen. The demand for a more perfect system reflects a growing sentiment among those who esteem an honorable and effective public service as more desirable than party ascendancy or distribution of offices. The thought is to adopt some system by which the judicial office can be placed beyond the control or influence of political organizations, beyond the behests of party or class leaders, and to establish it more firmly in the respect, confidence and esteem of the public. The Committee on Legal Reform will offer some suggestions or recommendations upon this subject, involving a separate election for members of the judiciary. This report will receive, as it should, your earnest consideration, and it would, perhaps, not be unwise. for the Association at this meeting, or at a special meeting to be held in the near future, to take some definite action upon this subject. Certainly, none of greater importance to the state at large and to the bar as a class, could command your attention.

It may not now be feasible to do more than secure an election of judges uninfluenced by the excitement, prejudice and hos tility of party contests, but such a measure, though a distinct improvement upon the existing system, would not accomplish all that seems to be demanded. History, observation, experience and reflection, seem conclusively to demonstrate the wisdom of an appointive judiciary with a tenure of good behavior.

I am not unmindful of the fact that upon the very threshold this suggestion will be met by the contention that such a system is monarchical in its tendencies, undemocratic in principle and at war with our theory of liberty and government. This view is entertained and will be advanced by some who sincerely adopt it. To this limited number will be added many others, actuated by the hope of attracting public favor, who, with an affectation of disinterested love for republican institutions, will proclaim to their constituents that each department of the government should rest exclusively upon the approval of the people.

From this last suggested contention there can be no dissent where the office to be chosen sustains even to a very limited extent a representative character. Legislators in theory, and in many instances in practice, are governed in the performance of their duties by a desire for the general welfare. Nevertheless, they are the representatives of communities, classes, interests and opinions, the latter subject to frequent and sometimes radical changes. Such officers, to be truly representative, must depend upon and respond to the will of the people as it finds expression in party platforms ratified and approved by the vote of the majority at the polls.

This view is also applicable in a measure to the chief executive of a state. While many of his duties are purely executive or ministerial, others are representative, and it is in harmony with the spirit of our government that this officer, like legislators, should at comparatively brief intervals be required to render an account to the people, whose servant he is, or should be. The judicial functions are distinctly and radically different from the duties devolved upon the officers referred to. The bench is in no sense representative of the people, parties, factions or interests. The administration of justice, the interpretation of the laws, their proper application and enforcement, does not change with a change of administration, is not molded by temporary political inclinations, does not yield to the demands of classes, does not depend upon majorities, is not directed by party policies, nor influenced by public opinion or local interests. All these party policies, class demands, majority views, public opinions, local interests, even the warmth of friendship and the sacred ties of kindred, the judiciary must disregard.

A proper apprehension of our system of government recog nizes in the judiciary an institution created and maintained for the security of the people as distinguished from the other de

partments of government, which are peculiarly representative of that liberty which is the foundation of the principles, theories and objects of a republic. Our system of government, intensely republican, permits and demands the utmost freedom of popular will. It also provides the most ample security for life, liberty and happiness, and for exact justice to all. This provi sion for, or element of, security as distinguished from the broadest liberty of action, is found in our judiciary. Our government is not less republican, does not contain less of liberty, when that security which is equally essential, is strengthened by the election of a judiciary, learned and impartial, free from the feelings and prejudices which at times warp and blind the judgment of the executive, the legislature and the people themselves.

It will doubtless also be objected to so radical a change in our system that to question the capacity of the people to select their judicial officers is equivalent to the expression of a distrust of republican institutions. Such a contention is wholly untena. ble. It is a fact, recognized by the legal profession, and by many who are not within the ranks of the profession, that no one is thoroughly qualified for a position upon the bench except he be learned in the law, has a large experience, and is possessed of a well-balanced judgment, that judicial frame of mind which enables him promptly and properly to apply the learning which he possesses.

It is no discredit to the electors in general to say that as a rule they have no opportunity which enables them to form a correct opinion as to what member of the legal profession has that extent and character of learning, and that peculiar mental inclination which qualifies him for the bench. Those best qual ified for such positions rarely possess the other qualities which command public attention and draw to them that support now necessary to secure an election to judicial position.

It is those endowed with showy talents or glittering accomplishments who create upon the average citizen the most agreeable impression, and through such impressions secure public favor and party popularity. It is no discredit to this class, having within its ranks many estimable members of the bar, to say it is not infrequently true that they possess few qualities necessary for the successful and satisfactory administration of the judicial office.

The science of law is a specialty involving profound, abstruse and uncommon learning. For this reason, if for no other,

the selection at popular elections for political reasons, of those who are to administer the laws, to make a practical application of this science, is no more justified than would be a selection in the same manner and for the same reasons, of the president or a professor of mathematics, or an instructor in some depart ment of science or philosophy, for our State University.

The remark, not infrequently heard, that judges holding office by appointment, are often arbitrary and tyrannical, requires but a passing notice. Such conduct, if there really be ground for the charge, reflects the man, but does not condemn the method of selection. Personally, I have seen and heard of more arbitrary acts committed, more judicial tyranny practiced by elected judges than by those holding by appointment. If a man is not gentle and thoughtful by nature, if he is without the instincts and sentiments of a gentleman, his character will not be transformed by vesting him with the ermine, whether he secures position through the gift of the electors or through the power of appointment.

Examples of this character are, fortunately, too rare either from the appointive or the elective bench, to justify their consideration in a question of so much gravity.

It does not seem difficult, in theory at least, however it may be in practice, to meet objections which it must be expected will be interposed to a change in the system of selecting our judicial officers. The members of the bar, and all good citizens, are united in a desire to secure the best and ablest lawyers which it is possible to secure, for the bench. If a system can be presented and adopted, which fairly promises that result, which fairly promises to be an improvement upon the existing system, we should not be without hope of securing its adoption, even though there be difficulties to encounter and to overcome.

In Colorado we have, in the main, been fortunate in the selection of our judges. They have been lawyers who, in the performance of their duties, have added dignity and lustre to the judicial office, who have attained distinction and secured for themselves the affectionate regard of the people. But this has not always been true. Perfection must not be expected. It can not be attained either in men or systems. But the existing system of selecting our judicial officers is not only imperfect and unsatisfactory, but growing in disfavor, as social, industrial and political conditions change and develop.

Elections are notoriously unfavorable to the selection of men of the greatest ability and largest attainments to fill the judicial office. Attention has been called to the fact that electors, as a rule, have but poor opportunities to judge of the pe culiar and necessary qualifications of one seeking judicial preferment, that those who have the requisite qualities most largely developed attract the least of public attention, while those of attractive, but often superficial, attainments are too apt to most impress the public and secure that partisan and popular support which ensures their elevation to the position for which they are, too often, but poorly equipped.

Not infrequently it is the active, urgent, persistent, political worker, who, as a reward for his services, secures judicial preferment. His selection, while nominally the act of a party and of the people at the polls, is demonstrated by actual party workings to be the result of caucus manipulation. The result is a judiciary named by a caucus, whose leaders are under no responsibility to the public, who are answerable to no higher power, whose respect for public opinion is not always the highest, and whose motives can not always be said to be to secure superlative fitness in their nominees for judicial functions.

The partisan activity involved in elections, the accompanying criticism, calumny and abuse, the dependence upon partisan leaders, the subsequent tendency to recognize valuable services rendered, are not elements favorable to the selection of men of courage, fidelity, modesty and learning, for the discharge of the important duties of the judicial department.

The bench, under the existing system in this state, has produced many honorable and commendable examples of unquestioned independence of partisan pressure. But judges and lawyers are not free from the weaknesses of mankind in general, nor exempt from the influences, sometimes subtle and unappreciated, which may imperceptibly control individual and judicial actions. A sense of obligation for political favors bestowed, and a possible necessity for the recurrence of conditions calling for a further exercise of such favors, renders it less easy for a judge to be blindly impartial. Though the judge, elevated to his posi tion through partisan influences, possesses learning, ability and impartiality, the impression always prevails to a greater or less extent, and often develops into an actual belief, that the essential elements of independence and unbiased judgment are not always present.