RANTS- continued. northwest of the Ohio, and to annex conditions to the extension of the time. Jackson v. Clark, 1 Pet. 628.

8. Although an entry must have such certainty that a subsequent locator may locate the adjacent residuum, a description that will identify the land is sufficient for the validity of a grant. McArthur v. Browder, 4 Wheat. 488.

9. To support an entry, the person claiming thereunder must prove that the objects called for are so described or are so notorious that others, by using reasonable diligence, could readily find them. Watts v. Lindsey, 7 Wheat. 158.

10. Under the act of 1794, a patent for a part of the land embraced in the warrant might be issued to an assignee. Bouldin v. Massie, 7 Wheat. 122.

that part of the land was withdrawn, it was held that the warrant was not thereby so satisfied or merged that a new and effective entry of other land might not afterwards be made thereon. Niswanger v. Saunders, 1 Wal. 424.

20. The act of 1807 was intended to cure defects in entries and surveys, which had occurred without fraud, in the pursuit of a valid title, but not to give validity to titles under Virginia land-warrants, not within the reservation made by that state in the act of cession of lands northwest of the Ohio. Lindsey v. Miller, 6 Pet. 666.

21. A warrant issued under a resolution of the general assembly of Virginia, before the act of cession, for services in the continental line, is within that act, although not purporting to be issued under such resolution, and although the

12. Although the act of March 3, 1803, § 8 (2 Sts. 237), required one seeking a patent under a lost Virginia military warrant to produce a certified duplicate thereof, yet, as that was to protect the government from fraud, a third person cannot take advantage of the non-production of such duplicate, there having been a certified copy on file in the land office. Ib.

13. Reference to the certificate in a warrant for military land does not amount to notice of an irregularity on the face of the certificate; and if the purchaser of such a warrant took it subject to any infirmity on account thereof, his title would become good on issue of patent. Hoofnagle v. Anderson, 7 Wheat. 212.

14. The possession of the warrant, and recognition by the surveyor of the right of the holder to act for the owner, are equivalent to a letter of attorney, and empower him to make, alter, or withdraw the entry, and to direct the survey; but such authority is terminated by the death of the owner. Galt v. Galloway, 4 Pet. 332.

15. Under the laws applicable to the Virginia military lands in Ohio, a warrant may be withdrawn after a survey has been made and recorded.

Ib.

16. An entry made in the name of a deceased person is void. McDonald v. Smalley, 6 Pet. 261. And see Galt v. Galloway, 4 Pet. 332.

17. An amended entry retains its original character so far as it is not altered; so far as it is altered, it is a new entry. McArthur v. Browder, 4 Wheat. 488.

18. The owner of a survey, made in conformity with his entry, and not interfering with any other person's right, may abandon his survey, after it has been recorded. Taylor v. Myers, 7 Wheat. 23.

19. Where a Virginia military land warrant calling for no specific tract was carried into survey and patent of land a part of which had been previously granted to another, and the entry for

the law in force when the resolution was passed. Wallace v. Parker, 6 Pet. 680.

22. The act of 1807 extends to every case that comes within the reservation by Virginia in her act of cession. Ib.

23. Under that act a defective survey of such land protected it from being patented under a subsequent warrant and survey by one claiming under the United States. Jackson v. Clark, 1 Pet. 628.

24. A location and survey within the reservation for Virginia military warrants, made in contravention of the proviso to § 2, act of March 1, 1823 (3 Sts. 772), held void, although the conflicting entry was made in 1822 in the name of a person then deceased. McArthur v. Dun, 7 How. 262.

25. Under the act of March 23, 1804, § 3 (2 Sts. 274), providing for the return within five years of surveys of land in the Virginia military land district, which provision was in effect repeated in subsequent statutes down to and including the act of February 20, 1850 (9 Sts. 421), a location and a survey of lands in that district under a Virginia military land warrant did not give even an equitable title thereto. Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 550.

26. The act of March 3, 1855 (10 Sts. 701), allowing two years within which to make return of surveys of entries made before January 1, 1852, had no application in case of surveys made before that date. Ib.

27. Nor had the act of May 27, 1880, § 3 (21 Sts. 142), adding a year to the time limited by the act of 1855. Ib.

28. Section 2 of that act, relating to surveys returned to the "land office," meant the general land office, not the office of the district. Ib.

29. The act of March 5, 1816 (3 Sts. 256), granting bounties of land to American citizens residing in Canada, has no necessary connection with the bounty land acts of 1811 and 1812, and warrants delivered thereunder to be located by

30. A deed which professed to convey the land, and also to be a power of attorney to locate the warrant in the name of the grantee, was valid, and conveyed the land really entered and located, the location of the warraut being sufficient for identification. Ib.

31. A patent afterwards issued to the original beneficiary inured, through relation to the date of the entry, to his grantee. Ib.

32. It also inured to his benefit on the principle of estoppel, the deed having set forth seisin of the particular estate which it purported to convey, and the adverse claimants being the heirs of the grantor. lb.

33. The act of May 22, 1826 (4 Sts. 190), providing for the surrender of patents issued under the bounty act of May 6, 1812 (2 Sts. 728), where the land proved to be unfit for cultivation, and for the selection of other land in lieu thereof, is not to be construed in connection with the latter act so as to preclude an assignment of the right to land after the surrender of the original patent and before the issue of the new one. Maxwell v. Moore, 22 How. 185.

34. Under the act of August 31, 1852 (10 Sts. 143), authorizing the issue of land scrip to the holders of outstanding military land warrants, the secretary of the interior is to determine who are entitled to its benefit; and the courts cannot interfere by injunction with the discharge of that duty on the ground that he is about to issue to one person scrip to which another has a better right. Walker v. Smith, 21 How. 579.

Location gives Vested Interest.

See LANDS OF UNITED STATES-CON-
FLICTING CLAIMS, 53.

the equities on which the patents were founded. Barnard v. Ashley, 18 How. 43.

4. A patent reserving the rights of settlers in Peoria under the acts of May 15, 1820, and March 3, 1823 (3 Sts. 605, 786), held to confer no title as against such a settler, although claiming under a patent of subsequent date. Ballance v. Forsyth, 13 How. 18.

5. Where a claim was favorably reported under those acts, and a survey made in 1840 and a patent issued in 1845, the title was held to relate back to 1823, and to be superior to a patent on an ordinary entry, issued in 1838, which contained a reservation of the rights of all persons claiming under the act of 1823. Bryan v. Forsyth, 19 How. 334. And see Gregg v. Tesson, 1 Black, 150; Dredge v. Forsyth, 2 Black, 563; Kellogg v. Forsyth, 2 Black, 571.

6. But otherwise where the prior patent contained no such reservation, and was issued to a pre-emptor who had been several years in possession. Hall v. Papin, 24 How. 132.

7. A donation certificate, under the act of March 3, 1803 (2 Sts. 229), gives a title superior to that acquired by a purchase at a public land sale. Ross v. Barland, 1 Pet. 655.

8. Such certificate need be in no particular form: it is sufficient if it show the occupancy required by the act, and the land granted. Ib.

9. A confirmation of a Spanish concession in 1836 gave a title good as against a patent issued on a location of a New Madrid certificate made in 1818. Easton v. Salisbury, 21 How. 426.

10. Where a patent is issued on a claim without any certain limits, reserving "all valid adverse rights," a second patent to another claimant for a portion of the same land is valid and operates to convey the title. Maguire v. Tyler, 8 Wal.

650.

11. Under the act of May 24, 1828, § 2 (4 Sts. 298), a decree of the supreme court made in 1836, on a petition filed in 1824, confirming an inchoate Spanish title, cannot, by relation to the time of the filing of the petition, devest a title to land not reserved from sale, derived from the United States under an entry made in 1834. McCabe v. Worthington, 16 How. 86.

12. A controversy between claimants of land in California under conflicting patents of the United States, issued on confirmation of grants made by the Mexican government, each of which reserves the rights of other parties, must be settled by determining which gives the better right; and the character of the original concessions must be inquired into. Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wal. 255.

13. A patent issued on a grant of land capable of specific identification confers a better right than one based on a floating grant, although the floating grant was first surveyed and patented. Ib. 14. A patent issued on October 12, 1812, founded on an entry made in 1810, on a Virginia

LANDS OF UNITED STATES

CLAIMS continued. military land warrant for land between Ludlow's and Roberts's lines, held valid as against a claim under a sale made by the United States in 1813. Reynolds v. McArthur, 2 Pet. 417.

15. Where the contest in ejectment is between conflicting confirmations of Spanish grants, the elder confirmation and survey must prevail, and the jury cannot consider whether the survey and patent correspond with the confirmation. Willot v. Sandford, 19 How. 79.

16. Where the commissioner decides in favor of one pre-emptor and the secretary, on the same facts, but a different construction of the law, decides in favor of another, and a patent issues to each, a court of equity, as in other cases where title has passed from the government, may inquire and determine whether one party does not hold in trust for the other. [CLIFFORD, J., dissenting. Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wal. 72.

17. And so, although the decision in favor of the claimant, who on a proper construction of the law has the better right, is not followed by patent. Samson v. Smiley, 13 Wal. 91.

18. Where congress by resolution granted land subject to the president's approval, the title of the grantee became absolute on the issue of the president's order of approval, had relation back to the date of the passage of the resolution, and so took precedence of an intermediate patent to another. Republican River Bridge Co. v. Kansas Pacific Railway Co, 92 U. S. 315.

CONFLICTING

state's grantee. Natoma Water & Mining Co. v. Bugbey, 96 U. S. 165.

22.

Claims to Titles both of which are equitable.] A certificate under the act of February 17, 1815 (3 Sts. 211), for the relief of sufferers by earthquake in New Madrid County, Missouri, was located on land covered by an inchoate Spanish title, before the bar to that title created by neglect to file the evidence thereof required by the act of March 3, 1807 (2 Sts. 440), and previous acts was removed by the act of May 26, 1824 (4 Sts. 52); and a patent pursuant thereto was issued after the bar was removed. It was held that congress in removing that bar might impose conditions giving a preference to titles acquired while it was in existence; and that the title acquired under such location and patent was protected as against such inchoate title by the act removing that bar, and the act of May 24, 1828 (4 Sts. 298), in addition thereto. Barry v. Gamble, 3 How. 32.

23. An owner of an inchoate Spanish title never had any standing in court unless conferred on him by the political power; and as between two such claimants that power could determine which should have title. Les Bois v. Bramell, 4 How. 449.

24. A location under a New Madrid certificate cannot prevail against a subsequently confirmed Spanish concession, notice whereof had been given pursuant to the act of March 3, 1811, § 10 (2 Sts. 665). Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How. 317; Mills v. Stoddard, 8 How. 345.

169.

joining proprietor who had a right to enter and purchase the land under the act of June 15, 1832 (4 Sts. 534), and did so enter and purchase. Jourdan v. Barrett, 4 How. 169.

26. A selection of lands under a grant by congress to a territory, held not to impair the right of a pre-emptor who had proved his right before the grant was made. Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 How. 314. 27. Where two grants for specific quantities of

21. Under the act of March 3, 1853 (10 Sts. 244), providing for the survey, pre-emption, and sale of lands in California, if a settler on sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections thereby granted to the state for school purposes fail to make good his claim within three months after the return of the plats of the surveys to the local land-office, the title to the land embraced by his settlement vests in the state as of the date of the completion of the surveys. One, therefore, claiming under the United States, under an act passed after the state thus acquired title, has no title as against the

as within general boundaries including a much larger quantity, priority of location by occupa tion and settlement under a provisional license was held to give the second grantee an equity superior to that of the prior grantee in the focation by survey. United States v. Armijo, 5

Wal. 444.

28. Where the same land was confirmed to two different persons, but neither of them had received a patent, the state court, in an action for possession, properly inquired into the equities prior to confirmation. Berthold v. McDonald, 22 How. 334.

29. And, it having held that the prior confirmation was void as against the second, because a deed on which it was founded was forged and fraudulent, and never recognized by the owner of the right, the supreme court affirmed the judgment. Ib.

30. At the time of the acquisition of California by the United States, the title of the pueblo lands in San Francisco was unperfected and was such as the United States might have refused to recognize. Until 1864, congress took no action concerning these lands. Until 1863, there was no statute of limitations in California affecting titles derived from the Spanish or Mexican government before their final consummation by the United States. One, therefore, who entered upon these lands, without title, in 1852, could not, under a claim of adverse possession, hold them as against one claiming under an alcalde grant. Palmer v. Low, 98 U. S. 1.

31. Claims, one legal and one equitable.] A mere right to enter land for military services, no particular land having been appropriated, is not such a prior equity as will enable its holder to set aside a patent regular on its face. Hoof nagle v. Anderson, 7 Wheat. 212.

he will hold as trustee for his principal. Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558.

39. A territorial statute abolishing resulting trusts in certain cases cannot affect the liability of one who has purchased public lands for another and with the other's money, but has taken the patent certificate in his own name, to account in a federal court as the trustee of his principal. [CATRON, NELSON, GRIER, and CAMPBELL, JJ., dissenting.] Ib.

40. A bona fide purchaser from the patentee has a title good in equity as against a complainant who made the entry, and was therefore equitably entitled to the patent. Leav. Polk County Copper Co., 21 How. 493.

41. Where a grant has been confirmed and the land surveyed, and a patent issued to the grantee, the correctness of the survey cannot be disputed by defendants in ejectment who are in possession claiming under a title not perfected by survey and patent. Greer v. Mezes, 24 How. 268.

33. A patent which, by reason of a void survey and division, appropriates to one pre-emption claim what belongs to another is void as as against the owner of the latter claim. [TANEY, C. J., and CATRON and DANIEL, JJ., dissenting.] Brown v. Clements, 3 How. 650.

34. An equitable Spanish title, not confirmed by the United States, cannot prevail against a legal title acquired from the United States. United States v. King, 3 How. 773.

35. The owner of an inchoate Spanish title to land in Missouri who had not presented his claim to the commissioners nor to the district court for confirmation before May 29, 1829, was barred by subsequent confirmation by congress of another claim. Les Bois v. Bramell, 4 How. 449

36. An incomplete Spanish title confirmed by the act of July 4, 1836 (5 Sts. 126), cannot prevail against a patent issued before the passage of that act. Menard v. Massey, 8 How. 293.

37. A title by pre-emption, under the act of May 29, 1830 (4 Sts. 420), held superior to titles under floating rights under the acts of July 14, 1832, and June 19, 1834 (4 Sts. 603, 678), and patents for the latter set aside in equity. Cunningham v. Ashley, 14 How. 377. 38. If one enter public land as the agent of another, and pay for it with the other's money, but take the patent certificate in his own name,

and possession taken, will not estop the other party from setting up title under a subsequent bona fide settlement and entry. Ib.

44. The equity of a pre-emption claimant who has paid the purchase-money, received the usual certificate, and taken and maintained possession, cannot be defeated by a subsequent entry supported by a patent. Hughes v. United States, 4 Wal. 232.

45. Confirmation of a claim under the act of March 3, 1851 (9 Sts. 634), does not affect the equities of third persons, but merely confers a legal title on the confirmee. Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wal. 326.

46. If relief be sought on the ground that a patent was issued to one person, when the right was in another, the decree should not annul the patent, but provide for a transfer of title to the person equitably entitled to it. Silver v. Ladil, 7 Wal. 219.

47. A decree under the act of March 3, 1851 (9 Sts. 633), to ascertain and settle private claims to land in California, confirming a claim under a Mexican grant even when followed by a patent, did not conclude the equitable rights of third persons, but left them to assert their rights by suit in equity against the patentee and persons claiming under him with notice; the intent of that act being only the separation of the land of individuals from the public domain. Meader v. Norton, 11 Wal. 442.